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Central Eurasia

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Daily Report

Central Eurasia

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Fedorov Does Not Rule Out 'Special Statute for Chechnya'

BR1901142195 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 19 Jan 95
p 6

[Report on interview with Chuvash President Nikolay Fedorov by "P.B." in Moscow; date not given: "Russian Regional Policy Dominated by Primitivism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow—"Mental primitivism dominates Russian leaders' regional policy," which is made in "Moscow's drawing-rooms" in "complete ignorance" of the situation in the Federation's territories. This was the opinion of Nikolay Fedorov, one of the Russian regional leaders who have once again alarmed the Kremlin by their latest attempts to upstage it in the heat of the Chechen crisis. Fedorov, 37, is the president-elect of the Republic of Chuvashia, an 18,300 square-km territory in the Volga basin, with 1.3 million inhabitants, most of whom are Chuvash, a Turkic people of orthodox faith.

Fedorov was Russia's first justice minister when this country broke out of the USSR shell, and President Yeltsin confirmed his post on four occasions. However, the young official distanced himself from the central administration in March 1993, at the time of Yeltsin's first serious attempt to suppress his political opponents in Russia's Supreme Soviet. The reason for his departure was "the contempt shown for the rule of law in politics."

"When making decisions, the federal state must take account of the Federation's citizens in the 89 territories which, with different statuses, make up Russia. This is the normal procedure in any state professing to be civilized," Fedorov remarked.

Fedorov said that his starting point was "a differentiated, rather than a unified approach to the situation of the Federation's citizens, in accordance with the Russian Constitution." "I do not rule out drafting a special statute for Chechnya." According to Fedorov, one example of a state capable of integrating various different organizational forms and statutes was the pre-1917 Russian empire.

On 5 January last, the president of Chuvashia organized a regional leaders' meeting in Cheboksary, the capital of his republic. The meeting was motivated by "discontent" and considered by the Kremlin almost as a conspiracy. Particularly disapproved of was the presence, in Cheboksary, of former Security Council Secretary Yuri Skokov who had carried out numerous tasks on Yeltsin's behalf in the Russian regions when the present Russian president was still vying for power with Gorbachev in 1991.

On several occasions the Russian republics' leaders have attempted to reconvene the Council of the Heads of the Republics, a body which played a major role in 1993, when the Kremlin needed allies in its struggle against Russia's Supreme Soviet. The Council of the Heads of the Republics solemnly met for the first time in Karelia, in August 1993. Subsequently, the regional leaders

ceased to use the body's name, and its last session was held on 4 October 1993, with artillery shelling parliament as a backdrop.

Displaying a veritable allergy to any regional body, the Kremlin has ignored all requests to reconvene the Council, preferring to hold conversations behind closed doors with individual leaders. Fedorov says he wrote a letter to Yeltsin, and another letter to Chief of Presidents Staff Sergey Filatov, proposing to convene the Council to act as a mediator in the Chechen conflict.

According to Fedorov, Yeltsin needs to assert his authority in extreme situations. "He needs barricades, tanks, and the Republic of Chechnya. Maybe he does not realize this, but there are people in his entourage who have understood this very well, and use it." "The West," he pointed out, "has failed to understand that its support will turn into a boomerang," that "the West's hero in the fight against the dragon has himself become a dragon, and tendencies to set up a police state are already apparent today."

Salmin: 'Russian Democrats Have Succumbed'

BR1901145595 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 19 Jan 95
p 11

[Article by Russian Presidential Council Member Aleksey Salmin: "Democracy Without Democrats?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At least the military action in Chechnya has been crowned with indisputable success, but the Russian democrats, or rather, the Moscow democrats, those who were the political underpinning of the system which was set up as something amorphous in 1991 and secured a clearer albeit more limited social base in October 1993, have succumbed as a collective casualty.

The defeat of the "democrats," formerly united in their struggle against the Communist Party's supremacy, is more devastating and complex than many people, both in Russia and in the West, believe. President Boris Yeltsin and Human Rights Delegate Sergey Kovalev are the symbol of the most absolute split that can be imagined. The former was the commander-in-chief of an Army under whose bombs and gunfire in Grozny the latter found himself.

The most brilliant figures of the democrats' ranks, such as Yegor Gaydar and Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, have gone over to more or less irreconcilable opposition to Yeltsin, but agreement on the issue of Chechnya has by no means brought closer to each other Gaydar and Yavlinskiy, who continue to disagree on aspects of economic policy and, of course, in their ideas about who should be the next president of Russia, and they have both moved away from the third democratic leader, Boris Fedorov, leader of the 12 December Liberal Democratic Union group, who resolutely supported the operation in Chechnya, although he condemned just as resolutely the incompetence of its implementation.

The split also affects the democratic parties and groups. While Yabloko (Grigoriy Yavlinskiy's group) is still holding out, Boris Fedorov's group clearly does not unanimously support his stance. Matters are even worse in the organization led by Yegor Gaydar, Russia's Choice. Personalities as brilliant as Gennadiy Burbulis or Ella Pamfilova, and, at the beginning of the Chechen crisis, Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, have gradually distanced themselves from it. At the rallies, Yegor Gaydar levels grave accusations against the cabinet, but some members of his group such as First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubays still remain in it.

The Chechen tragedy is a further test, perhaps the last, of the democrats' steadiness of mind and firmness in their convictions. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's success in the 12 December 1993 legislative elections and a series of victories for the Communists combined with suspect personalities in the 1994 local and intermediate elections have led many people to demand that the parliamentary and presidential elections be postponed or canceled so that Yeltsin can remain in power as the sole guarantor of democracy, and since 12 December 1994, calls for the setting up of a military regime without Yeltsin, even with clear allusions to specific names, are now being made openly in this atmosphere.

Discussions about democracy's terminal illness and failure are so regular that they have ceased to arouse interest, but, more than the weakness of democracy as such, what the Chechnya conflict, which has become a bloody and unpopular war, has shown is the weakness of the state.

The president's "entourage" has two parts, a military and bodyguard part and a political part, which operate in different dimensions. The government is not a collegiate body and does not include the ministers responsible for the de facto powers, who come directly under the president. The lack of coordination in the activities of several special services, some of which come under the Defense Ministry and others the Interior Ministry, is tragicomic. And in the meantime, the Council of the Federation criticizes without accepting responsibilities, as became clear when Yeltsin asked it to clarify its stance on the conditions of a possible negotiation with the Chechens. More than to the government's authoritarian habits, the cruelty of the war in the Caucasus is due to poor leadership and the lack of a clear understanding of the operation and of politics in that region and in the federation in general.

The vacuum left by the totalitarian ideocracy has not yet been filled by the normal state institutions but rather by makeshift structures which overlap, do not perform all the necessary functions, and act in a dilettantish manner.

It was precisely the "democrats" who attained power without having a clear idea of the state and who even today interpret the term "state" as an insult. The Russian "democrats" ideology from 1988-94 is a strange

mixture of libertarianism, neoconservatism, and anarchism. "Everything will sort itself out" on its own, the market, state power, national relations, and federalism.

The people, who supported the "democrats" as fighters against the totalitarian system, are now taking revenge for what is perceived as the destruction of the foundations of the state and society. The popularity of the "democrats" and that of President Yeltsin is very low. However, despite everything, the Public Opinion Foundation's figures show that two-thirds of the population believe in democracy as a value, over half do not regard the Chechen conflict as the end of democracy in Russia, and only 20 percent are convinced of the contrary. Moreover, two-thirds of the population are in favor of "imposing order" in the country, which means that for many people democracy and order are not antonyms. Today Russia stands again at a crossroads of at least two roads. The irritation with the "democrats" could cause some adventurer to be supported in the next election, or a violent coup, which, as we see, is not in keeping with the people's orientation, to be accepted.

But it is also possible that the "democrats," with all their difficulties, are leaving scope for the supporters of the state, from the technocrats and the conservatives to the moderate Communists, all of them frightened both by the "democratic" rhetoric (especially since 1993) and by the extreme Communist and nationalist slogans. And it seems that the silent democratic majority disillusioned with the "democrats" will support them if they succeed in organizing themselves and finding a leader.

UKRAINE: Foreign Ministry Protests Luzhkov Remarks

954F0960A Simferopol KRYMSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jan 95 p 1

["Statement of the press center of the Ukraine Ministry of Foreign Affairs—UKRINFORM"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Ukraine Ministry of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly focused attention on the attempts by representatives of certain political circles in the Russian Federation to exacerbate relations between our countries, interfere in the process of normalization of bilateral relations, and disrupt the negotiations process with respect to preparation of a new interstate Ukrainian-Russian treaty.

At one time in particular, the Ukraine Ministry of Foreign Affairs categorized a statement of Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov as nothing less than attempted encroachment on the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Visiting Crimea, the mayor had called Sevastopol "Moscow's 11th Prefecture." It was stressed that such statements contradict the standpoint of the Ukraine Security Council issued 5 December 1994, the Helsinki Final Act, and international law.

On 12 January of this year, the Treaty on Cooperation Between Moscow and Sevastopol was signed in the

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Russian capital. It was learned from reports of the mass media that here again, Yu. Luzhkov allowed himself to utter unfriendly statements towards Ukraine, declaring that "Sevastopol is acquiring the status of the capital's 11th prefecture."

The press center of the Ukraine Ministry of Foreign Affairs is authorized to register a resolute protest with respect to this recurring anti-Ukraine attack by Mr. Luzhkov, and expects an immediate clarification in this regard from official circles of the Russian Federation.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 20 Jan

LD2001065295 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English* 0621 GMT 20 Jan 95

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 20 TASS—All Russian newspapers on Friday [20 January] run a report issued by the Russian Government's press service to the effect that the flag of the Russian Federation was hoisted above the presidential palace in Grozny on Thursday afternoon.

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI runs a statement by President Boris Yeltsin, frontpaging its words that "the military phase of the restoration of the validity of the Russian Federation Constitution in Chechnya has been practically completed".

KRASNAYA ZEVZDA (RED STAR) stands up for the defence of the Russian Army which lately became a "target for attacks" on the part of mass media.

"The one who defends the good image of the army and of the Russian serviceman should have a good deal of courage," the newspaper writes.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reprints an article from the independent newspaper SEGODNYA (TODAY) in which journalists Maria Dementyeva and Mikhail Leontyev issued a rebuff to all those who try to denigrate the Russian soldier who was discharging his duty in Chechnya.

NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA (NEW DAILY NEWSPAPER) carries a column of materials related to the Chechnya situation.

Issa Kostoyev, chairman of the Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation, Court and Legal Matters, told the newspaper that, in his view, the military operations in Chechnya were unlawful from all points of view.

"If the Chechen Republic is a subject of the federation, a military invasion is unlawful from the viewpoint of constitution and the law on defence. If Chechnya is a

sovereign state, then this is a real aggression with all the ensuing consequences, right up to an international tribunal," Kostoyev maintains.

OBSHCAYA GAZETA (COMMON NEWSPAPER) makes an attempt to estimate the costs of the restoration of "constitutional law and order" in Chechnya by Russia. The newspaper's opinion is that the war in Chechnya will even enrich some people. It has concluded this on the strength of the findings of an all-Russia sociological survey carried out by the public opinion foundation.

"Three percent of people in Russia believe that their material position will improve as a result of the military operation in Chechnya.

Vladimir Lysenko, chairman of the State Duma subcommittee on the development of federative relations, is of the opinion the "price" of this "unpopular war" is too great.

"The Chechen crisis has brought about an upsurge of both great-Russia chauvinism and local nationalism and separatism. This relatively local political conflict is on the verge of developing into a national and religious one, going beyond the borders of the Russian Federation," Lysenko told the newspaper.

IZVESTIYA on the truce talks held in Moscow by Dudayev's representatives.

The newspaper has come forward with "three versions why the talks broke down". Its opinion is that the Russian authorities dragged out the talks, putting forward conditions which were obviously unacceptable to Dudayev, which resulted in the breakdown of the talks.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA (INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER) focuses on the international aspect of the Chechen crisis.

The newspaper maintains that the crisis has not brought dividends to Moscow in the international arena. Russia loses its positions at the United Nations Security Council. This has been shown by the latest security council debate on the question of U.N. sanctions against Iraq.

The "failure-prone delay with the military operation in Chechnya" pushed Moscow "away from the world community, provoking a spate of criticism throughout the world," the newspaper emphasised.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA describes a discovery by Russian heliometrists. The discovery "makes it possible not only to forecast various calamities with amazing accuracy but also compels one to take a novel view of the causes of disasters which already happened, including the Chernobyl tragedy and the crash of the A-310 aerobus near Mezhdurechensk."

Finland Asked to Promote Russia's Membership in EU*LD2001110895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1026 GMT 20 Jan 95*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 20 TASS—President Boris Yeltsin has called on Finland to promote Russia's admission to the European Union (EU). He expressed this request when receiving Finnish Prime Minister Esko Aho in the Kremlin on Friday [20 January].

"Please accept my congratulations on Finland's joining the European Union. I hope that from now on our relations, particularly trade ones, will develop trilaterally—the European Union, Finland, and Russia. I hope that you will throw your weight into the balance and help promote Russia's admission to the European Union," the Russian president said.

Yeltsin pointed out that the talks between Mr Aho and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin went off successfully. Mr Aho admitted that his meeting with the Russian premier "was very interesting and substantive". He referred to it as a continuation of the dialogue which had been started during Chernomyrdin's visit to Finland in March last year. "We are now successfully developing our relations on the foundation which was laid then," Mr Aho said.

The meeting between Boris Yeltsin and the Finnish prime minister was held behind closed doors.

Yeltsin, Kohl Phone Conversation on Chechnya*LD2001113995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1134 GMT 20 Jan 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 20 TASS—In keeping with a preliminary arrangement, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl had a telephone conversation on Friday [20 January].

The presidential press service has announced that "at the chancellor's request, the president of the Russian Federation informed him of the development of the situation in Chechnya and of the efforts being made by the Russian leadership to normalise the situation and to organise peace processes following the completion of the military phase of a solution to the problem."

Chernomyrdin: 'Chechen War Will End Soon'*LD1901132095 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1220 GMT 19 Jan 95*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 19 Jan (ITAR-TASS)—"We are not talking to bandits," Russian Federation Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said in

response to a question about the possibility of talks with [Chechen President] Dzhokhar Dudayev. Meeting journalists at the end of talks between the Russian prime minister and his Finnish counterpart Esko Aho, Viktor Chernomyrdin said that the war in Chechnya will end soon. "We won't guess precisely when this will happen," the prime minister replied when asked about more precise timing by the journalists.

The Russian prime minister noted in particular that within the government "there is no party of war and there is no such party in Russia at all." "The spreading of such information is the fault of journalists and some hotheads who want to worsen the situation over the Chechen conflict. There is no party of war, there will not and cannot be," Viktor Chernomyrdin stressed.

Kozyrev Against Western Role in Chechnya*LD1901220795 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1725 GMT 19 Jan 95*

[Studio interview with Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev by Nikolay Svanidze on 19 January, in the "Details" program—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Kozyrev] Speaking pragmatically, what exactly can our foreign partners do in this [Chechnya] situation? Can they monitor human rights? But who can monitor human rights better and who will direct more criticism—including unpleasant criticism—than, say, Sergey Adamovich Kovalev? First, I do not even know anyone who comes close to him in the sense of his weight, so to speak, or experience in the field of the human rights movement. Second, he understands the language, he is in his own country. He is there, he lives there. What foreign mission or individual who requires translators and so on can add anything to this? What more can they suggest?

[Svanidze] Sergey Adamovich Kovalev can speak out on this issue, but his levers of actual influence on the Russian authorities are limited.

[Kozyrev] Actually, he has quite strong levers, the same as the whole of the [Duma] human rights commission. You know this perfectly well. Because we must consider our reputation to a certain extent, and public opinion and we are worried about all this. But our foreign colleagues have even fewer levers, they have none at all. Because, you see, sometimes there are threats, and I want to say it once again, that they are not made at the government level, no such threats are even being made. Let's say they use some economic sanctions. This will cause only a negative reaction from us, it will only irritate public opinion. I am absolutely convinced of this.

Besides, all this economic aid is very, very limited as it is. In all these years it has come to little more than just talk and promises. Therefore I think that they have no levers at all. And speaking of pressure, we do not intend to and will not talk with anyone, on any issue on such terms.

Now, let's consider the offer of help in organizing the negotiation process. Well, this is even more laughable. Because, you can see that Chernomyrdin and everyone are naturally busy with it for days on end, but we do not know with whom to negotiate. Two representatives are arriving, from Dudayev, it seems. They begin talks by saying: We are not representing all the militants and we are not responsible for all of them. And this is the negotiation process for you. So, we have to conduct the negotiation process on a very wide spectrum—with field commanders, with some respected religious representatives and so on. Just now, the mufti was telling me about his participation. I mean, we are all taking part in this. Again, what group, numbering three or four—who should they be? What foreign diplomats—who do not understand the language or anything—will carry out these negotiations for us? All this is not serious.

[Svanidze] On the surface, the West behaves in a very constrained manner. But you meet people and look into their eyes. You, probably, know more than the papers.

[Kozyrev] Yes, but I want to say it once again: the reaction is constrained. But it is not favorable because all the media is full of these reports, these photographs; in other words, there is a negative reaction. I would prefer them to publish photographs from Russia of people like our new Savva Morozovs [reference to a wealthy entrepreneur and collector of impressionist and avant-garde paintings in Tsarist Russia], new entrepreneurs, so to speak, of construction sites in Chechnya—say, of a mosque restoration, of urban construction. Rather than the views of destroyed housing blocks, combat actions and so on. In this sense, I mean. But on the other hand, I can say that there is—perhaps, more so at government level—a certain realization that the question is, in actual fact, extremely complex. Realization that there was initial confusion in the Russian and foreign media surrounding the terms Chechnya and Russia is beginning to penetrate people's minds. Now they are beginning to have a better understanding of the fact that Chechnya is Russia. If we are to speak of it seriously, of course, any state would prefer quite different television footage for its foreign policy and its image abroad. This is a universal truth.

[Svanidze] Do you want to say that other footage of other aspects of life should be shown?

[Kozyrev] Of course, other footage. But this is not a foreign policy issue. It is a domestic policy issue. It is unfortunate that we are going through these trials, these difficulties. But, foreign policy in this respect if of secondary importance.

[Svanidze] Don't you have an impression that western politicians, even those who feel constructive goodwill toward us have decided to quietly ignore us? They understand that we will not accept their advice—no one accepts advice. It is not possible to influence us in other ways. And so, they say: What can one do with them? Let's leave them to their own devices.

[Kozyrev] No, it is not like that. We do accept advice. I listen to advice and similarly people listen to mine. The thing is, we lived in the Soviet Union for 70 years and are still sorting out this. But I would not say that they ignore us or their interest in us is diminishing. No, even my agenda, if you like, is changing now because, for example, German Foreign Minister Kinkel invited me to meet him. We should not panic. The world is not in a panic about it. The most frightening thing would be to ignore our situation. The world will not ignore us.

Recently when I asked my friends the Democrats whether they have any suggestions, some said to hell with it, we should have left Dudayev alone, let them do their own thing there. Well, this is also an attitude. OK, let us consider then that we have a first class region and also something like a ghetto, where bandits can do as they please. They did not provide medical care for children, did not pay pensions, there was no civic life to speak of—there was total arbitrariness and lawlessness. So, let us consider it as such, just so that our hands are clean and we do not get involved in anything. Let them live in their ghetto. But, listen, is this a responsible attitude? And what about human rights? No state can allow itself to tolerate a nest of armed bandits or such. And, so we are trying to manage. Well, the best we can. [passage omitted]

Theater Launches Aim to 'Bypass ABM Treaty'

MM1901121595 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 Jan 95 p 3

[Report by Aleksandr Sychev: "Washington Is Acting in an Ungentlemanly Manner by Preparing for Tests of ABM System"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In February the United States intends to begin tests on a tactical ABM defense system: President Clinton's staff has notified Moscow of this.

The Russian Foreign Ministry refrained from comment, merely announcing that it had asked Washington for appropriate explanations and that Moscow would be making a thorough analysis of the situation. Surely Washington is violating the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Defense Systems concluded by the United States and the USSR in 1972? The treaty forbids the United States and Russia from creating defense systems against ICBM's.

The ABM Treaty is one of the bases of stability in the world. It is largely thanks to the existence of this document that the United States and the USSR/Russia were able to negotiate drastic cuts in nuclear strategic arsenals.

In May 1993 the incumbent U.S. administration announced the discontinuation of the "Star Wars" program, and during a meeting last year Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that "maintaining the validity and

integrity of the ABM Treaty" was fundamentally important. Then, suddenly, President Clinton makes a decision to begin testing, to use the professional jargon, theater ABM systems, granting the Pentagon permission to carry out 14 launches over two years "for the purpose of studying the efficiency of individual elements."

The idea of an ABM shield was spearheaded by former President Ronald Reagan and continues to be the darling of the Republican heart. In the Reagan and Bush era Washington insisted at talks with Moscow on the acceptance of a broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty which would open the way to switch from "Star Wars" theory to practice. They even promised to share SDI secrets with Moscow, provided it altered its stance.

It is as if the still Democrat-controlled White House is humoring the Republican majority which emerged in the Senate and the House of Representatives as a result of recent elections.

The start of tests on a nonstrategic ABM system in the United States is still not proof of Washington's noncompliance with the ABM Treaty, which, incidentally, in no way limits the right of participant-states to create nonstrategic ABM defense systems. Officially, Washington is not in breach of anything. The White House is trying to convince Moscow that it is merely a matter of scientific developments, and that tests of the full system, with the use of monitors [datchiki] positioned in space, will not be conducted. Even the word "test" is replaced by the expression "demonstration launches."

But, by beginning the tests, Washington is not acting in the spirit of partnership which, the diplomats say, typifies contemporary Russian-American relations and is not being wholly honest.

The ABM Treaty provides no definition of what is considered to be a nonstrategic ABM system. Since December 1993 a standing consultative commission has been working on eliminating this flaw—it is elaborating a set of clear parameters ruling out the possibility of creating nonstrategic ABM defense systems capable, nevertheless, of destroying ICBM's.

Should Russia or the United States become able to take out strategic missiles, the ABM Treaty will become a useless piece of paper, and this will nudge the world into an new nuclear arms race.

The United States, for instance, insists that missiles with an active range of up to 3,000-3,500 km be classed among the nonstrategic weaponry against which is it suggested that the ABM systems being created could be used. But is such weaponry tactical?

In November 1992 the United States suggested that NATO install ABM systems on ships in the Mediterranean, which would be capable of taking out missiles launched from countries in North Africa and the Near East (NATO fears Libya, Iran, and Iraq). A Mediterranean ABM System, intended to screen Europe from

missiles with an active range of around 3,000 km can hardly be described as nonstrategic.

The consultative commission's work on delimiting strategic and tactical ABM systems is far from complete. At any rate, the concluding document is unlikely to be prepared at the commission's next session, which is scheduled for March. Nevertheless, Washington is unilaterally undertaking "demonstration missile launches" whose parameters have not been agreed by the participants in the agreement.

Whatever the politicians may say, nuclear deterrence exists as an element in maintaining stability. Nuclear parity between the United States and Russia is being preserved, and the leaderships of both states continue to take this factor into account. The White House plan to avail itself of a new ABM defense system gives rise to the suspicion that the United States is trying to bypass the ABM Treaty and attain military-strategic superiority.

Geneva Parley Shows Russo-U.S. Partnership 'Working'

MM1901211195 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jan 95 p 3

[Report by Manki Ponomarev: "There Will Be No 'Cold Peace,' The Russian Foreign Minister Believes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Geneva meeting between Andrey Kozyrev and Warren Christopher—heads of the Russian Federation and U.S. foreign policy departments—lasted two days. During it there was a discussion of a wide range of questions: Russian-American relations, European security, including Russia's relations with NATO and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], a Bosnian settlement, and various military-political problems. But the subject that was discussed in particular detail was the situation in Chechnya.

It was to be expected. Although the Chechen crisis is purely an internal matter for the Russian Federation, it is causing concern throughout the world. It is reported that Christopher confirmed in Geneva that the United States fully supports the principle of Russia's territorial integrity and welcomed the federal authorities' latest initiatives aimed at halting the bloodshed. At the same time, Washington is worried about the possible adverse effect of the war on support for reforms in Russia and its position in the world.

The shadow of the crisis in Chechnya also fell on the discussion of other issues. Observers noted this in particular during the examination of the prospects for a Russian-American summit. As is known, Russia is inviting the leaders of a number of states to Moscow to attend the celebrations in aid of the 50th Anniversary of Victory. During the May celebrations there could be another summit—a state visit by the U.S. President to the Russian Federation. But they failed in Geneva to fix

the specific dates and conditions of the summit meeting. The exchange of opinions on this subject will continue.

Russia did not conceal its concern about a number of matters. Moscow is bound to be alarmed by statements in Washington about a possible change of foreign policy guidelines in connection with the results of the recent congressional elections. Christopher effectively admitted that Congress, which is now controlled by the Republicans, could suspend financial aid to Russia or the ratification of disarmament treaties unless its behavior in Chechnya changes.

Nonetheless the meeting between the leaders of the two countries' foreign policy departments showed that the Russian-American partnership is working and can cope with the problems. For instance, prospects are emerging for a new dialogue on the question of relations between Moscow and NATO and even on Russia's joining the organization, if it actually enters a period of transformations. There are still many questions about this at the moment.

But by and large the results of the Geneva meeting enabled Andrey Kozyrev to express confidence that there will be no "cold peace" in international relations.

Kozyrev on Talks With Warren Christopher

Talks on Chechnya

LD1901203395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1933
GMT 19 Jan 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: Reports by diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said he and Warren Christopher had discussed the Chechen issue "calmly and without confrontation." The U.S. said on Chechnya "what we tell ourselves."

Kozyrev agreed that Chechen events would "certainly negatively affect the international positions of Russia." At the same time, he said he was satisfied with the position of Russia's partners understanding the difficulty of the situation which Russia had to face in Chechnya.

Kozyrev said he did not see at present "how the OSCE could contribute to settling the Chechen conflict."

Kozyrev also said he wondered how the OSCE could help Russia to resolve problems involving violations of human rights. "We agree that human rights are not only our domestic problem. However, foreigners are unlikely to understand the problem better than, for instance, Russian Commissioner for Human Rights Sergey Kovalev who had been imprisoned in the USSR for his activities defending human rights."

Kozyrev said the OSCE could help when local administrations were restored in Chechnya. He said seminars could be organized and the OSCE could give computers and required documental material for conferences and elections.

Kozyrev said the West failed to understand "what Chechnya is." "However, we in Russia sometimes also fail to realize how complex the Chechen problem is," he added.

Kozyrev told a press conference in Geneva today that the Russian and U.S. presidents were maintaining contacts on the Chechen problem. He said his meetings with his U.S. colleague had confirmed that Russian-U.S. partnership was developing.

Kozyrev said both the Russian and U.S. parties were concerned over the conflict in Chechnya.

Commenting on the democratic process in Russia, Kozyrev said he believed Boris Yeltsin to be the only nation-wide leader of the reformers as Yeltsin was associated with the reforms closer than anybody else in Russia.

Christopher told the same press conference that the U.S. "completely support inviolability of Russia's territorial integrity." At the same time, he said he worried about military actions in Chechnya continuing as far as human rights and support for Russia on the part of the international community were concerned.

Christopher confirmed the willingness of U.S. President Bill Clinton to provide economic assistance for Russia carrying out the democratic reforms. However, he made it clear that much would depend on "the situation in Chechnya and Russia's position on the conflict."

On 'More Mature' U.S. Understanding

LD1901202695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1932
GMT 19 Jan 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: reports by diplomatic correspondents Aleksander Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 19 (INTERFAX)—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said that the "somehow simplified approach of Washington" to relations with Moscow had been overcome during his talks with U.S. state Secretary Warren Christopher in Geneva on January 17-18.

Kozyrev told an Interfax correspondent on his way from Geneva to Moscow last night that the "U.S. has worked out more mature understanding" of possible problems in bilateral relations "as a result of transition from overwhelming confrontation to friendship and partnership."

Kozyrev said he himself and the U.S. state secretary were concerned about "the lack of single consolidated democratic movement in Russia." Kozyrev said he was worrying about if the both U.S. parties would back the Russian foreign policy.

He said the U.S. narrowed the issue to aid to Russia "which is not so much important for us." "Moscow is concerned about statements of some new leaders of the Congress committees saying that the U.S. is not going to finance the UN and participate in UN peacekeeping operations. This happens after resolutions were adopted creating the basis for implementing peacekeeping operations in the CIS with large participation of the UN in them, including financial support," Kozyrev said.

He stressed that Warren Christopher had spoken on the issue very carefully "understanding possible unpredictable aftermath of such statements."

Kozyrev on Cooperation With NATO

LD1901202095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1933
GMT 19 Jan 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: Reports by diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev told an Interfax correspondent on his way from Geneva to Moscow last night that he had honestly discussed the issue of relations between Russia and NATO with U.S. State Secretary Warren Christopher.

"We understand that NATO is not hostile to us as the so-called national-patriotic opposition in Russia believes. However, NATO is not so close to us. We do not understand how NATO develops and how to cooperate with it," he added.

"The program for partnership seemed to answer the questions in the beginning. However, NATO has brought new nuances to the problem planning to extend the alliance to the East which could even dominate over the partnership itself," he said.

Kozyrev said he believed this a kind of a trap. "We want to be partners but the present mechanism provides for Russia and NATO working independently from each other without due interaction."

Kozyrev said he believed Russia would be a partner of NATO and would not refuse from cooperation with it. "Russia could joint [as received] NATO if it was modernized and reformed," he added. He said the U.S. also considered it possible for Russia to join NATO.

Kozyrev said the task was to develop cooperation between Russia and NATO so that they made decisions taking into consideration the interests of each other.

Chechnya Looms Over Russo-U.S. Geneva Talks

MM1901193195 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
20 Jan 95 p 3

[Report by Stanislav Kondrashov: "Specter of Chechnya at Kozyrev-Christopher Meeting"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Geneva/Moscow—Early Thursday morning Andrey Kozyrev returned from Geneva after a two-day meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. On the aircraft he announced that he could be flying there again on Saturday or Sunday for a business meeting with German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. The meeting with Christopher had been prearranged, and Kinkel urgently required contact. And although Kozyrev diplomatically said that the "same range of questions" would be covered—he meant Chechnya—Kinkel is also wanting to "register" his extreme concern.

Whereas Kozyrev could end up being in Switzerland twice in a week, Boris Yeltsin has taken the precaution of canceling his visit there, to Davos, for the world economic forum, at the end of January—he would have to "account" for Chechnya. While in Geneva, Kozyrev received two of Yeltsin's intended interlocutors—the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN high commissioner for human rights. The topic of conversation was the same.

The International Red Cross is conducting aid operations in Chechnya and is also compiling a detailed list of needs for 400,000 people who have been "displaced" as a result of military operations.

These are incidental details of the two days in Geneva. One could add to them. But let us return to the Russian-American meeting. Before it the sides were busy maneuvering in different directions. Moscow was pretending that nothing out of the ordinary had happened. Washington was cranking up the level of its concern and criticism. The advice, if not the conditions, was linked to Chechnya, but went beyond it. On the eve of the Geneva meeting, Christopher insisted that President Yeltsin should "return to the reform track" and "establish a new relationship with his reformers." So the path had been strayed from and the relationship with the reformers had been lost. The U.S. press went further and linked the future of the partnership between the two powers direct to Chechnya.

But restraint nonetheless was the order of the day in Geneva. Without wishing to incite further emotion, in some cases they applied a soothing lotion to fresh wounds and added here and there the sedative of "mature partnership." This was helped by the tactics of the meeting. Chechnya was swept under the carpet of confidential *tete-a-tetes* between Kozyrev and Christopher. The plenary meetings between the delegations touched on questions which would have been the most pressing, the most topical six weeks ago, but now seem rather abstract against the backdrop of the Chechnya conflagration: expansion of NATO (timeframe and evolution; what is it going to be like in the new Europe?); regional problems like Bosnia and the Near East; peace-making operations and why, for example, the United Nations is not allocating funds to Russia for them, whereas the Americans were generously funded in Haiti;

disarmament topics, including the question of flank restrictions on Russia under the treaty on conventional armaments in Europe, which do not fit the new situation, and so on.

The question of the U.S. President's visit to Moscow was prominent. Christopher was rather vague about dates—"late spring." Moscow would like to see Clinton at the celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of Victory, but there are fears that he would then be "lost in the crowd" of other leaders and this would mess up the visit.

There is something surrealistic about planning celebrations during the Chechen wake. It was the same people who gained the great victory, but it was a different, now abolished state. In that great war it achieved its maximum territorial expansion, "taking" Eastern Europe as the spoils of victory. But it is the new Russia that is intending to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Victory, while it experiences in Chechnya the effect of the shrinking wild ass's skin.

But this surrealistic design also depends on the Chechen dynamics and it is haunted by this specter.

At the final press conference in Geneva the two participants were calm and the partnership between the two countries was not called into question. They decided not to be in a hurry to expand NATO, but to personally supervise the discussion of this question in 1995. While stressing that Chechnya was an internal matter for Russia, Kozyrev also said that the maturing partnership could tolerate the discussion of "any matters." There was "equal concern" over the casualties and the violation of human rights.

Christopher also talked about the maturing relationship with regard to a "wide range of strategic possibilities." The nature of the relationship enables them to talk "honestly and openly" about differences. In connection with Chechnya Washington is concerned not only about the casualties and the devastation, but also about the damage to Russia's prestige in the world, and about the fact that the Russian reform could also suffer. "We want a stable, democratic Russia, integrated into the world community," the U.S. secretary of state stressed.

The atmosphere of the meeting was improved by Chernomyrdin's simultaneous proposal on a cease-fire—without any conditions—in Chechnya. Christopher expressed the hope that this initiative would succeed. The feeling was that this was a calculated move to make Kozyrev's position easier in the first high-level Russian-American contact of the "Chechen era." But Kozyrev said that it had happened by chance. To avoid any mistakes, it is better to be a pessimist where interdepartmental coordination in Russia is concerned.

At the press conference, in reply to my question about the abovementioned calls, if not demands, to Yeltsin to "return to the reform track," Christopher avoided repeating the criticism.

But the influential American press, anticipating the official position and in many respects shaping it, has now shifted its Chechen emphasis for the third time. The first was that it was an internal matter for Russia. The second emphasis was on the brutality, the destruction, and the casualties in Grozny. Now the emphasis is on a demand for an immediate political settlement with Chechnya, and if this does not materialize the partnership with Russia should end. In an editorial, THE WASHINGTON POST recommends that Yeltsin meet with Dudayev in January instead of with Clinton in May.

When Kozyrev talked with journalists on his way from Geneva to Moscow and I told him of what was in my view a shift of emphasis, the gist of his reply was that our partners or international organizations cannot give effective assistance in the matter of a political settlement. The minister regards the fact that under the rules he cannot participate in the settlement of an internal matter as a "personal tragedy" for him. And who would he negotiate with anyway? Envoys from Grozny say that Dudayev does not control all the fighters: Are they telling the truth or is it just a pretext for not getting involved in any binding agreements?

Or take the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]: How can it be more useful in talks than Russian representatives? The same applies to the protection of human rights, the minister believes. "Who is better than Sergey Adamovich Kovalev at criticizing and unearthing things?"...

So, after Christopher comes Kinkel. Clinton does not have the forces to deal with a Republican Congress in which the Chechen dynamics are generating anti-Russian sentiments.

A very experienced Russian diplomat, who has spent decades observing America and who flew from Washington to the Geneva meeting, predicts that there will be a cease-fire, the fires will be extinguished, corpses will be removed, and a semblance of normal life will return to Grozny, and America will drop the issue. Otherwise the reaction will grow and grow—and not in favor of Russia and the Russians.

Kozyrev Calls Partnership With NATO 'Premature'

LD1901133095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1147
GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, January 19. (Interfax) —Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev believes that it is "premature" to launch a Russia-NATO partnership program.

Answering a question from an Interfax reporter Wednesday night, Kozyrev reported that "he discussed this problem very frankly in the course of negotiations with U.S. secretary of State Warren Christopher in Geneva on January 17-18."

"We realize that NATO is an organization not hostile to us. It's this that makes us different from the so-called national patriotic opposition of Russia," Kozyrev declared, stressing, however, that NATO "is like being alien toward us." "We do not understand where NATO is developing and how to cooperate with it," Kozyrev emphasized.

He expressed confidence that "Russia will be NATO's partner and will not forgo cooperation with this organization". It is possible, Kozyrev suggested, that in the future "Russia will join NATO but as a renewed organization." As Kozyrev remarked, "the crux of the matter is what should be done so that they and we adopt decisions, considering each other's interests in advance."

Political Issues

'Text' of Yeltsin's Statement on Chechnya

LD1901172395 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1540 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 19 Jan—Russian President Boris Yeltsin made a statement today. The text was released by the Russian Federation presidential press service:

"I am addressing the citizens of Russia, the world community, and everyone who has been following the course of events in the Chechen Republic with anxiety and sympathy.

"I hereby inform them all that the military stage of restoring the Constitution of Russia in the Chechen Republic has practically been completed. The additional mission of restoring law, order, and the population's civil rights is being transferred to the sphere of competence of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

"Conditions are being created and firmly established for the transition from armed confrontation to restoration of peaceful life in the Chechen Republic within the Russian Federation.

"The priority tasks which the Government of Russia has to tackle at this stage include restoration of the population's life-support infrastructure and the full protection of human rights. The government will take all necessary measures to eliminate the consequences of the economic devastation and provide the population with everything necessary for normal life in the shortest possible time.

"On this day that gives us hope for a restoration of peace, I bow my head to the memory of the soldiers who have died in this conflict and to the casualties suffered by the civilian population. I express my condolences to their close ones and relatives. Let the tragedy suffered by Russia and by the Chechen and Russian peoples serve as a lesson for peoples and politicians.

"[Signed] Boris Yeltsin"

Government Approves Plan To Restore Chechen Economy

LD2001105695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1015 GMT 20 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 20 TASS—The Russian Government has approved a plan to restore the economy of the Chechen Republic. It will be carried out by the federal ministries and other agencies.

Russia's First Vice-Premier Oleg Soskovets recently said here that "the new Chechen government, based on democratic principles, will have the right to independently manage the republic's natural resources and will be exempted for some time from compulsory payments

to the federal budget". This will allow the Chechen Republic to obtain considerable funds for restoring the economy, the first vice-premier believes.

Russian experts say that the Dudayev regime had completely ruined the Chechen economy. Many facts can be cited to prove this assertion. For instance, all the four Chechen electric power plants were brought to a standstill long before the federal troops were moved into Chechnya. Being as it is connected to the single Russian power grid, Chechnya practically stole up to 400 megawatts of electricity from its immediate neighbours. Before the advent of the Dudayev regime the Chechen Republic had produced up to ten million tonnes of oil a year. This figure dropped to only two millions in the course of the recent few years. Moreover, Russian law enforcement services assert that the bulk of the money earned on oil was spent on weapons and used to enrich a handful of corrupt government officials.

Primary attention in the plan to revive the ruined Chechen economy is being attached to the complete restoration of the territorial organs of federal and local power. According to some statements made this year by high-ranking members of the Russian Government, the first to be restored will be the territorial structures of the Finance Ministry, the Central Bank, the social insurance system and the pensions fund, the transportation and communication systems. This will allow the Chechen Republic to make quicker and more effective use of the financial and material resources allocated to it by the central authorities.

Sources for financing the restoration of the Chechen economy and industrial potential have already been found. Effective measures are being taken to pay pensions and compensations to the Chechen population. Children from Chechnya are being enrolled at educational establishments of the Dagestan Republic and Stavropol territory.

ITAR-TASS was told at the Russian Ministry for Construction that sixteen special designing organisations were invited to implement the programme for housing construction in the Chechen Republic. Special attention, specialists of the ministry stated, will be devoted to the restoration of the transportation system, the repair of railway and automobile bridges.

The Russian Ministry for Fuel and Energy, jointly with the Economics Ministry, has drawn up a list of 420 oil wells, as well as several oil and gas pipelines, which are to be restored first and foremost. The "Russian Electric Power System" joint-stock society is now busy restoring the Vladikavkaz-Karlan-Yurt power transmission line. It promises to ensure shortly the stable supply of electricity to the Chechen Republic.

The situation in the republic's health system is also deplorable. Practically all the hospitals were ruined during the hostilities. There is not a single practising doctor in Chechnya today. The Russian Public Health

Ministry has already taken steps to send the first 300-man group of doctors to the Chechen Republic.

Budget Impact of Chechnya War Played Down

MM1901165795 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jan 95 First Edition p 2

[Report by RIA-NOVOSTI observer Vladimir Mytarev specially for ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA: "No Panic. Acute Conflict in Chechnya Forces Changes to Draft 95 Budget"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the basis of a decision by the president, the premier, and the speakers of both houses of the Federal Assembly, the Finance Ministry will have to review its figures and determine planned expenditure on the Chechnya crisis. Government, parliamentary, and independent experts have already stated their attitude to any possible amendments.

Their essence briefly boils down to the oft-quoted comparison of Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov to the resourceful Odysseus sailing his ship between Scylla and Charybdis. Any increase in budget expenditure runs the risk of boosting inflation (in the latest version 7.7 percent a month)—which would bring a protest from the IMF and would possibly block previously arranged credits totaling \$12.7 billion. These credits were to be used to finance part of the budget deficit.

On the other hand, cutting budget subsidies will generate resistance from parliamentary lobbies, and the budget will be postponed yet again. Preliminary discussions have already proposed making spending on Chechnya (military, administrative, humanitarian, and economic spending) a separate budget item. The Army is demanding this primarily because last year it obtained only around 70 percent of its planned figures, and the unforeseen expenditure on the Chechnya conflict out of "its" money will compound its already difficult position. Farmers, who are experiencing chronic shortages of budget funds, also believe that even the relatively small expenditure on Chechnya's rural needs (76 billion rubles [R]) and food shipments (R179 billion) should be paid for out of additional funding. The migration service, transport workers—who will have to repair the railroads—and oil workers have been complaining of a shortage of funds.

Just how much money will Chechnya need? The range of estimates of current and potential expenditure is vast. Thus, Western experts estimate that every day of armed conflict costs \$30 million (approximately R120 billion at the current rate, but they have different estimates). Russian sources are talking about R10 billion. There are differences in the estimates of total expenditure on restoration work too. Vice Premier Nikolay Yegorov, the Russian president's representative in Chechnya, gives a minimum estimate of R4 trillion. The press has quoted a forecast from a parliamentary committee of R15 trillion. It has to be admitted that both sums are unlikely to be a

final figure, if only because the "military phase" of the conflict is not yet over. In the opinion of Aleksey Yablokov, a leading Russian ecologist, the consequences could be comparable to natural disasters if the Dudayev gunmen resort to "scorched earth tactics."

Nonetheless, government experts do not consider the budget situation catastrophic, as many deputies are trying to convince the public that it is. Even the maximum forecasts are no more than 2-2.5 percent of budget spending. It cannot be ruled out that some items of expenditure will be cut. But the financiers' efforts are mainly aimed at increasing the revenue side so as to ensure that the planned deficit of R71 trillion is not exceeded. It is thought that foreign-economic concessions will be canceled and extra state securities will be issued.

In general, in my view, the obsession with the Chechnya crisis is turning into a national psychological epidemic. Life goes on independently of Chechnya throughout the vast territory of Russia, with its problems, sorrows, and joys. The main economic problem, experts almost unanimously believe, is the inflationary expectations of the population, including the business world. These are pushing up the dollar and accelerating the turnover of money in retail trade—everyone is trying to get rid of their unreliable rubles. Overcoming this very human syndrome will make it possible to hold price growth in check and, correspondingly, to keep inflation at 7-8 percent in January-February. Then we may be able to talk about a further fall in inflation and an improvement in the economy as a whole.

Shumeyko Says Chechen State of Emergency Possible

LD1901193795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1911 GMT 19 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 19 TASS—Federation Council Chairman Vladimir Shumeyko said a state of emergency might be introduced in Chechnya. This will provide a special legal ground for interior troops to enforce law and order, Shumeyko told reporters after today's Federation Council sitting. "It appears a state of emergency cannot be avoided," Shumeyko said.

The upper house speaker said return to law was needed, "One should try to act in such a way that a new government of Chechnya is not appointed by Moscow."

Shumeyko said he did not believe a guerrilla war would be started in Chechnya since "peaceful civilians don't have any need to wage it in difficult mountain conditions, and militants are used to fighting for money in good conditions."

Military Issues

Deputy Defense Ministers Not on New Appointment List

LD1901132895 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1300 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian president has signed a decree on the personal appointments of the deputy defense ministers, says an informed source in the Defense Ministry. Not on the list are Generals Gromov, Kondratyev, and Mironov. In addition, General Matvey Burlakov is not in the new appointments.

Yeltsin To Decide 'Fate' of Generals

LD1901162895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1456 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 19 (Interfax)—President Boris Yeltsin has issued a decree appointing new defence ministers as part of a shake up of the country's defence department, a defence ministry source told Interfax.

First Vice Ministers Mikhail Kolesnikov and Andrey Kokoshin retain their jobs as do General-Colonels Vladimir Toporov and Konstantin Kobets.

General-Colonels Anatoliy Solomatin and Vladimir Churanov become Deputy Ministers for Construction and Billeting of Troops, and Logistical Support respectively.

However, Former Defence Ministers General-Colonels Boris Gromov, Georgiy Kondratyev and Valery Mironov are conspicuously absent in the list which provides for six vice ministers, two of them first deputy ministers.

Yeltsin is expected to decide on the fate of the three generals who are now on leave in the next few days.

Nor was former Deputy Minister General-Colonel Matvey Burlakov included in the list.

Reshuffle Seen To Strengthen Grachev

MK2001104095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 20 Jan 95 pp 1, 3

[Report by Ilya Bulavinov: "Rear Generals Take Center Stage"]

[FBIS Translated Text] KOMMERSANT-DAILY's forecasts about cadre and structural changes in the Defense Ministry are beginning to be fulfilled. Under a new organizational structure of the military department approved by Yeltsin, the number of deputy ministers has been cut from eight to six. Deputy Ministers Boris Gromov, Valery Mironov, and Georgiy Kondratyev, who are being discharged, and Matvey Burlakov, who was suspended but not dismissed from his post, have been replaced by Colonel General Vladimir Churanov,

chief of logistics; and Col. Gen. Anatoliy Solomatin, chief of construction and billeting. One can, of course, debate the expediency of the new appointments. But it is clear that one of the main reasons for the removal of the former deputies was their negative attitude to the Chechen operation.

Although Gromov, Mironov, and Kondratyev have not been dismissed officially, the appointment of new deputies to their posts means that a presidential edict on their resignation will appear within the next few days. Whereas the first two have never shared Pavel Grachev's ideas, including on political matters, while with respect to them Chechnya has become the last straw, Kondratyev has until recently been considered to be close to the minister in spirit. Their relations soured only recently: In fall 1994 the Defense Ministry's "chief peacekeeper" (Kondratyev was in charge of peacekeeping operations) nearly provoked a Georgian-Abkhaz conflict with his actions, and later he actually stood up against the minister, failing to support the idea of using the army in Chechnya.

The distribution of duties between Grachev's deputies now will look as follows: Andrey Kokoshin and Mikhail Kolesnikov have retained their positions as first deputies; Vladimir Toporov, who was earlier in charge of logistics, has become a deputy "without portfolio" ["osvobozhdennym" zamom].

His purview will include some of the duties of his dismissed colleagues (physical fitness training and cultural and recreation activities). The newly fledged deputies will remain at the head of their "main administrations," with only their status being upgraded. Chief Military Inspector Konstantin Kobets has also retained his post. Generally speaking, the role of this general in the Russian military-political hierarchy remains unclear. Having displayed personal loyalty to Boris Yeltsin both in August 1991, when he organized the defense of the White House, and in October 1993, when he played a major role in organizing its storming by assault, Kobets was little involved in inner ministerial affairs: Even his residence is on Leningradskiy Prospekt, in the building of the former Warsaw Pact headquarters. The chief military inspector has always been regarded as a kind of shadow figure, capable of taking center stage by virtue of purely political deserts. Kobets' reputation, however, was somewhat shattered after Rutskoy's statement that during the siege of the White House Kobets contacted him and offered his help.

As for Burlakov, in spite of the official disgrace (he was suspended by the president under the pressure of public opinion, but "in connection with ongoing checks" into the activity of the Western Group of Forces), his positions at the top are still solid. True, in October he will be 60, and under Russian legislation, he will have to be discharged to the reserves. Incidentally, a blemished track record is apparently not decisive for the president: Solomatin's name, for instance, was mentioned in the

final document following government inspection of the Defense Ministry's performance, in a context clearly unfavorable to the general.

Giving logistics officers the status of deputy ministers can be interpreted in two ways. On one hand, this indicates that the military intends to raise army provision matters to a basically new level. At the same time the increase in the proportion of logistics men also fits into the country leadership's plans on reorganizing the Defense Ministry: The ministry may retain control of economic and administrative matters while purely military functions will be concentrated in the reorganized General Staff. In any event, Pavel Grachev will get rid of strong opponents in his own department.

General Vorobyev Reportedly Discharged

*MK2001123095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
20 Jan 95 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "Eduard Vorobyev May Have Been Already Fired"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Federation president has signed an edict discharging Colonel General Eduard Vorobyev, Ground Forces first deputy commander-in-chief, into the reserves, a high-ranking Russian military man has advised.

Commander Cited on Pacific Fleet Marines in Chechnya

OW2001024695 Moscow Russian Television and Dubl Networks in Russian 0620 GMT 18 Jan 95

[Video report by V. Dudik; from the "Dalniy Vostok" program]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mikhail Glubokovskiy, a State Duma deputy from the Maritime Kray, is protesting the sending of Pacific Fleet marines to the combat zone. The combined regiment contains not only subunits of marines but also sailors taken off battle ships. Up until five days before the plane carrying the Pacific Fleet servicemen took off, the Fleet News Service had been referring to its commander Admiral Khmelnov as categorically denying the possibility of marines being sent to the conflict zone.

[Begin recording] [Dudik] As I looked at these lads, I thought bitterly: This is it. The wrenching wait for the unknown and the illusionary hopes that politicians might behave reasonably are all behind us now, and the military secret, which was so staunchly guarded at all levels of the Ministry of Defense, is out in the open now. Instead, there is just a short note in one's personal file: Next service location: Chechnya.

[Khmelnov] The General Staff ordered a separate marine task force to be transported by air to the Mozdok region. [video cuts to show Dudik talking to troops]

[Dudik] Lads, tell me, are you willing to carry out a real combat task in Chechnya?

[First soldier] We are willing.

[Second soldier] Yes.

[Third soldier] We are willing.

[Fourth soldier] We are willing.

[Fifth soldier, speaking from behind the reporter] Who is willing? Is it you who are willing?

[Sixth soldier] I am an officer. I will go. I will now get on the plane and go. But I will go nowhere with these sailors. These sailors, they do not know how to shoot, any of them.

[Khmelnov] During the short time that we have been allocated, the subunits of this task force have been prepared. Of course, they come from practically all over the fleet...

[Dudik interrupts] But personally, are you satisfied with their level of readiness?

[Khmelnov] Undoubtedly, one wishes for more. But an order is an order, and it has to be carried out. We are military people.

The skeleton of the task force is made up of volunteers. We have cases of people writing and appealing directly...

[Dudik interrupts] But honestly, Igor Nikolayevich, were there refusals?

[Khmelnov] Of course, there were refusals among officers, and we at once waived using them in this action, and they continue to serve here.

[Dudik] Are there any kind of repressive measures being taken against them?

[Khmelnov] Absolutely not.

[Dudik] Like retiring them into the reserves and so on?

[Khmelnov] No. What for? We understand this very well. This is how things stand: one must also think a little about one's subordinates and people, and therefore there will be no repressions of any kind. This is definite.

[Dudik] Still, human memory is an amazing gift of nature. An equally amazing phenomenon is the complete loss of this gift on the part of those of our politicians who reached the summit of the political Olympus. They can no longer remember today that as they marched Russia's perestroika road towards the pinnacle of power, they stopped at every intersection to utter these words of philosophical wisdom, all the while criminally playing with the holiest of all parents' emotions: "There are no big or small wars, because even if one soldier dies, for his relatives and friends it is the biggest war of all." Thus they branded the Afghan war, and its godfathers as representative of the authoritarian regime of the Soviet

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state. But this is a different topic. However, I consider it my duty as an officer and a civilian to add another stroke to the picture: no matter what they say now and later about the Chechen conflict, remember these faces. These are Russian soldiers. They must obey orders because this is their military duty. [end recording]

Economic Issues

Chubays Says Privatization Minister Polevanov Dismissed

LD2001113195 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English* 1119 GMT 20 Jan 95

[By BUSINESS-TASS correspondent Robert Serebrennikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 20 TASS—The new Russian privatisation chief, Vladimir Polevanov, will no longer run the privatisation ministry, according to First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubays.

"There is no place for Polevanov in the State Property Managing Committee, he will not work in the organisation", Chubays told reporters on Friday.

"The issue has been finally settled", he added, but did not say whether Polevanov will retain his post of deputy premier.

Polevanov came to head the privatisation ministry from the post of the governor of the Amur region and was also promoted to the rank of deputy prime minister.

Soon he stunned Russian and foreign investors by announcing an upcoming nationalisation.

On Wednesday Russian President Boris Yeltsin criticised Polevanov for his anti-privatisation pronouncements and stressed that the privatisation course remains unchanged.

"Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Polevanov did not understand his role", Yeltsin told reporters calling the privatisation chief "a man from the province who got a high post and did not understand that he has to work in a team".

"I think we shall correct the issue in the coming days", Yeltsin said adding that "nothing changes in the strategy and tactics of reform in Russia from the part of the president or the government".

Premier Reportedly Endorsed Edict on Polevanov

MK2001084095 Moscow *SEGODNYA in Russian* 20 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by Aleksandr Bekker under the "Amendment" rubric: "Viktor Chernomyrdin Endorsed Goskomimushchestvo Head's Firing. Russian Privatization Inspector Taken Ill"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] It has come to light from sources in the White House that head of government Viktor Chernomyrdin endorsed at 1700 on 18 January a draft Russian presidential edict on removing Vladimir Polevanov from the position of chairman of the State Committee for the Administration of State Property [Goskomimushchestvo]. The motive for this sort of document is stereotypical—"for mistakes made in work." One would think that it is in this context that one should see President Yeltsin's words in his television appearance the day before yesterday: "I think we will rectify this question in the next few days." [passage omitted]

Government Statement Affirms Privatization Policy

LD2001111795 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English* 1040 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 20 TASS—The government of the Russian Federation "is stating that the current state policy in the field of privatisation remains unchanged and that it will not allow any individual executive power bodies or officials to take actions that would run counter to it," said a Russian Government statement made available to ITAR-TASS on Friday.

"Privatisation has been and remains a major component of the strategy of economic reforms being effected by the president and government of the Russian Federation.

"Attempts to secure a reconsideration of this policy, to renounce the results of privatisation or revise the decisions taken by the president and the government, and calls to 're-nationalise' privatised enterprises are unfounded. The ownership right, which emerged as a result of privatisation, will be undeviatingly upheld by the government as one of major constitutional rights in Russia.

"Now that the first, cheque-investment, stage of privatisation is over, the task of privatisation policy is to stimulate investments and structural economic changes, ensure a dynamic development of the stock market and improve the management of all types of property.

"the Russian Federation's privatisation policy is the key orientation of economic reforms. The principles and content of the privatisation policy have stood the test of life in practically all regions of the country.

"The implementation of the privatisation programme has made it possible to break the years-long monopoly of state ownership in the sphere of production and furnish a social basis to form a stratum of efficient proprietors. The operation of privatised enterprises serves as the basis for emerging trends towards brisk business activity, creates new job opportunities and renders market-oriented reforms irreversible", the statement said.

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The Russian Government deems it necessary to state this "in view of numerous enquiries directed to executive power bodies by work collectives, directors of enterprises, national and foreign investors, political figures and ordinary citizens on matters concerning the privatization of state and municipal property in 1995", the statement said.

Emergence of New 'Power Center' Around Chubays Viewed

MK2001110095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 20 Jan 95 p 2

[Report by Vladislav Borodulin: "Second Birth of Economic Reform Commission. Chubays Becomes Authorized Symbol of Economic Reform"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday's emergence of a government decree approving the statute of a commission on economic reform confirmed yet another time that a new center of economic power is being created around First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubays. The redistribution of powers among the most influential government members, prompted by the Chechen campaign, has resuscitated the idea of setting up a special bureaucratic body responsible for the strategic planning of economic policy.

Viktor Chernomyrdin promised the creation of a special government commission on economic reform at an expanded government meeting last year. According to the authors of the idea, this step would help the White House to deflect a considerable part of accusations of pursuing a "short-sighted economic policy." Subsequently, however, the commission's operation was effectively frozen: first Aleksandr Shokhin, then commission chairman, did not have time to get down to business, and in the fall he ceased being a deputy prime minister at all.

The emergence of a government decree approving the statute of the commission (the main document for any bureaucratic body) precisely at this juncture can hardly be seen as a coincidence. As is evident from the document's text, the economic reform commission has fairly broad powers—for instance, it has the right to "hear representatives of executive bodies and to make decisions on matters assigned to its jurisdiction." Translated from apparatus-speak, this means that the commission effectively becomes a council of ministers of sorts and starts competing directly with entities already vested with similar authority: the commissions on operational matters and nonpayments. It is the existence of built-in authority that makes the current "reform commission" crucially different from its USSR prototype, known as the "Abalkin commission," and subsequent Russian versions under Grigoriy Yavlinskiy and Yevgeniy Saburov.

Now there is every reason to state that the Chechen campaign has had a serious impact on the level of tension in relations between a cluster of "minor councils of ministers." It has set off the process of redistributing

powers between two first deputy prime ministers—Oleg Soskovets and Anatoliy Chubays. Oleg Soskovets, his hands tied by being in command of the "Chechen staff," lost the initiative to a technically unoccupied Anatoliy Chubays. Chubays was swift to exploit that: early this week it transpired that the chairmanship of the nonpayments commission was transferred from Soskovets to Chubays. Presently the still "second" first deputy prime minister has concentrated in his hands both tactical (nonpayments commission) and strategic levers (economic reform commission) to influence the government's economic policy. However, these events by themselves (just as the fact that Chubays is due to represent Russia at an economic forum in Davos) do not give grounds to state with complete assurance that Chubays is gradually becoming "the very first" first deputy prime minister.

The question of who is calling the shots in the government can be answered definitely only after a government meeting is held in the premier's absence: up to now it was Oleg Soskovets who took the premier's seat in such cases.

Federal Assembly

Federation Council on Violation of Rights in Chechnya

LD1901213295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2021 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 19 (INTERFAX)—On Thursday Federation Council (FC) proposed to President Boris Yeltsin "to urgently bring actions of the federal authorities in the Chechen republic in line with the Constitution of the Russian Federation."

It has also decided to create a commission to investigate events in Chechnya together with the State Duma "beginning with the coercive seizure of power by Dudayev's group in 1991." The Federation Council should adopt a decision on the responsibility of the people guilty of this tragedy.

The resolution adopted by the Federation Council Thursday (a total of 101 deputies were for, 20 against, and two abstained) points out that "the Chechen republic has turned into a zone of mass violation of human rights and freedoms."

In addition, the Federation Council proposed to Russia's Prosecutor-General's office to institute proceedings on the illegal division of military property and transfer of arms of the Russian army to the Chechen power bodies.

The Federation Council believes that the Russian government should develop measures to compensate material damaged inflicted to the country's citizens who have suffered from hostilities.

A proposal, which was included in the draft resolution and which planned to use the State Duma's constitutional right to make accusations against the Russian

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president in accordance with Article 171 of the RF Criminal Code for his dismissal, has failed to collect the necessary number of votes (a total of 61 were for, 54 against, and nine abstained; a total of 90 votes were needed to pass this decision).

The proposal put forward to the State Duma to express non-confidence in the Russian government was declined (a total of 66 were for, 55 against, and 7 abstained). In addition, deputies of the Federation Council declined proposals to ban the Federation Council chairman to participate in the work of the RF Security Council and to suspend participation of the Federation Council in the Agreement on Civic Accord.

The Federation Council held secret electronic voting on each of these items.

Discusses Legality of Chechnya Operation

LD1901130395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1147 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 19 (INTERFAX)—The Federation Council (the upper house of Russian Parliament) discusses a draft resolution qualifying the use of Russian forces in Chechnya as unlawful.

It also calls on the State Duma (the lower house) to withdraw trust in the federal government while President Yeltsin is offered to take immediate actions to restore constitutional order to the Chechen Republic in line with Russia's basic law.

The resolution provides for recalling Council members from the interim civil rights commission because of its inability to monitor the human rights situation in Chechnya while fighting goes on. It proposes for suspending the Council's adherence to the Civic Accord until the regional crisis has been resolved.

The government is offered to reimburse war damage to the victims of fighting in Chechnya.

Debate on Chechnya 'Inconclusive'

LD1901142795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1413 GMT 19 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 19 TASS—A four hour debate on Chechnya at today's sitting of the Federation Council, the Russian parliament upper house, proved hot and inconclusive, and is to continue in the evening. Whether a resolution concerning the Chechen conflict is passed at the evening session is uncertain. An 11-paragraph draft resolution was motioned by a previously formed editorial commission. The resolution opens with a paragraph which defines the use of armed forces in Chechnya as unlawful. The resolution is to demand that President Yeltsin immediately brings the federal authorities' actions in Chechnya in conformity with the Russian Constitution.

During the debate, another draft resolution was motioned, with an additional paragraph which offers to the State Duma, or the lower house, to motion impeachment of President Yeltsin on charges of Article 171 of the Russian penal code. The resolution also motions that the State Duma give a no-confidence vote to the government. Some parliamentarians proposed a secret ballot on the two paragraphs and on suspension of the Federation Council chairman's membership of the Russian Security Council.

Others moved suspension of the Federation Council's endorsement of the Russian Public Accord Treaty until the Chechen crisis is settled.

It was also proposed that the council's representatives be called back from the provisional human rights commission because real human rights watch is impossible during hostilities. Both parliamentary houses should set up instead this commission a new enquiry commission to investigate the events relating to Chechnya. Whether any of the motions is passed remains to be seen in the evening.

Federation Council Rejects No Confidence Vote Proposal

LD1901161595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1510 GMT 19 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 19 Jan—Today the Federation Council rejected the proposal of a vote of no confidence in the Russian president and government in connection with the Chechen problem. The deputies did not approve the points in the resolution on the situation in Chechnya that contained proposals to the State Duma to level "accusations against the president of committing a crime under part two of Article 171 of the Criminal Code, and for dismissing him from his post" and "to express no confidence in the Russian Federation Government."

Sixty-one voted for the first proposal, 54 against it, and nine abstained. For the second proposal, the voting went as follows: 66—for, 55—against, and seven abstained.

The deputies also did not support the point on prohibiting the chairman of the Federation Council from taking part in the work of the Security Council. The proposal to halt the Federation Council's participation in the Public Accord Treaty also did not receive the necessary majority vote.

Voting on the resolution was conducted by secret ballot, electronically, on each point. Discussion of the resolution as a whole continues.

Duma To Discuss Confidence in Defense Minister Grachev

LD2001091195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0855 GMT 20 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 20 TASS—The Russian State Duma decided on Friday [20 January] to include into its agenda the issue of confidence in Defence Minister Pavel Grachev.

The proposal was voiced by Yekaterina Lakhova, the leader of the "Women of Russia" faction in connection with the latest Chechen developments and was backed by 230 lawmakers.

44 deputies were against and two abstained.

Officially the Duma is to consider whether Grachev "corresponds to his position".

It is only the Russian president who appoints and dismisses the defence minister.

Duma Kills State of Emergency Draft Law

MK1901122095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian, 19 Jan 95, p 2

[Report by Petr Zhuravlev under the "Lawmakers" rubric: "State Duma Dislikes New State of Emergency Draft Law"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday the State Duma turned down in first reading a draft constitutional law on states of emergency submitted by its Security Committee. As little as 210 deputies voted for it whereas the passing of constitutional laws requires the votes of two-thirds of the deputies on the roster (300). Characteristically, had the draft law submitted yesterday not been constitutional, it would not have been "passed" yesterday all the same: the "norm" for a usual law is 226 votes.

Security Committee Deputy Chairman Viktor Mironov ("Russia's Choice"), who presented his colleagues' brainchild, stated that the draft law's concept was approved by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Presidium as far back as in early 1993. In the deputy's words, it was clear already at that time that the Russian law on states of emergency was passed to counter the USSR law, and it was excessively politicized and declaratory. Having hyped in every way the text now submitted to the State Duma's verdict, Mr. Mironov vouched that all the amendments suggested by the deputies will be taken into account or at least discussed as the text gets prepared for second reading.

His arguments, however, had no effect. Vyacheslav Nikonov (Party of Russian Unity and Accord) stated he failed to understand how Mironov, a "Russia's Choice" member, could present such an anti-democratic law. In the view of Mr. Nikonov and his fellow parliamentarians who agree with him, the draft law provides for the possibility of authorities' arbitrariness while a state of emergency is in effect. "It once again does not follow from the text that, now, for example, it is necessary to introduce a state of emergency in Chechnya. To do this is really necessary," one of the opponents also said. The sharpest

protest, however, was drawn by the draft law's provision permitting the use of the army "in exceptional cases" for the maintenance of a state of emergency regime, in particular, for "separation of the opposing sides of conflicts," and for "cutting short the activities of unlawful armed formations." Nor was joy provoked by the president's right, incorporated in the text, to impose on the territory of a Federation component where a state of emergency was announced, a special mode of administration where the powers of both the executive and representative authorities are either limited or suspended.

Regional Affairs

Reportage, Commentary on Conflict in Chechnya

Capture of Presidential Palace Confirmed

LD1901144895 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1321 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] I now repeat a report which we have just received from the Russian Federation government's press office: The Russian Federation flag was hoisted over the Presidential Palace in Grozny this afternoon. And Pavel Guskov, our correspondent in the North Caucasus, just phoned the office with the details. Go ahead Pavel Borisovich.

[Guskov] Good afternoon, Mayak listeners. I would like to confirm this report from the Russian Federation press office that the Russian flag has been hoisted over what remains of the Presidential Palace in Grozny. The North Caucasus department of the television and radio company received this report about 90 minutes ago.

Fighting continued in Grozny today and it became clear that Dudayev's supporters were already on the defensive and there could no longer be any question of the military action turning in their favor. But the question is being asked: Who was conducting the combat action in Grozny? Colonel (Nikolay Kleptsov), deputy chief of the Stavropol Territory Internal Affairs Directorate, finished a news conference just 15 minutes ago where he spoke of his stay in Chechnya as deputy head of the group for operational planning of the Russian Interior Ministry forces.

Nikolay Kleptsov spoke of what he, as an eyewitness, saw in Grozny. And here are a few sentences from what he said. He said: Of course, we in Russia were late in putting things in order. But this needed to be done. He stressed that the appearance of the Interior Ministry Forces and the appearance of the militia in itself inspired much more confidence among the population of Chechnya, and he did not just mean the Russians but the Chechens themselves who started asking them to protect them from the whims of Dudayev's militants. Dudayev's militants are not an uncoordinated mass, Nikolay Kleptsov said. They are a well-trained army with a valuable past which fights with an understanding that it has nothing to lose. For this reason, he ruled out the

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possibility of a peaceful outcome and he stressed that around 200-400 mujahedin were fighting on their side, according to his information. He also said that in essence the entire population of Chechnya—both the Russians and the Russian-speaking population and the Chechens—welcomed with hope the advance of the Russian troops since this rescues them from the absolute power of the gang which has administered this republic for the past three years.

Dudayev Reportedly Still in Grozny

LD1901211595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2020 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Grozny, Jan 19 (INTERFAX)—Military intelligence reported that large losses were sustained by militants of Dzhokar Dudayev today when Federal troops seized the Presidential Palace in the Chechen capital. The Russian state flag was hoisted over the Presidential Palace.

A part of the Chechen militants defending Grozny retreated to the northwestern districts of the town. Military Intelligence said chief of the Chechen Armed Forces Main Headquarters Aslan Maskhadov had also left for northwestern districts of Grozny.

An INTERFAX correspondent reports from Grozny that 10 paratroopers of the Northern Group of Federal troops led by General Lev Rokhlin were the first to enter the Presidential Palace this morning. Federal troops also seized the Kavkaz Hotel and the building of the Council of Ministers on the central square of Grozny. All buildings there have been completely or partially destroyed as a result of previous bombing and missile attacks.

Russian intelligence said Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev was still in Grozny in the southeastern district of the town not controlled by Federal troops. He replaced his bodyguards with Lithuanian mercenaries and created a group of 30 people specially for his personal protection, the same source said.

In the interim, chief of the Chechen Armed Forces Main Headquarters Aslan Maskhadov agreed during a meeting with journalists that Federal troops had seized the Presidential Palace. He added, however, that supporters of Dzhokhar Dudayev saw no sense in remaining there as the Palace had been nearly completely destroyed by intensive fire last night.

Maskhadov said the seizure of the Presidential Palace did not mark the end of military actions. He said the Chechen headquarters had been moved to the opposite side of the Sunzha River several kilometers away from the Presidential Palace.

Chechen Forces Fall Back to Sunja River

AU2001115495 Paris AFP in English 1149 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Grozny, Jan 20 (AFP)—Chechen separatist forces have withdrawn from the

eastern part of central Grozny, including the area around the railway station, and taken up new defensive positions west of the Sunja river, their commander said Friday.

Aslan Maskhadov, head of the general staff of Chechen forces, told AFP that the decision was taken to "better defend the city" as positions in central Grozny could not be defended because of ferocious Russian bombardments.

Chechen separatist forces are now deployed along the Sunja river, the new battlefield between the warring sides, which runs across the city from north to south.

Grozny Center To Fall 'In Next Few Days'

LD1901174395 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1600 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The flag of the Russian Federation was raised on the Presidential Palace in Grozny this afternoon. As a result of powerful shelling some of the buildings around the palace are on fire. There is a pall of smoke over the city.

Military sources told the Interfax agency that the center of Grozny will be taken in the next few days.

The press service of the government of Russia reported that on 18 January Dudayev and those accompanying him—150 to 200 members of his bodyguard—were in the bombshelter of City Hospital No. 5.

According to information from intercepted radio messages the illegal armed formations are setting up a military district in the mountain regions of Chechnya. Contracts are being concluded with persons who express willingness to continue combat actions as members of this district.

Government Press Report on Conflict

LD1901192095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1717 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 19 TASS—The Russian Government's press service released on Thursday a report on the latest developments in the Chechen Republic. The report reads as follows:

"According to the Russian Government's press service, over the past twenty-four hours, federal troop units continued combat operations in downtown Grozny, enlarging spheres of influence, blocking illegal armed formations, regrouping troops and cleaning certain districts of the city. Units of the northern and western army groupings joined together on Pobeda Prospekt.

Russian interior troops blocked the main routes of militants, sealed off the areas of deployment of bandit formations, mercenaries and weapons, maintained railway traffic on the section from Mozdok to Chervlenaya.

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Opposition troops remained in their places of dislocation, not taking part in combat operations.

On Thursday, federal troops are expected to go ahead with driving the enemy from downtown Grozny, blocking, disengaging, disarming illegal armed formations, enlarging spheres of influence, preparing reserves.

Over the past twenty-four hours, groups of the Ministry for Emergencies delivered and unloaded in Grozny 72 tons of foodstuffs, and took 170 refugees from the Chechen capital. The ministry's teams were dispatched to the settlement of Tolstoy-Yurt to carry out reconstruction work. A plane carrying 21 tons of medications was unloaded in the town of Mozdok.

According to some reports, as of January 18, Dudayev and his escort (150-200 guards) remained in the bomb-proof shelter of city hospital #5.

Report also say Dudayev has lost control over illegal armed formations, communication among them is rather unstable, many groups of recruited militants do not appear at the assigned positions, while foreign mercenaries often act in the second echelon, pressing Dudayev militants from behind and killing those seeking to desert.

According to radio interception data, illegal armed formations are now building a military district in Chechnya's mountainous regions. Contracts are being signed with those wishing to continue fighting within this grouping."

Shakhray, CIS Ambassadors Discuss Conflict

LD1901212495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2023 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 19 (INTERFAX)—Russian Deputy Premier Sergey Shakhray said in Moscow today that the Russian leaders had always tried to resolve the Chechen problem by peaceful means.

Shakhray informed the ambassadors of the CIS countries on measures taken by the Russian leaders for settling the crisis in Chechnya.

He said all attempts of Dzhokhar Dudayev to declare himself head of an independent state had not been backed abroad.

Shakhray said the main problem after seizing the Presidential Palace in Grozny was to decide who could represent the provisional legitimate power in Chechnya and "with whom restoration of the Chechen economy and power structures could be discussed." He said he believed that seniors and the heads of Chechen clans could form the provisional power.

When asked why the federal power had not taken radical measures in Chechnya for so long, Shakhray said, "We hoped that Dzhokhar Dudayev would understand that it

would be better for his republic to live in Russia than independently. There had been many attempts to resolve the problem by talks."

Commenting on the results of the meeting with Shakhray, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Kolokolov told INTERFAX that "the ambassadors of all CIS countries were concerned about the number of civilians killed in the conflict." He stressed that, however, none of the CIS ambassadors doubted that the federal power in Russia had been forced to use troops in Chechnya.

The CIS ambassadors made it clear that events in Chechnya would not affect relations of the CIS countries with Russia, Kolokolov said.

Enquiry Into Root Causes of Conflict Set

LD1901192495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1853 GMT 19 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 19 (TASS)—Russia's Federation Council passed a resolution today to set up a joint enquiry commission with the State Duma for scrutiny of events in Chechnya, beginning from seizing power by a Dudayev-led group in 1991. The enquiry is to lead to decisions on responsibility of officials.

The Federation Council passed a resolution on compliance with its December 8 and 17 resolutions. The resolution says "a civil war is going on in the territory of one of Russian Federation component parts, Chechnya has become an area of mass violation of human rights and freedoms.

Deputies stressed that escalation of the Chechen conflict was made possible by miscompliance with the Federation Council's resolutions. The Council recommended the president to immediately bring federal authorities' actions in Chechnya in conformity to the Russian Constitution.

Deputies decided that the Prosecutor General's office should open a criminal case on earlier illegal division of military property and passing of Russian Army's weapons to Chechen authorities. The Federation Council recommended the government to adopt a damage compensation programme for Russian citizens affected by the conflict. The Federation Council and the State Duma decided to form a joint commission to draft amendments to the Russian Constitution and the legislation.

The Upper Parliament house issued a statement which calls on the president and the government to cooperate with the parliament. Only strict universal abiding by the Constitution and cooperation of powers can stop the civil war, the statement says.

Republic Leaders Comment on Crisis

MK1901130095 Moscow OBSHCAYA GAZETA in Russian No. 3/79, 19-25 Jan 95 (Signed to press 18 Jan) p 8

[Unattributed report on comments by regional leaders Viktor Stepanov, Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, and Mikhail Nikolayev under the "Tendency" rubric: "Shooting in Grozny, Windows Rattling in Yakutsk"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The war in Chechnya is a serious test for the fledgling Russian statehood. Such upheavals do not pass without a trace. As soon as the first shots rang out in Grozny, responsible politicians became alarmed: such measures to consolidate the Federation, to protect Russia's integrity, can revive the process of the country's disintegration, and lead to a complete disintegration of its statehood. Fortunately, the worst forecasts have not come true. But the "Chechnya pacification" experience has had a decidedly negative impact on the state of federative relations. This is a view of the authoritative politicians OBSHCAYA GAZETA has asked to comment on the situation.

Viktor Stepanov, Republic of Karelia government head:

I am convinced that a forcible solution of the Chechen problem is no method. A state cannot be preserved with sword and fire. Power propped up by an army is not democratic. Now that we have opted for a democratic road, such methods are unacceptable for us. In Karelia we have a sufficiently strong protest against the central authorities' actions in Chechnya. The Committee of Soldiers' Mothers has forwarded to the federal parliament and myself an appeal warning about possible civil disobedience actions. Besides, our Karelian parliament has spoken categorically against the participation by the republic's residents in the Chechen conflict. In a word, the problem has taken on an interethnic character. I think the results of future elections both for president and parliament are going to prove deplorable for those who made the decision on Chechnya.

Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, Republic of Kalmykia president:

The Chechen crisis will have more than negative consequences. The reaction of Federation components to Moscow's actions is rather predictable: They will now be more wary in relations with the federal power. It is no longer trusted, it has proved it wants to talk with the republics only in the language of force. I think that leaders of the regions will try to agree among themselves. Now things are moving toward what I spoke about in October 1993—toward creating a Council of Heads of Russian Federation Components. We in the regions can see better what is to be done and how. As for the center, it should only tackle "global" matters—security, international relations, and things like that. We do not intend to take away these functions from it, we have enough of our own problems.

Mikhail Nikolayev, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) president:

What is happening in the Northern Caucasus is a tragedy not only for the Chechen people but also for all Russia. The methods being used there by the federal power cannot elicit approval from normal people. The center's actions corroborate the urgency of our demand: one should create a fully fledged constitutional-treaty federation, to pass a federal law on a system of organs of state power.

'Deception' of Chechen Delegation Alleged

LD1901173395 Moscow NTV in Russian 1600 GMT 19 Jan 95

[Video report by Aleksandr Zazaelyan]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sergey Kovalev, human rights commissioner under the president of Russia, arrived in Moscow Vnukovo airport today on flight 91 from Mineralnye Vody. According to Lidiya Semina, Sergey Kovalev's aide, there is nothing extraordinary in his return today: he simply must catch up on things to do. However, Sergey Adamovich [Kovalev] revealed at a news conference which he conducted at the airport that the reason for his coming to Moscow is much more serious.

[Begin Kovalev recording] The Chechens who met with [Prime Minister] Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin have come back, as you certainly know. They came back full of hope. They were expecting that yesterday at 1800 they would meet with a representative of the military command of the Russian Army to discuss technical issues of the armistice agreement, which—in their opinion—had already been achieved. But there then ensued an inappropriate and a lengthy merry-go-round or reproaches and deception. It turned out that the Chechens had to be at 1800 in Grozny, rather than in Nazran. That's physically impossible. It turned out that it was up to them to find these army generals in Grozny themselves. [end recording]

Sergey Kovalev bitterly criticized the actions of the defense minister, accusing him of direct disobedience to the Russian government. Asked whether Kovalev was going to insist on a meeting with the prime minister, he said:

[Begin Kovalev recording] I hope very much that this meeting will happen. [end recording]

According to Sergey Kovalev, the Chechen war is far from finished. [video shows Kovalev speaking to correspondents at the airport]

Raw Recruits Not Involved in Street Fighting

LD1901172295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1311 GMT 19 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 19 TASS— "Only soldiers of the federal force, well trained for this type of warfare, are taking part in combat operations in

Chechnya. Inexperienced young soldiers are not taking part in street fighting in Grozny," Major General Sergey Zdorikov, head of the main department for educational work, said today at a press conference in the Russian Defence Ministry.

According to Zdorikov, soldiers of the first year of service are also taking part in the fighting, but they undergo preliminary training at a training base in Mozdok and only after that they are committed to action. Soldiers and sergeants, who served for more than six months, "get their first experience at the outskirts of Grozny, during the patrolling of the facilities, controlled by the federal forces, specifically, on the territory of the Grozny cannery, and in the north-eastern streets of the Chechen capital, and only after that they are sent to block posts," he continued.

General Zdorikov, who spent much time in the conflict zone, including the front line, was "deeply impressed by the nobility of character of Russians, by the courage and devotion to the soldiers' duty of those, who put the interests of the state above anything else."

Touching upon the loss of life in the course of the conflict, Zdorikov said that it was too early to give exact figures. According to his information, "the servicemen who were reported missing after the new year street fighting, continue to leave Grozny one by one or in groups ... Many people were killed and wounded during the first days of the fighting because they were forbidden to be the first to open fire."

According to Zdorikov, who fought in Afghanistan as a young officer, the experience of the current military operation is without precedent. "We keep in mind that it is our compatriots who are in the zone of the fighting," he said.

'Gray Wolf' Deputy Chief Denies Involvement

MK1901125095 Moscow NOVAYA
YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Jan 95
p 1

[Unattributed report on interview with Mansur Mansurov, deputy chief of the Azerbaijani "Boz Gurd" party: "Every Wolf Has His Own Forest. Azerbaijani 'Gray Wolves' Assert That Their Men Are Not Fighting in Chechnya"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The leadership of the Azerbaijani "Boz Gurd" ("Gray Wolf") democratic party has expressed its "concern over reports that are being increasingly often carried by the mass media about the alleged participation of party members in the fighting in Chechnya."

Mansur Mansurov, deputy party chairman, who contacted our editorial board, emphasized that even without a foreign party's intervention the leaders of Chechnya and Russia can and are obliged to their peoples to sit

down at the negotiating table and resolve the problem at the top political level, not on the battlefield.

Official sources have reported that three members of the "Boz Gurd" party have allegedly been detained in Moscow with firearms on them. The government press service has released information that a subunit of Azerbaijani "Gray Wolves" with a strength of up to 200 men is operating in Grozny. We are reiterating that there are no armed men in Chechnya sent by our party, nor can there be such people. Moreover, the very allegation about Azerbaijani mercenaries' involvement in the Chechen conflict is very questionable. Borders with Russia are being fairly strictly policed, and the very idea of armed Azerbaijanis' participation in the Chechnya fighting has not been supported by either the official authorities or our state's public opinion.

The Azerbaijani "Boz Gurd" party sticks to universal democratic principles and denounces any forms of terror or violence in carrying out its activity. Our principles are the territorial integrity, peace, quiet, and independence of the state of Azerbaijan. Our objective is to assist in the development of Azerbaijani statehood and the prosperity of our people. This objective cannot be achieved without close, good-neighbor relations with Russia. For this very reason we are ready to take an active part in investigating any facts throwing a shadow on these relations.

At the same time, the Azerbaijani "Gray Wolves" leader noted that just as Russia is concerned about the fate of Orthodox Serbs, the goings-on in the predominantly Muslim Chechnya cannot but arouse concern in Azerbaijan. Human rights violations cannot be considered to be an internal affair of any state.

A wolf in the Chechen state emblem and a wolf in the emblem of this Azerbaijani party still do not give grounds to accuse Chechen and Azerbaijani Muslims of carrying out joint military operations. Here, every wolf has his own forest.

Talks With Russian Commanders Sought

LD2001105295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1013
GMT 20 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ruslan Mayzigov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Nazran January 20 TASS—The shelling of the central part of Grozny, where scattered detachments of Dudayev's fighters are still entrenched, continued last night and today morning, ITAR-TASS was told at the Ingush Ministry for Emergency Situations. [sentence as received] According to information received from this source, air strikes were dealt at the area around the Grozny motor terminal.

It is difficult to say whether the leaders of the Dudayev's regime are still in the city. Some members of his government met Russian and foreign journalists at Nazran on Thursday evening. They said they would like to hold

talks with the Russian military commanders in Nazran in order to reach agreement on a ceasefire. However, neither the economics minister Taimaz Abubakarov, nor the Chechen procurator-general Osman Imaev, who had talks in Moscow with Viktor Chernomyrdin and Sergey Shakhrai, nor chief of the Dudayev headquarters Aslan Maskhadov, who also came to Nazran, are ready to accept the capitulation terms which, as they claim, offered to them during a telephone talk with Russian General Babichev. The latter conditioned a meeting with them on their acceptance.

Maskhadov said that the headquarters of the Chechen forces was moved to a new place on the other side of the Sunzha river on Thursday night. "It is a few kilometres from the presidential palace," he stated. And although it is common knowledge that the palace is already in the hands of the federal troops, he only noted, in reply to one of the questions put to him, that the building was "completely ruined".

Maskhadov said nothing about the fate of the Russian prisoners, locked up in the palace's basement, but stressed that the treatment of the prisoners "will not change irrespective of the outcome of the hostilities". He also claimed that about 200 Russian officers and men were in the hands of Dudayev's troops.

The participants of the press conference assured the journalists that the Dudayev leadership "was ready, as before, to begin talks and to stop the hostilities". They left Nazran, heading in the direction of Grozny, late on Thursday evening.

Russian General Expects No Partisan War

LD1901213595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 2022
GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 19 (INTERFAX)—A high-ranking representative of the Russian armed forces believes that "there will be no partisan war in Chechnya."

In an interview with Interfax Thursday the general, who preferred to stay anonymous, categorically refuted messages stating that military bases are allegedly being created in the republic's mountainous regions where there are a great number of fighters and military equipment.

"Such rumors are intended for politicians who have no information about events in Chechnya," he said.

The general remarked that if any concentrations of fighters are discovered in the mountains they will be destroyed from the air by the Russian aviation.

According to him, armed forces will not follow fighters who left Grozny. "The army detachments will be deployed in camps near Grozny for possible support of the interior forces," he said.

Within the next few days Russian armed forces will completely cleanse Grozny from fighters and will hand over the city under control of Russia's interior forces, the general reported.

In his words, Dudayev's regime was getting ready for possible hostilities in Grozny for three years. It has created numerous firing points, communication nets and underground command points and this has seriously complicated the task aimed at liberation of the city.

The general reported that details of this defense infrastructure have become known only after several districts of Grozny were liberated. In his estimate, counterintelligence service had no information about this aspect of training of "illegal armed formations."

MVD Training Units To Be Dispatched

MK2001085095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
20 Jan 95 p 2

[Report from Khabarovsk by Oleg Kryuchek under the "Reserves" rubric: "Minister Yerin Sends 'Cannon Fodder' to Chechnya. Commanders Instructed To Prepare Interior Troops' Training Units for Dispatch to Chechnya"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Internal Affairs Ministry [MVD] leadership has proceeded with the promised replacement of Russian army units in Chechnya with interior troops. It was announced at the staff of the Eastern Interior Troop District that the Internal Affairs Ministry leadership has sent relevant orders throughout Russia to prepare individual units and subunits for the mission of ensuring order in the North Caucasus.

The Internal Affairs Ministry document contains a number of curious details: for instance, commanders of relevant ranks have been instructed to prepare first of all interior troop training units for deployment to Chechnya. According to the ministry's existing internal regulations, Mr. Yerin is entitled to use precisely these subunits because they belong to the internal affairs minister's personal reserve.

In the view of Eastern District staff officers, all talk about replacing regular army units with Internal Affairs Ministry regiments is "a fantasy of the lowest quality," since currently the Internal Affairs Ministry is unable to concentrate a group of forces capable of properly carrying out police functions in Chechnya.

At closer scrutiny, the internal affairs minister's reserve represents but regular training schools for noncommissioned officers whose personnel are draftees of autumn 1994, that is, soldiers who cannot yet actually tell a rifle barrel from a butt. Officers themselves say that real "cannon fodder" will be sent to Chechnya for the sake of delivering on the president's ill-conceived promises. Nonetheless, Colonel Yevgeniy Doroshin, a member of the Eastern Interior Troop District Command, thinks it

necessary to carry out all orders and instructions arriving from Moscow on the simple ground that "we're in the army now." Your SEGODNYA correspondent has learned that the first training regiment, No. 6653, is due to be flown from the Far East to the North Caucasus as early as the next few days.

Rybkin Comments on Previous Human 'Losses'

LD1901192795 Moscow *ITAR-TASS* in English 1824 GMT 19 Jan 95

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[*FBIS* Transcribed Text] Moscow January 19 (TASS)—The number of people killed in the Chechen Republic under the Dudayev rule "comes to thousands" of victims, according to Ivan Rybkin, speaker of the Russian Parliament's lower house.

After the situation in Chechnya stabilizes and a legitimate government sets to work there, "We will still have to learn about the huge and irretrievable human losses in the republic, where people used to disappear without any trial or investigation," Rybkin told reporters on Thursday.

Chechnya was an arena of mob murders and pillage by bandit-like groups, the speaker went on to say. And these actions affected people of all nationalities living in the republic, he stressed.

Shoygu Denies Aid Reaching Dudayev Units

LD1901164395 Moscow *INTERFAX* in English 1147 GMT 19 Jan 95

[*FBIS* Transcribed Text] Mozdok, Jan 19 (*INTERFAX*)—Russia's Emergency Situations Minister Sergey Shoygu has described as "absolute inventions" the reports run by certain news media that Russian humanitarian cargoes sent to Grozny end up in the hands of Dudayev's bandit units.

"Strict control has been established over each kilo of aid," he told *INTERFAX* before his departure for Moscow from Mozdok (North Ossetia).

Shoygu said, "Cargoes are sent to those population centers where there are representatives of Russia's Emergencies Ministry." His ministry, he added, cannot be responsible for the further destiny of such cargoes.

His ministry, Shoygu said, is establishing a field hospital in the area of Grozny's old airport, and teams of rescue workers will begin to function in the liberated areas of the city in the next few days.

According to Shoygu, more than 20 [metric] tonnes of building equipment are to be delivered to Grozny before the end of this week.

Dagestan, Ingushetia Borders Strengthened

LD2001110395 Moscow *ITAR-TASS* in English 1025 GMT 20 Jan 95

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Nikolay Styazhkin]

[*FBIS* Transcribed Text] Stavropol January 20 TASS—Troops of the Caucasian border district guarding Russian southern borders, including with Chechnya and Georgia, took up additional control of Chechnya's administrative borders with Dagestan and Ingushetia.

The border guards were ordered to block remnants of Dudayev's gangs from breaking at large across these republics, *ITAR-TASS* was told today by District Commander Viktor Zemtsov. The spread of arms must be prevented and civilians be protected from raids of terrorist fighters, Zemtsov said.

The border district commander said attempts of Chechen fighters to break through into Dagestan and Ingushetia were increasingly frequent recently. Heavy attacks of pro-Dudayev groups had to be resisted in the direction of Kizlar, Dagestan. The groups are armed to their teeth, Zemtsov said.

Speaking about the slaying of Russian border guards near the village of Assinovskaya last week, Zemtsov explained that the guards were going without arms to show their peaceful intents to locals. The district's headquarters have drawn lessons from this tragic experience, Zemtsov said.

Troops From Kaliningrad Sent to Fight

WS2001124295 Kaliningrad *KALININGRADSKAYA PRAVDA* in Russian 12 Jan 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Kaliningrad Residents in 'Hot Spot'"]

[*FBIS* Translated Excerpt] A special purpose militia detachment of the Kaliningrad Internal Affairs Administration is getting ready to be dispatched to Chechnya. It will carry out special missions related to disarming bandit formations and restoring order in the republic.

As we have learned at the press center of the Baltic Sea Fleet, to protect state interests in North Caucasus, a subunit of the Baltic Fleet marines under the command of Lieutenant Colonel A. Darkevich has been sent there at the disposal of the Russian troop command in the region. The guardsmen have arrived at their destination. [passage omitted]

Rumors are spreading that more than 10 coffins with bodies of servicemen and Interior Ministry officers from Kaliningrad have arrived in the city. We have managed to establish that the rumors are groundless. No such coffin has arrived either in the military garrison hospital morgue or the city morgue. [passage omitted]

Baltic Fleet Reports on Marines' Actions

WS2001123795 Kaliningrad *KALININGRADSKAYA PRAVDA* in Russian 17 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by the press center of the Baltic Sea Fleet: "Baltic Fleet Marines Are Carrying Out Their Mission"—last paragraph published in boldface]

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[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Over the last few days the airborne assault battalion of the Baltic Fleet marine brigade has not participated in combat actions.

The personnel are continuing to carry out their mission related to protecting rear facilities of the Federal Troops, and are conducting combat training and preparations. Certain servicemen are currently in Grozny, where they are carrying out a combat mission.

Their base has been equipped. The marines are provided with all kinds of allowances. [passage omitted]

Official Silence on Siberian Troops Scored

954F0907A Novosibirsk *VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK* in Russian 12 Jan 95 p 4

[Article by Yuriy Kuvshinov, chairman of the executive committee of the Novosibirsk branch of the Democratic Choice of Russia Party: "Yuriy Kuvshinov: 'We Are Losing the Right to the Truth...'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I read on Christmas Eve in *VECHERKA* a statement of the Siberian Military District Press Office from which I gleaned, finally, information on the participation of the district's subunits in military operations in Chechnya.

Thanks, folks! Not even a month has elapsed since the start of the events, and we have been notified of this. We probably need not have been notified of this at all, it is, after all, the army. Discipline, regulations, an order from higher up: they loaded up, and were off to war. If on top of all else even the army begins to debate, this is it—a total screw-up in the country.

But the sense of the statement lay altogether elsewhere. It was a question of the reaction of society and civilians to what is happening in Chechnya and to the participation in this of Siberians. And here, excuse me, esteemed generals and colonels, we have a right to discuss and to have our own opinion and to obtain, according to the constitution, timely information. Martial law, censorship, and other restrictions have not yet been imposed here, have they?

The statement of the Siberian Military District speaks with great fervor about the army's duty to defend the motherland and fatherland, which is undoubtedly true, but it is hardly apposite in respect to rocket and bomb attacks (which have continued merrily, incidentally, even after the statement of the president of the Russian Federation and the army commander on their termination) and tank assaults within the territory of Russia on a Russian city, in which Russian citizens live. Was military aggression that required an armed repulse being perpetrated against Russia?

The reason for the lengthy silence of the Siberian Military District command on the dispatch of the district's subunits to Chechnya is given in the statement as follows: "We maintained a silence to prevent the trains

carrying our children from being derailed." We have, generally, already begun once again to get accustomed to the lies, absurdities, and routine deviltry with which the powers that be regale us. But, dear friends, according to all the canons of psychology and propaganda, the habituation effect is more easily achieved when we are, for all that, treated to small doses of such information. I have reacted painfully to people's insincerity since childhood, and when I am told such things, and not to my face even, I cease to understand what is happening.

If the Siberian Military District Headquarters sincerely believes that in not having announced the dispatch of the troops earlier it was thereby protecting them against potential terrorists, I am made even more anxious at the fact that the lives of many Russian citizens—both military and civilian—are in the hands of such strategists. If this is not what they believe, but is only what they are telling us they believe, we are being taken for idiots who will believe everything they are told.

Perhaps the Siberian Military District Press Office has information that terrorists in Russia are now derauling troop trains only after they have been reported in the papers? All this and much else would be laughable were it not so distressing. In a situation where we are talking about the life and death of hundreds and thousands of Russian citizens, we are becoming witnesses to and hostages of unscrupulous policy. And if it is the mission of the military to carry out orders and, at times, to give these orders some interpretation for society, it is the right and duty of political organizations to convey to people their political position and to express their assessment of events. It is for this reason that we consider it our duty to announce that the viewpoint of the Democratic Choice of Russia Party differs appreciably today from the position of the official authorities.

Our position right at the start of these events was expressed in several statements of the party's federal Political Council, the essence of which amounted to nonsupport for military methods of a resolution of the problem, particularly against the background of the practically total absence of attempts at its political resolution preceding them. I will specify at the same time that not all members of the party, for various reasons, share this viewpoint of the Political Council, but the majority supports it, nonetheless. We believe that the crisis in Chechnya contains a considerably greater danger for society as a whole than is apparent on the surface. And one of them [as published] is the ever increasing information casuistry of the authorities. Having lost the right to the truth, we can boldly give up democratic transformations in society as a bad job. Are we prepared to understand this?

Tatarstan Delegation's Visit Detailed

954F0920B Kazan *IZVESTIYA TATARSTANA* in Russian 17 Jan 95 p 1

Galina Grigorenko report: "Are Dudayev's Irregulars To Be Believed?"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] A news conference of members of a parliamentary delegation of the Republic of Tatarstan Supreme Soviet, which had recently returned from Chechnya, was held yesterday.

The leader of this group, Razil Valeyev, chairman of a standing commission of the Republic of Tatarstan Supreme Soviet, told journalists that all the tasks set before the trip to Chechnya had been accomplished. First, the humanitarian assistance was handed over to the proper quarters, second, the situation in the conflict zone had been assessed in person, and, third, valuable information on the servicemen from Tatarstan engaged in the combat operations had been collected.

Unfortunately, our delegation did not get to meet with representatives of the federal authorities. The role of mediator was assumed by Boris Agapov, vice president of Ingushetia, who was handed a list containing the names of 84 natives of our republic on the territory of Chechnya at this time. In the opinion of our members of parliament, it is necessary to urgently demand of President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin that all our fellow countrymen (regardless of nationality) return home.

Marat Mulyukov, people's deputy of the Republic of Tatarstan, described the mood of the Russian soldiers as "downcast": contacts with them are essentially prohibited, and only officers enter into conversation with outsiders. But the contacts with Dudayev's irregulars made quite a favorable impression on the delegation members. In any event, the Chechens promised that they would not lay a finger on servicemen from Tatarstan. In addition, they would be among the first to be sent home were a truce to be announced. The bullet is not selective, alas....

During the five-day trip, our delegation met with the group of Sergey Kovalev, deputy of the State Duma, visited a hospital for casualties of the bombing, and talked with refugees from Grozny. A big impression was made also by demonstrations devoted to the struggle for Chechnya's freedom. According to eyewitnesses, the demonstrators support, in the main, Dudayev's aspiration to achieve his republic's independence, but disapprove of the "general methods" of achieving the goal. The initiatives of M. Shaymiyev, president of the Republic of Tatarstan, concerning a settlement of relations with the federal authorities are well known in Chechnya. The population of the Caucasus republic is now becoming increasingly persuaded that the same steps are preferable for Chechnya also.

To journalists' question as to whether a big "Caucasus conflagration" could, for all that, flare up from the present "fragment of coal," the members of the delegation did not give a definite answer. Although, they

observed that things were already extremely uneasy in Dagestan, and Ingushetia, which is an innocent casualty, could be pulled into the conflict also.

Chuvash President Refuses To Cancel Decree

LD1901172995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1254 GMT 19 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valentina Ivanova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Cheboksary January 19 TASS—The president of the Russian Republic of Chuvashia, Nikolay Fedorov, refused to meet the demand of Boris Yeltsin and said he would not cancel his own decision which actually allowed the servicemen from the republic to refuse to fight in Chechnya.

"My decree will not be cancelled by me because it is in the framework of the Russian Constitution and is aimed to protect the interests of servicemen", Fedorov, a former Russian justice minister, told reporters on Thursday.

On Tuesday Boris Yeltsin signed a decree "recommending" that Fedorov cancels his decree of January 11 "On the Protection of Servicemen" as "not corresponding to the provisions of the Russian Constitution".

The Russian Government later made an official statement denouncing Fedorov's decision and saying that it "indirectly makes residents of the republic ignore their duties during military service".

Fedorov's decree did not mention Chechnya, but said that acting legislation has no legal norms for the use of the Army and interior units in settling conflicts on the Russian territory. It explained that interior forces can be engaged only in case of a state of emergency.

However, no state of emergency was imposed on Chechnya.

Thus, "servicemen cannot bear corresponding legal obligations and responsibility," the decree said.

Chuvash residents immediately interpreted the decree as an attempt to legally defend conscripts from the republic who are not ready both morally and professionally to fight in Chechnya.

Fedorov told reporters that he had learned on Thursday that yet another conscript from Chuvashia had been killed in Chechnya. "this fact convinces me in the timeliness of my directive", he said.

Move To Reestablish Council of Republic Heads Viewed

954F0916A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by Vitaliy Portnikov under the "Federation" rubric: "Will the Council of Republic Heads Be Resurrected? Regional Leaders Would Like To Influence Not Only the Legislative but Also the Executive Power"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] The almost antique chorus of representatives of the Center discussing the proposal of the leaders of Russian republics gathered in Cheboksary spoke mainly about the Congress of Peoples of Russia but paid no attention to the idea of restoring the Council of Heads of Republics, which perished in the wreckage of the burning White House in October 1993.

Let us recall that the Council of Heads of Republics was not only a factor of real political influence but also a factor in the feasibility of many of Boris Yeltsin's steps in his opposition to the legislative branch. Ruslan Khasbulatov would first condemn the very existence of the Council of Heads of Republics and then he would try to create something like it for himself—in a word, in the situation that has developed, the need to share the power with the regions has been recognized by both parties; and, therefore, nobody was surprised when in September 1993 the regional leaders tried to organize themselves so as somehow to have an impact on the situation or at least to mitigate it. They were tolerated until the tanks appeared on the streets. Under the rumbling of these vehicles of power, the Council was simply driven out, as the sailor Zheleznyakov drove out the Constituent Assembly. Enjoying its victory, the Center did not want to share with anyone. True, the regions were thrown a bone in the form of the Federation Council, but as early as December the transparency of the victory (in any case the democratic victory) became clear even to idealists and old ladies who were still chanting "Yeltsin, Yeltsin!" (where are those old ladies now?...).

But it took another 12 months to become convinced that crowding the regional leaders out of the presidential and executive power into the pro forma legislative power led to an extremely grave illness, almost to paralysis of the executive power itself. Chechnya dotted the i, and now whether or not the correct conclusions are drawn will depend not only on executive structures and Boris Yeltsin but also on the development of the situation and the Russian society.

This Federation cannot be built from above, regardless of how it may seem to the regular sovereign. It must appear as a result of voluntary and well-considered consent from all regions, as a refined system of complex agreements between the Center and the regions and the regions among themselves. The Federation Treaty, which will sooner or later turn into a Constitution in any case (or it will itself become the Constitution)—this is only the foundation, on which there are still too few structures unless, of course, one counts the fairly hastily created (how could it be otherwise in a couple of months?) Basic Law, which was calculated exclusively for the figure of Yeltsin: Intended to support only one presidency, it will become outdated along with that presidency. Possibly, as a result of new agreements among the regions there will also appear new formations that are larger and more influential than today's oblasts. But again it is not for the Kremlin to decide this (this is a sure way of destroying the Federation altogether,

setting Moscow and the provinces against one another!), but in the localities. And, of course, with the strictest regard for the status of the republics, the extremely large cries, and the national districts—they were created not for diversion but as the only means of preserving statehood, even with the ultrarepressive power against which Boris Yeltsin fought so talentedly when it finally played itself out.

Cheboksary, which has been underestimated so far, could become an extremely important stage in Russian state history, a new Novgorod Veche, which proved that it was not the people in the Kremlin who were prepared for the construction of an effective structure that pleased everyone and did not bomb its compatriots, but the political elite in the localities who, unlike the majority of politicians in the capital, were not yet living in the poverty stricken illusory little world of immediate competitive interests. And, of course, the Federation Council is not an alternative but a supplement to the Council of Heads of Republics (regions) because it is in the localities that the executive and legislative power of Russia should be created and strictly supervised, at the same time providing for the safe existence of the autonomous judicial power.

Kremlin Seen Paying More Heed to Republic Leaders

MK2001082095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by Vitaliy Portnikov under the "President" rubric: "Yeltsin To Meet With Republic Heads? So Far He Is Receiving 'Cheboksary Men'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Appearing in the Kremlin, next to the heads of Northern Caucasus republics—whom not to receive during the days of the Chechen crisis would simply have been indecent—were leaders of the republics represented in the recent meeting in Cheboksary. Boris Yeltsin met with presidents Mintimer Shaymiyev of Tatarstan and Murtaza Rakhimov of Bashkortostan. The main upshot of these rendezvous should perhaps be seen in his consent in principle to meet with all the leaders of Russia's republics.

President Shaymiyev claims such a meeting can take place as early as February. Obviously, the possibility of Yeltsin's meetings with presidents of the republics is a compromise of sorts between the demand of the participants in the Cheboksary meeting to revive the Council of Heads of the Republics destroyed after October 1993, and the Kremlin's unwillingness to take notice of the regions as is usually the case in the days of great victories and heavy shocks. Since, however, the Chechen shocks proved much greater than expected, and that Moscow now has to receive not only the recognized representatives of Federation components and ministers of the embattled Chechen Republic, the Kremlin's attempts to find a common language with the most authoritative of the regional leaders are quite understandable. If one

recalls that Boris Yeltsin signed an edict repealing an edict of another, Chuvash, president, Nikolay Fedorov, on guarantees for those of his republic's citizens who have refused to serve in Chechnya, it becomes clear that the Kremlin is simultaneously trying to set rather rigid limits on its dialogue with regional leaders. They will be consulted, they will be met halfway (which is inevitable under the Russian Federation's post-Chechen economy), but attempts will be made to restrain them from both showy demonstrations and attempts to take advantage of the weakness of the regime, which is feverishly trying to demonstrate both power and wisdom. It is for this reason that, in the Yeltsin-Shaymiyev dialogue, the presidents easily managed to talk about Chechnya: the Russian president has now joined hands with Tatarstan's president who, right from the start of the Chechen adventure, has been advocating a peaceful solution to the conflict. Well then, if the Kremlin men are going—in the future, and, most importantly, in a timely way—to take into account the views of regional elites, the leaders of this "Federation component"—downtown Moscow—would then not have to perform Munchhausen-type miracles like pulling itself out by its own hair from yet another political mire.

Tatarstan's Supreme Soviet Confirms New Premier

954F0920B Kazan IZVESTIYA TATARSTANA in Russian 17 Jan 95 p 1

[Republic of Tatarstan Supreme Soviet Press Center release: "At the Republic of Tatarstan Supreme Soviet Session"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Republic of Tatarstan Supreme Soviet 23d Session opened on 16 January in Kazan. The deputies confirmed the agenda proposed by the Supreme Soviet Presidium, additionally including an item connected with the events in the Chechen Republic.

President of Tatarstan M. Shaymiyev addressed at the session the item "Prime Minister of the Republic of Tatarstan." He read out the statement of M. Sabirov, prime minister of the Republic of Tatarstan, requesting that he be relieved of his office. The president commented appreciatively here on Mukhammat Gallyamovich's activity in a most complex and critical period of the history of Tatarstan and expressed the wish that he subsequently employ his wealth of experience for the good of the republic. The Supreme Soviet agreed with the president's proposal that M. Sabirov be relieved of the office of prime minister. A letter of gratitude was read out, which contains, in part, the following lines: "The Supreme Soviet thanks you, an important statesman of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation, for your immense contribution to the development of the economy of the republic that you have made in four decades of selfless labor." In a speech in reply Mukhammat Gallyamovich thanked the president and the Supreme Soviet for the good, comradely atmosphere that had developed during their joint work for the good of the republic.

M. Shaymiyev then presented the candidacy for the office of prime minister of the Republic of Tatarstan of F. Mukhametshin. The president observed that the Supreme Soviet had in recent years under the leadership of Farid Khayrulloev tackled the most complex, critical tasks. Enjoying the immense respect and support of the population of the republic, F. Mukhametshin will be able in the new office also to unite people of different views for the sake of the social and economic progress of Tatarstan. The Supreme Soviet confirmed F. Mukhametshin for the office of prime minister of the Republic of Tatarstan.

A decree on the release of F. Mukhametshin from the duties of chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan was adopted. The duties of chairman of the Supreme Soviet were entrusted to Z. Valeyeva, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

Following the lunch break, the deputies worked in the standing commissions. Parliamentary hearings were held under the chairmanship of G. Kobelev with the participation of members of the government on the budget message of the president of the Republic of Tatarstan.

The item "Changes to the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Tatarstan" was considered at the evening meeting. The Supreme Soviet gave its consent to the release from their duties as deputy prime ministers of F. Khamidullin, V. Stekolshchikov, and M. Khasnulin and from the office of chief of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of M. Mingazov in connection with their transfer to other work. As moved by the president of Tatarstan, the Supreme Soviet gave its consent to the appointment to the offices of first deputy prime minister, R. Muratov; deputy prime minister-minister of agriculture and food, F. Sibagatullin; deputy prime minister-chairman of the State Committee for Construction and Architecture, N. Denisov; and chief of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers, N. Bakirov.

The Session will continue on 17 January. The meetings were chaired by F. Mukhametshin and Z. Valeyeva.

Shifts in Tatarstan's Leadership Viewed

954F0921A Kazan IZVESTIYA TATARSTANA in Russian 13 Jan 94 p 1

[Article by IZVESTIYA TATARSTANA writer Yuriy Alayev: "Too Soon To Call It Over"]

[FBIS Translated Text] And so the event being talked about at length in the corridors of power and written about on the pages of certain of the most clear-sighted newspapers is over: Speaking at yesterday's session of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tatarstan, President of Tatarstan M. Shaymiyev reported that Prime Minister M. Sabirov had submitted his resignation.

In this connection, the president suggested adding to the agenda of the regular session of the Supreme Soviet of

the Republic of Tatarstan that opened on 16 January the question of the prime minister of the Republic of Tatarstan and also, which was somewhat unexpected, changes in the composition of the republic Government; and he nominated his candidate for the post of leader of the Cabinet of Ministers—the current chairman of the Supreme Council of Tatarstan, F. Mukhametshin.

For members of the presidium, like, incidentally, for many “nonmembers,” it was no big secret that M. Sabirov’s fate had been decided: The divergence of his views on priorities and methods for implementing the economic policy from the views of the influential circle of the government and the no less influential group outside it had become too apparent in recent times. The question is what kept Mukhammat Gallyamovich from finishing out the less than three months he had to work until the natural transition to a different position after the election of the new republic parliament—the State Council?

Judging from the announcement of his resignation and the statements for the press, M. Sabirov was not holding up psychologically. But, for a “die-hard” like him, this kind of demarche without a public scandal is nonsense. In reality, it seems, M. Sabirov’s announcement was by no means the result of an emotional outburst but was a calculated step that was coordinated with the president.

The fact is that, according to the new Constitution of Tatarstan, it is the president who submits candidacies for prime minister and other members of Government to the parliament for approval. In other words, a change in the members of the Cabinet of Ministers certainly does not necessarily coincide with the change in the composition of the legislative organ. Thus, if the “cadre issue” is decided at the January session of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tatarstan, the new prime minister and his new deputies (more about them later) can work peacefully until the middle of 1976 when there are to be elections for the president of Tatarstan. Moreover, even if it seems to the new members of parliament—the State Council—that, for example, the prime minister is “the wrong man,” it will be practically impossible to get rid of him, and the main obstacle will be an argument something like “give the person a chance to prove himself, he has been in this post for less than three months.”

Therefore, what is of practical interest in general is the figure not of the chief of the Cabinet of Ministers but the personalities of his deputies. From the statement from President M. Shaymiyev at the presidium, it is clear that a course has been taken toward reinforcing the role of the ministers and the ministry vis-a-vis departments of the Cabinet of Ministers. As a result, Mintimer Sharipovich intends to propose, for example, raising to deputy prime minister the rank of the Minister of Agriculture and Food of the Republic of Tatarstan, F. Sibagatullin. Thus, two deputies—the aforementioned one and the current first deputy, V. Vasilyev—will be in charge of the agrarian sector in the republic at the same time. Moreover, after the departure of Deputy Prime Minister M.

Khasnulin, such branches as industry, transportation, and communications will be left “unsupervised” (for the time being, of course). The chairman of the State Committee on Economics, Deputy Prime Minister F. Khamidullin, has left the government, and his nine deputies and the department’s solid apparatus have been left on their own. The question of elimination of the position of deputy prime minister in charge of law enforcement organs (S. Kirilov) has been solved in practice, and it will be very interesting—very interesting indeed—to see who in the new Cabinet of Ministers will have to add these functions to his own. Deputy Prime Minister V. Stekolshchikov has also left. The candidate nominated for his position is the current deputy chief of the administration of Kazan, N. Denisov.

Thus, in the category of deputies to the chairman of the government, the only ones left in their posts (in addition to the aforementioned V. Vasilyev) are R. Muratov, whose status, it is quite naturally suggested, will be raised to the level of first deputy prime minister, and the chairman of the State Committee on Administration of State Property, F. Gazizullin. So the new chief of the Cabinet of Ministers will have to exert a good deal of effort and energy to form the government into a unified team and adjust its structure.

Of course, whether things will work out the way they are intended or not will be decided by the Supreme Council. But actually, as you understand, the question has already been decided. President M. Shaymiyev is not the kind of person who would take certain steps without feeling things out and doing the groundwork in advance. Although I will not be surprised if the deputy corps protests the fact that such a noticeably mature, experienced, and skillful chairman is being “taken away” from it. Ultimately one must also think about the future of the republic’s legislative organ, the more so since it is coming to work as a professional parliament for the first time. How will it do, especially at first, without a shepherd?

Oblast Deputy Views Draft Law on Local Government

954F0908A Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR in
Russian 13 Jan 95 p 1

[V.Ya. Karpov comment: “A ‘President’ in Each Oblast. Is This Possible?”]

[FBIS Translated Text] That there is a great deal of thinking going on in the State Duma about our form of government may be deemed axiomatic. And this is gratifying. Even more gratifying is the fact that it is sometimes conferring with the local people’s elect also. Parliamentary hearings have in the preparation of the most important bills become a part of practice.

Representing the position of the oblast council of deputies, Vladimir Yakovlevich Karpov, deputy chairman of the council, took part in a recent hearing—during discussion

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of the bill on general principles of organization of the system of organs of state power in the components of the Federation.

Since the future law concerns the organization of the system of power on the territory, it is of particular interest to the population and the electorate. As is the position of the council on this matter also.

We asked V.Ya. Karpov to comment on this position.

We have for a long time now been living in a state in which the structure of state power itself has not been formalized legally. Yes, a constitution that outlines the overall contours of the structure of power and administration has been adopted, but they should be written out in detail in the corresponding laws. Specifically, in laws on the organization of the system of state power in the components of the Federation and on local government.

A system of state power itself on the territory has taken shape and has been endowed with certain obligations. But all this is de facto, but not de jure! Specifically, the local representative authorities are endowed with legislative functions also, but they do not have sufficient legal grounds for exercising them.

The law whose adoption is at issue must afford such grounds.

Now concerning the position of the drafters of the bill given its first reading by the Duma and of the representatives of the legislative authorities of the components of the Federation invited to the hearings for modification of the document.

The drafters presented us with two concepts of the organization of the system of state power on the territories: presidential and parliamentary, so to speak.

It is clear, I believe, that the "presidential" form of power means a mini-"president" in each oblast, the omnipotence of one person, and, virtually, the abolition of the constitutional formula concerning a separation of the powers and actions of each branch of power within its competence.

It was this attitude toward this concept that was expressed by representatives of components of the Federation. It was most distinctly expressed by the representative of Tuva, who asked the Duma to foresee all the possible consequences of the automatic transference of the presidential form of rule in Russia to the level of the components of the Federation. After all, the "sovereignty" of each oblast and an end to the situation are possible in this case. An end of Russia included.

But the presidential version of the bill is cobbled together from several blocks, each of which determines its logic. Thus, block two: it is proposed introducing the concept of highest official on a territory.

But the logic of rejection of such a proposal automatically takes effect here since this would infringe that same

principle of the separation of powers. Were such a point to be adopted in law, it would be necessary to revise the constitution, supplementing the "triarchy" principle with the introduction of a fourth power standing above the declared three: representative, executive, and judicial.

The third position of the draft of the presidential version, which evoked tumultuous debate, is the question of the property of the components of the Federation. As of this time, the administration feels itself to be the proprietor on the territory "without prior arrangement," as it were. The executive branch of power, that is. Yet the constitution records that the source of power and property in Russia are the people, who delegate this right to their representatives in the representative (legislative) organs of power.

It is very important that everything be put in its rightful place in the new law on property issues also.

Yes, the legislature will, all the same, entrust the executive with the administration of property. Property must work, after all!

But the right to use and dispose of property should be transferred to it only in accordance with a law adopted, for example, by the oblast council.

We in our oblast are today meeting with the leadership of the administration and are concertedly, with full mutual understanding, continuing the work on the format of the government of the oblast and its charter. But it is essential that this work be organized on precise legal foundations also.

The fourth fundamental issue in discussion of the versions of this bill was determination of the principle of the participation of state bodies of the components of the Federation in the shaping of the system of the judiciary on a territory.

But, the parliamentary form of state government on a territory prescribes the participation in this process of the representative bodies, and the "presidential" form does not.

Naturally, the representatives of the components of the Federation did not agree in this case either.

V.I. Ryzhkov, the representative of the drafters of the bill, who spoke in conclusion of the parliamentary hearings, promised to convey the opinion of the components of the Federation to the Duma deputies at the time of subsequent work on the bill.

If the "parliamentary" version of the organization of state power locally passes, we can speak of democracy. If not, then of authoritarian rule.

North Ossetia's Biragov on State of Emergency

954F0923A Vladikavkaz VESTNIK in Russian
13 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with Yuriy Biragov, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, by

Vladimir Gutnov; place and date not given: "The State of Emergency Regime Is Guaranteeing Peace in the South of Russia"; VESTNIK is a publication of the provisional administration for the republics of North Ossetia and Ingushetia]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Gutnov] Another term of the state of emergency regime on part of the territories of the Republic of North Ossetia and the Republic of Ingushetia will have expired on 31 January. What, from the viewpoint of the speaker of the parliament of North Ossetia, are the results of the more than two years of the state of emergency regime?

[Biragov] I believe that the preservation of a certain stability on the territories of the two republics should be considered the main result. At the same time, on the other hand, it has to be recalled that approximately 100 persons have died at the hands of terrorists in these two years in North Ossetia. The main reasons, in my view, are that the measures of the state of emergency regime have not been realized in full, certain army subunits have not discharged their official duties, and, finally, North Ossetia's proposals concerning a concentration of forces along the administrative border between our republic and Ingushetia to exclude the penetration of terrorist groups have been ignored.

On the other hand, the activity of the Provisional Administration in the state of emergency zone has permitted the creation of the conditions and the prerequisites for the fulfillment of the edict of the president of the Russian Federation of 13 December 1993 on the return of the involuntary migrants to the places of their former habitation in four localities of North Ossetia's Prigorodny District. People are returning, and in terms of the actual state of affairs no one can deny this. The pace and the timeframe and the number of persons and groups are open to argument, of course, but the fact that the process is taking place according to the terms signed in Beslan is not in question. This has been brought about largely by the activity of the federal authorities in the structure of the Provisional Administration, which has made it possible to embark on the restoration of the damaged living quarters and the social infrastructure in the four localities of Prigorodny District designated in President B.N. Yeltsin's edict.

[Gutnov] What will the adjustments in the actions of the branches of power of North Ossetia in connection with the possible transition as of 1 February to customary, peaceful living conditions be?

[Biragov] I believe that it is the state of emergency regime, considering the current state of affairs, that is enabling us to preserve peaceful living conditions. The assertion that with the lifting of the regime we will acquire peace hardly corresponds to reality. Of course, the state of emergency regime entails a qualification of the citizens' rights and liberties, and there are also certain elements of coercion of the personality, but this measure is necessary and dictated by an aspiration to

preserve stability and guarantee people's safety. If we are speaking on the level of the possibilities at the disposal of North Ossetia, we could in principle with the forces of the republic MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] ensure the maintenance of order on our territory. Such preparatory work is being performed currently and includes a whole set of measures.

[Gutnov] To what extent are events in Chechnya influencing the situation in North Ossetia? What is your attitude toward the "Chechen conflict?"

[Biragov] The events in Chechnya are having a direct impact on the situation in our republic. First, we are close neighbors and have a common border. Many of the inhabitants of North Ossetia are in a state of anxious ignorance as regards the fate of their relatives, near ones and dear ones, and friends living in Grozny. But what is most important is that a real war is under way in Chechnya, people are dying, and the flow of refugees, including to North Ossetia, is growing. Since the first days of the conflict we have been taking in wounded and providing them with the necessary assistance, regardless of whose side they are on and of their nationality. Both Chechens and Russian soldiers have been treated in the republic's hospitals. They are all Russian citizens, our fellow citizens. And we are performing our human duty with the aid of the federal authorities, the Ministry for Emergencies particularly.

We have increasingly fewer supporters of a power solution of the Chechen crisis left here. The events in Chechnya are rocking the social and political situation in Russia, which is complex and tense as it is. While advocating constitutional order and supporting the struggle against extremism, it is impossible to agree with the use of military-power methods entailing numerous casualties. There are no supreme political ends that could justify the death of hundreds of women, children, old people, and 18-year-old Russian soldiers. I believe that the blame for the bloodshed should be assumed primarily by the federal authorities, who have in three years demonstratively distanced themselves from the Chechen Republic and have failed to formulate a constructive concept of a settlement of relations with a component of the Russian Federation. It is for the absence of a firm state policy and the insatiable ambitions of certain leaders of Chechnya that not only Chechens but also other peoples of Russia are today paying with their own lives.

The sole way out of the crisis situation is an immediate termination of combat operations and a search for compromise at the negotiating table in the name of the preservation of people's lives and the prevention of a Caucasus war, which is not, in fact, as spectral as it seems to some people in Moscow.

[Gutnov] Parliamentary elections are scheduled in North Ossetia for 26 March. Could you draw up an approximate forecast-picture of the future corps of deputies?

[Biragov] In accordance with the recently adopted Constitution of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and the law on elections of the republic's parliament, the future corps of deputies will be composed of 75 persons. Forecasts are, generally, a thankless business, nonetheless, evaluating the situation in the republic and analyzing the results of the elections that have been held in other republics, I could anticipate some of today's deputies being a part of the future parliament. On what do I base this viewpoint? In the five years of work of the present corps of deputies we have succeeded in preserving relative stability, despite the war in South Ossetia and the tragedy of the fall of 1992 in North Ossetia's Prigorodnyy District. Parliament has adopted balanced decisions, which will make it possible to emerge from the adverse political situation. I believe that the electorate will be able to evaluate all the candidates on their merits, including from the present parliament. In addition, it would be useful and logical, in my view, were some of the deputies of the current parliament to be reelected since they have some experience of parliamentary activity.

[Gutnov] What does 1995 in the south of Russia look like to you in the plane of political prospects?

[Biragov] I believe that our fellow citizens of the region can overcome today's difficulties, separate the wheat from the chaff, and involve themselves in creative work. The times of fake fervor are passing, and a growth of the national self-awareness of the peoples has nothing in common with nationalism or extremism. People are tired of the constant tension in politics and the confusion in the economy and social sphere. I hope that the time-tested good-neighborliness and fraternity will come to replace the interethnic strife.

The political prospects of the south of Russia will depend to a certain extent on the federal authorities. In order to build a truly firm federal state it is essential to establish between the center and the components of the Federation civilized relations based on mutual respect and mutual understanding and trust. Other ways are counterproductive, rather, and will inevitably lead to the collapse of the Russian state.

Maritime Kray Administration Restricts Media Access

954F0906A Vladivostok VLADIVOSTOK in Russian
13 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by Valeriy Bakshin, VLADIVOSTOK editor in chief: "Journalists Permitted Entry Into the White House Only Under Escort"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I did not want to be discussing this today, on our professional holiday, but unfortunately, it is necessary. On the very occasion of Russian Journalism Day.

Early yesterday morning I listened to Deputy Governor Lebedinets—who oversees the mass media, incidentally—spout profusely over the radio concerning the

pernicious press and the tremendous harm it is causing the economy of Maritime Kray. Then they did not allow me, editor in chief of the largest local newspaper, to enter the kray administration building. We had agreed with Yevgeniy Nazdratenko the day before to meet at 0730 to discuss the problems that had accumulated surrounding the kray mass media, including reciprocal relations with the kray administration. At 0720 I was in the vestibule (I was walking literally just 10 steps behind Nazdratenko). Militia Sergeant Kryuchkov, however, carrying out his official duties, quite properly did not allow me into the building.

It turns out that this Lebedinets issued a directive 21 December tightening up procedure in the Maritime Kray administration building. In accordance with the first point of the "procedure" confirmed by Lebedinets, entry into the administration building is authorized from 0800 to 1200 and from 1300 to 1645 (to 1530 on Fridays). It was in vain, therefore, that I attempted to gain access to the White House at 0720 (I would like to know why the militia let Nazdratenko himself in at 0720). The second point enumerates the "citizens" authorized entry to the White House by a show of identification. Editors in chief and journalists in general are not included on this list. On the other hand, Point 5 states that central and kray newspaper correspondents are allowed entry into the building only with a pass, and only when accompanied by press service personnel.

How can journalists be shown such disrespect, such distrust, as to prohibit them from independent movement in the White House?! Even in the strict party days we did not see such stupidity. And I, as the editor of a small-circulation newspaper at that time, was permitted free access to the kraykom [kray committee] building upon presentation of my journalist credentials. Now in democratic times—only under escort. This is apparently the only way Lebedinets could react to the decision of the House of Justice in Moscow on freedom of the mass media in Maritime Kray. You want freedom? Here you go—but under escort.

To date I have had free access to the White House, including at inopportune times. I have met fairly frequently with Yevgeniy Nazdratenko (most recently—late the evening of 26 December), and I would hope that our meetings were interesting and useful not only to me. I will not hide the fact that I wanted to speak with the governor yesterday as well. I had business to discuss with him. And although the reception office phoned me twice regarding this meeting, I refused. Why would I show such disrespect for myself, for my profession, by going to the White House following all this "procedure"? Moreover, I forbade journalists of the newspaper VLADIVOSTOK from appearing in the kray administration building accompanied by press service personnel. And I appeal to all journalists of the central and kray newspapers to do the same.

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I think we will somehow be able to do without visits to the White House. But will the White House be able to do without us?

Novosibirsk Residents To Pay Higher Living Expenses

954F0907B *Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR in Russian 13 Jan 95 p 1*

[Unattributed roundup in the Municipal Life column]

[FBIS Translated Text]

The Frost Hardens, and Life Gets More Expensive

The frosts of Epiphany have yet to set in, but a chill wind has blown from an announcement received last Wednesday in the Novosibirsk City Hall, at a news conference of V.A. Tolokonskiy and his assistants. It was said that a decree on an increase in the rates for the maintenance of housing and public utilities had been prepared for discussion in the board of the administration and in the city's Assembly of Deputies.

It should be mentioned that this news was not unexpected for the decision of the head of the oblast administration to impose as of the start of the year a 40-percent payment by apartment owners of the actual cost of the maintenance of housing and public utilities had already been announced. And I. Indinok, head of the oblast administration, was, in fact, fulfilling the government's decision—to gradually switch before 1998 to a 100-percent system of Russians' payment for their "comfortable" habitation.

Last year the city spent approximately R200 billion on thermal energy, water supply and sewerage, and housing maintenance; and only 18 percent of this amount was paid for by the residents themselves. In 1995 they will have to assume 40 percent of these expenses.

Of course, for many Novosibirskers the increase in the apartment charge could prove beyond their means, and for this reason city hall has devised a program of targeted social support for the townspeople. It provides for a sum of compensation of housing and utilities expenses to be paid to the citizens for whom it [as published] has exceeded 15 percent of aggregate income. This social assistance may be realized in the form of reductions.

The allowances for single retirees and the handicapped of groups I and II are retained. City hall will assume 50 percent of the expenditure on the payment for the housing of this category of citizens.

In order to get an idea of what our expenditure on the maintenance of housing (excluding payment for electricity) will be, we may, meanwhile, take the following calculations as a basis. Whereas in 1994 we paid on average in terms of the overall rate per square meter R330 a month, the maintenance of this area now will cost us approximately R720 a month. Multiply R720 by

the number of square meters of your apartment. If this sum is more than 15 percent of your aggregate income, look for the mayor's assistance.

Housing Construction

Not one ruble from the budget for housing construction in Novosibirsk is contemplated in 1995. Housing will be put up with the money of investors. Last year's experience shows that both enterprises and individual citizens are willing to invest money in real estate. City hall intends to attract foreign capital for this purpose also.

The Munich Fairs and Exhibitions Society, which organizes in Novosibirsk the annual Sibgerma exhibitions, has decided this year to stage a specialized—investment—exhibition at the start of September.

Approximately 400 square meters of housing were built last year in Novosibirsk, and it is intended to introduce as many in the present year also.

Privileges

V.A. Tolokonskiy asked retirees to rest assured that they would enjoy free travel in Novosibirsk in 1995 also. City hall only intends to streamline the use of this privilege. Only real retirees, that is, those who have no income other than their pensions, should travel free.

Bridge Closing

The plans for renovation of the city's road bed will entail the closure of the Oktyabrskiy Bridge from April through September-October 1995. The renovation will cost approximately R15 billion.

Economic Issues

Ruble Falls to Record Low, Exceeding 'Black Tuesday'

LD2001095795 *Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0901 GMT 20 Jan 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 20 Jan— The U.S. dollar rate stood at 3,947 rubles during MICEX [Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange] trading today, exceeding the level of "Black Tuesday." This is 31 rubles higher than yesterday's figure. Experts expected this to happen this Friday [20 January].

Food Price Hikes Blamed on Foreign Trade Deals

MM1901161295 *Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jan 95 First Edition p 3*

["Commentary" by Lyubov Volkova on 4-10 January price rises: "Everyone Preparing Their Own Con Trick"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In Moscow and St. Petersburg the rise in prices for basic commodities was somewhat higher than the Russian average—by 3.9 percent in Moscow and 3.7 percent in St. Petersburg.

This fact has been noted by our statisticians and analysts in the umpteenth report in succession. The trend emerged long ago and in the first half of January we suddenly discovered that prices had doubled since New Year. Moscow's newspapers sounded the alarm: Milk, curd cheese, eggs, cheap brands of sausage, and fresh meat are disappearing from trading outlets. So they conclude that Russian industry is exhausted and it is time to buy food abroad. Last year production of livestock products dropped more sharply than ever—by almost a factor of 2.5.

This deliberately planned situation now suits many people. Russian food producers take advantage of it to instantly raise prices. Admittedly, their greed will be kept in check: The Moscow Government has introduced restrictions on them and wholesalers. Henceforth prices cannot be raised by more than 5 percent a month. But now total pricing chaos will probably set in for Moscow trading outlets' foreign partners.

Back last November the "Mosprodkontrakt" state enterprise bought butter and dried milk at a price of just over \$1 per kg from foreign firms. But three weeks later these prices were no longer to be seen. Their foreign partners, or to be more precise, accomplices, had immediately jacked up prices of these very same goods to \$2.

What a commercial coup! World trade and the accursed capitalists sweat blood for every cent of profit while through trade with Russia they can snap up these tasty morsels without particular difficulty. Thanks to the efforts of their Moscow accomplices, of course. There is after all cheaper produce abroad. The laws of the market are in operation; we could abandon costly commodities and buy produce abroad at lower prices. But our people do not want that kind of trade. A pattern has been set, and it is already working.

Three-fourths of the goods now in Moscow are imported. The prices rise as the dollar rate of exchange rises. A monopoly!

International Affairs

Concern Over UN Withdrawal From Croatia

LD1901153895 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1300 GMT
19 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev [no date as received]—Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed concern at plans to withdraw the UN peacekeeping forces from the territory of Croatia by 31 March 1995, following a decision by the Croatian Government. The ministry warned in its statement yesterday that the pull-out could lead to renewed fighting and affect the overall peace process in the Balkans.

The document stressed that the UN peacekeeping forces, including the Ukrainian battalion, played a stabilizing role and helped to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid to the republic.

The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry expressed hope that the leaders of Croatia and the United Nations will find a common solution which will have a positive effect on the peace settlement on the entire territory of former Yugoslavia.

Turkmen President Addresses Parliament

LD2001130595 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0920 GMT
20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev—The views of Ukraine and Turkmenistan on cooperation coincide very much. Attempts to push our states towards a union are clearly discernible. If we transfer some of the functions to the CIS, this will result in a loss of independence. We believe the CIS should be a consultative body and all relations between the states should be built on a bilateral basis, said Saparmurad Niyazov, president of Turkmenistan, in a greeting to the parliament of Ukraine.

Turkmenistan, he said, has drawn up a national program to reform the state in the transitional period. It provides for three stages: transformation, stabilization, and development. Each of these stages may last from three to eight years.

The principal aim of this program, Saparmurad Niyazov added, is to carry out reforms not only in the economy, but also in the psychology of the people without causing social shocks.

The president of Turkmenistan announced an agreement had been signed between both states on the supply to Ukraine in 1995 of 25 billion cubic meters of gas at \$10-12 below the world price. Ukraine is to settle its debts to Turkmenistan for 1992-93 in the course of seven years, commencing repayments of 40 percent in currency and 60 [percent] in agricultural produce in installments in the second year.

At a meeting with Oleksandr Moroz, Ukrainian Supreme Council chairman, Saparmurad Niyazov stated Turkmenistan rejected the accusations made against it of

post-Communism and post-totalitarianism. He said there was not a single political prisoner in Turkmenistan. At present, the membership of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan was approximately 70,000. No agrarian party has been formed in that country, as only 700 people have declared their wish to join it.

At present, the president of Turkmenistan said, his country has virtually resolved the problem of grain supply, with around 1.5 million tonnes of it grown internally.

Saparmurad Niyazov said his vision of Ukraine in future was that of a country "in a constellation of leading European nations alongside of Germany, France, and others."

Niyazov Signs Gas Deal

WS2001125695 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0346
GMT 20 Jan 95

[Report by Natalia Filipchuk]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Jan. 19—Turkmenistan will supply Ukraine with 20 billion cubic meters of natural gas this year, according to an agreement signed Thursday [19 January] by President Leonid Kuchma and Turkmenistan President Saparmurad Niyazov.

The deal, through which Turkmenistan agrees to supply Ukraine with 10 billion cubic meters of gas daily, comes four days after Turkmenistan reopened the critical supply line which it had closed last November in a dispute over a US\$700 million payment arrears.

"We highly appraise Ukraine's economic potential," said Niyazov at a Thursday press conference at Boryspil airport upon his arrival in Kiev.

"We have never had any political disputes. We just had some minor disagreements on the ways of development of our economic relations, but all these problems have been already solved," said Niyazov.

Also were signed a joint communique, a protocol on the schedule of clearing of Ukraine's debt to Turkmenistan for 1994, a protocol on restructuring of Ukraine's debt to Turkmenistan and some other documents.

"A thousand cubic meters of Turkmenistan gas cost US\$60, whereas the world price is US\$80 for a thousand cubic meters. Due to this, every year Ukraine will save US\$10-12 million," said Kuchma.

"We are glad to receive the Turkmenistan President in Ukraine. Recently, we have had many meetings with each other. Our meeting helps us realize that, helping each other, we are solving problems faced by our countries," said Kuchma.

Turkmenistan is greatly interested in importing Ukrainian passenger and cargo airplanes, according to Niyazov. On Thursday the Turkmenistan President visited the Kiev-based Antonov aircraft factory, where he was

shown seven Turkmenistan Antonov-24 passenger planes that are currently being repaired. In the near future Turkmenistan will get from Ukraine five Antonov-74 cargo planes, according to Niyazov.

"Turkmenistan will always cooperate with Ukraine. This is our strategic goal," said the Turkmenistan president. "If need be, we can increase the volume of our gas deliveries to Ukraine. This will make it possible to broaden our cooperation in all fields," said the Turkmenistan leader.

According to the protocol, 40 percent of Ukraine's debt will be paid off in hard currency and 60 percent by goods. The range of Ukrainian products to be exported to Turkmenistan includes more than a thousand items.

"It is better to have two sources of oil and gas deliveries than just one," said Kuchma.

National Affairs

Crimean Leader Admits Crimean Tatars Fighting in Chechnya

AU1901143095 Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 14 Jan 95 pp 1,3

[Article by UNIAN correspondent Vyacheslav Savchenko: "Crimean Tatars in the Chechen Conflict"]

[FBIS Translated Text] That a consolidation of Muslim and Turkic peoples, residing on the territory of the former USSR, is not a myth, is confirmed by events around Chechnya and, in particular, by the reaction to them on the part of Crimean Tatars. It would be appropriate here to recall somewhat more distant events: The destruction by a special-purpose militia [police] unit and [special police force] "Berkut" of the unauthorized building project in the settlement of Krasnyy Ray near Alushta, when 26 Tatars were, in fact, taken hostage and many people, including women and children, were seriously wounded. It is unlikely that the Ukrainian leadership could be unaware of such a large-scale action by the Crimean authorities. At the same time, Dzhokhar Dudayev, Chechen general and president, was among those who decisively condemned those actions.

The Majlis [Crimean Tatars Assembly] returned the favor: Back in the summer, when opposition forces became active in Chechnya, it called upon the Chechen people to consolidate around their president. When the events started acquiring tragic implications and when armed clashes started, the Majlis came up with another statement in support of official Groznyy. It read, in particular, this: "The opposition is provided for and armed by third forces, which are situated outside the republic. Those forces are not interested in a peaceful solution to the Chechnya problems. The creation of an "opposition" where it was absent, its provision with

weapons, and the fuelling of a civil war are old and well-tested methods to impose one's 'peacekeeping' influence."

On 12 December, when war was already in progress in Northern Caucasus, a rally was held in Simferopol and a resolution was adopted with a demand that the Russian leadership stop combat actions and withdraw Russian troops from Chechnya.

On 29 December, the Majlis characterized the war in Chechnya as "a most serious international crime." The statement that was adopted pointed out, in particular, that "the crimes committed by the Russian military machine in Chechnya, the mass killings of the civilian population, including the shooting of wounded prisoners of war, the bombardment and shelling of populated areas... cannot leave anybody in Ukraine or in the Crimea indifferent."

The Crimean Islamic Party expressed its position even in sharper terms. It appealed to "Muslims in CIS countries and worldwide and to the people of good will" with a call to "consolidate forces and render comprehensive assistance." The matter did not end in calls alone. The leadership of the party informed the Majlis that 10 persons had volunteered to fight within "kamikaze units" in Chechnya. People keep turning to the Majlis with the question: "Why aren't volunteer units formed?" Well, Ivan Kolomytsev, head of Ukraine's Security Service in the Crimea, refuted this information.

According to [chairman of the Crimean Majlis] Mustafa Dzhemilev, Russian Ambassador to Ukraine Leonid Smolyakov was asked whether Russia intends to take part in the program for the return of the Crimean Tatars to their homeland, because in 1944 they had been deported from the territory of the Russian Federation. The ambassador replied this: "This is heartbreaking, but Russia has no money." At the same time, in just a single week, more than 400 billion rubles was spent on air force operations, and the funds that will be necessary for restoring what was been destroyed will be a hundredfold greater than what the Tatars needed for their settlement in the Crimea. If, though for other reasons, Kiev also fails to find money for that, the Crimean Tatars will only have to rely upon themselves. If one also takes into account the attitude of the Russian-speaking majority, it is hard to expect understanding. Mustafa Dzhemilev, in fact, refuted the statement by the "Cheka" official [Kolomytsev] and his bosses in Kiev. Following a request by the UNIAN correspondent to comment upon the situation, he answered: "As many as 13 Crimean Tatars are already fighting as volunteers in Chechnya, but we have not heard from them yet." Moreover, according to Dzhemilev, people continually turn to the Majlis with a request to help them go to Chechnya as volunteers.

Whether some people like it or not, the Crimean Tatars reacted to the events in Chechnya very sharply. In a certain sense, Ukraine, on whose territory there reside two Turkic peoples (the Crimean Tatars and the

Gagauz), must take into consideration other peoples' experience. Even though the Crimean Tatars and Kiev have always been on the same side of the barricades during conflicts in the Crimean Republic, changes in the position of the indigenous Crimean population cannot be ruled out. This may also happen as a result of the inability on the part of central Ukrainian authorities to resolve numerous problems, associated with the return of the Crimean Tatars to their homes.

Parliamentarian Describes Visit to Chechnya

AU2001110395 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
17 Jan 95 p 3

[Interview with Ukrainian People's Deputy Mykhaylo Ratushnyy by Serhiy Lavrenyuk; place and date not given: "The Truth Is Clearly Visible in Grozny: Every Building a Fortress and Every Man a Fighter"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ratushnyy] We established contact with the Chechen president and government rather a long time ago. Representatives of Chechnya have also visited Ukraine more than once, in particular, to take part in the work of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations. Consequently, we had the necessary information about the people to whom we went. The delegation included Sayid Abuslimov, deputy of the Chechen Parliament who had been in Ukraine shortly before; Mariya Bazel'yuk, head of the Ukrainian Committee of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, and a few other people. The entire Caucasus was blocked. It took us a long time to get to Grozny: We had planned to be there on New Year's eve, but only arrived on 3 January. There were also advantages to the long journey—we were able to meet personally representatives of various nations inhabiting the Caucasus and analyze their attitude toward the Chechen events. All of that was not without surprises. For example, in Tbilisi we were detained near the aircraft steps by Georgian special services and held for almost 24 hours. Despite everything, however, we managed to get to Grozny, where we stayed for two days. On 3 January, we had a meeting with Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev and passed on to him the statement by Ukraine's Supreme Council, the message to the Russian State Duma, and the appeal by 105 Ukraine Supreme Council people's deputies to the UN Secretary General on the need to urgently convene a UN session on Chechnya. We also had meetings with Zelimkhan Yanderbiyev, vice president of the Chechen Republic; Akhad Idigov, head of the Chechen Parliament; and Shamil Basayev, commander of the Armed Forces of the Confederation of Caucasian Peoples. On 5 January, we visited the settlement of Shali, which a day earlier had been destroyed by bombs dropped by Russian aircraft. A funeral procession was bombed there and also a maternity home, and other "strategic" facilities. In general, over 3 and 4 January alone, 75 populated areas in Chechnya were subjected to bombardment.

[Lavrenyuk] Are there estimates of casualties at least on the Chechen side?

[Ratushnyy] We could not be given precise figures, because the republic has no regular army. The warfare is being carried out by home guards—almost every man from the age of 14. However, the main casualties are the civilian population, since the military have places of deployment in shelters, and, besides, they are much more on the move. As for Russian losses, I can only say that on 3 and 4 January the streets of the city were littered with the corpses of Russian soldiers. (The Russian command would not agree to a temporary cease-fire to bury the dead. Dogs were carrying pieces of the corpses all over the city). It is dreadful. What are the people dying for?! On reflection, it can be concluded that, if as a result of the assault on New Year's eve the Russians lost more than 270 of their armored vehicles, then the tank crews, infantry combat vehicles, and armored personnel carriers account for more than 1,000 persons. If one adds to this figure those motorized infantry soldiers who were in the infantry combat vehicles, the losses will be even greater. In my opinion, since the beginning of the aggression, up to 10,000 Russian servicemen have died. For example, when Chechen parliamentarians met with a Russian subunit commander to arrange a temporary cease-fire in order to collect the dead, the commander told them that Russian television was shamelessly lying about the number of casualties, because in his subunit alone up to 150 were killed every day. This suggests that, in order to avoid mass protests by mothers, the Russian command has not yet returned the bodies to the families, but is keeping them in freezers in Mozdok, Stavropol, and other cities. There is ample evidence to support this. There is also evidence that many bodies are simply buried in communal graves so that the losses would be "lower than planned." I believe that this is an expression of their barbaric attitude not only to the Chechens, but also to their own people.

I repeat, the Chechens do not have a regular army in the traditional sense. It is a nation at war. Every building is a fortress and every man—a soldier. Regarding the tactics of conducting warfare, I will mention only one example. Two Russian subunits had occupied positions a few kilometers apart with a small wooded area between them. In the dusk, 25 Chechen home guards approached one of them and opened indiscriminate fire with all types of weapons and then retreated in the direction of the other Russian subunit. The latter decided that it had been attacked by the Chechens and began an offensive on the small woodland, covering it with fire from all types of weapons. The Chechens slipped through between the two subunits. As a result, the Russian subunits barraged each other with fire. Dzhokhar Dudayev told us that there had been concern that the home guards might be scared by the tank armada. However, today, a popular saying among the Chechens goes that the tank is the most frightful weapon for those who are inside it.

[Lavrenyuk] Did you meet with prisoners of war?

[Ratushnyy] Yes. I think that the treatment of prisoners of war is one of the factors in the victory of the Chechen spirit. In the conditions of daily bombardment, artillery shelling, and unending aggression, prisoners of war are getting human treatment, the necessary medical assistance, and the same food as the Chechens. At the same time, a case is known when Russian troops captured six wounded Chechens and, having flown them over a gorge, then threw them down it while everybody, including press representatives, watched. In general, however, the Chechens do not surrender, and that is why the Russian television has never shown captured Chechens.

[Lavrenyuk] Many questions arise about the participation of Ukrainian citizens in Chechen events. In particular, while you were in Grozny, the Russian media reported that the Chechens had shot 50 Ukrainian volunteers who wanted to leave the area of confrontation. Did you meet Ukrainians in Grozny?

[Ratushnyy] We met citizens of the Chechen Republic from the settlements of Pervomayskoye, Petropavlovskoye, and the [Cossack] village of Kazachya who identify themselves with Ukrainians and fight on Dudayev's side. Regarding volunteers (not mercenaries) who are Ukrainian citizens, there are some fighting there, but not in such large numbers as is claimed in Russia. I had meetings with them and realized that they had gone there of their own free will, proceeding from the consideration that today it is Chechnya and tomorrow it could also be Ukraine. The Chechens (and also the Russians, although with a different assessment) tell stories about them: Shortly before our arrival, some Ukrainian volunteers had seized several armored personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles. The Ukrainian volunteers do not belong to any single political organization, but they all consider themselves Ukrainian nationalists. At the same time, it has to be pointed out that the Chechen leadership is trying somehow to keep the Ukrainian volunteers from participating in active combat actions. I also met there with Crimean Tatars who are citizens of Ukraine.

[Lavrenyuk] How close to reality are the Russian leadership's assertions that thousands of mercenaries from Muslim countries are fighting in Chechnya and that they are paid \$1,000 each a day?

[Ratushnyy] It is the armed nation that fights. At the same time, we met Chechens who had arrived from Turkey, Pakistan, and other countries. Perhaps, the Russian command pictures them as mercenaries. For example, when I spoke to Jordanians, I learned that they are fighting against the Russian occupation and not for money.

[Lavrenyuk] How are the Russian leadership's statements received in Chechnya?

[Ratushnyy] The truth is clearly visible in Grozny. Especially when, during bombardment, "Ostankino"

[Television] carries statements that Grozny has not been subjected to bombardments since probably 26 December.

Of course, Grozny may be seized. However, from the military point of view, this will not give much: Today, the Chechens are much better armed than they were at the beginning of the warfare and they will proceed to guerrilla war. I will only repeat Dzhokhar Dudayev's words. He said that he was sorry for those Russians who are going to pursue their imperial policy in Chechnya in the next 15 years. That is why a political solution must be sought. I do not know whether the Russian politicians will be able to agree to the right of the nation to self-determination. In fact, Chechnya never voluntarily agreed to be part of Russia and that is why, over the course of 300 years, it has been subjected to genocide six times. All the Russian command's actions are aimed at leaving Chechnya without Chechens. This must be spoken out loud.

U.S. President Clinton, in fact, sanctioned the aggression in Chechnya by his statement in Budapest to the effect that this is Russia's internal affair and that the world community would only want to have this problem resolved with minimum bloodshed. I saw that blood.

In my opinion, the events in Chechnya have destroyed two myths: Regarding Russian democracy and regarding the liberal world, which, allegedly, is ready to stand up firmly for the protection of human rights and rights of nations. Therefore, in this context, we must ask ourselves whether troops of an alien state should continue to be deployed on Ukrainian territory and whether they may not be used in the same way as in Chechnya.

On 29 December 1994, an interparliamentary anti-imperial coordination committee was created in Kiev. It was joined by parliamentarians of Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Lithuania, the Chechen Republic, Moldova, Bashkortostan, Estonia, Belarus, and Tajikistan. Parliamentarians of other post-Soviet states also expressed a desire to join. The committee's main task is to stand up for the rights of nations and individuals. We in Ukraine should not allow the signing with Yeltsin of the Russian-Ukrainian agreement on friendship and cooperation. If we sign it, this will be identical to the actions by the United States when it recognized the USSR in 1933. That was the year when millions of Ukrainians died from the artificially created famine. Returning to the activity of the committee, I will say that it was largely owing to cooperation with parliamentarians of other countries that we were able to visit Grozny, taking at least a minimal quantity of medicines. I hope that, in the near future, we will be able to send an aircraft to Chechnya with medicines collected all over Ukraine. In conclusion, taking the opportunity of the fact that I am giving this interview to a newspaper that is widely distributed in Ukraine, I want to convey the words of gratitude from Dzhokhar Dudayev, president of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria, to all those who support the Chechen people in

defending their independence and also his hope that Ukraine will be the first state to recognize the independent Chechen Republic Ichkeria.

Donetsk Security Service Chief Interviewed

954F0929A Donetsk AKTSENT in Russian 17 Jan 95
pp 1-2

[Interview with Colonel Anatoliy Chumak, chief of the Security Service of Ukraine administration for Donetsk Oblast, by deputy Editor in Chief L. Kozin; place and date not given: "One of the Priorities Is the Fight Against Corruption and Organized Crime in the Sphere of Administration, the Economy, and the Credit-Banking Structure"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently AKTSENT reported on the appointment of Colonel A.A. Chumak as chief of the administration of the Security Service of Ukraine for Donetsk Oblast.

[begin italics]Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Chumak was born in 1946 in the city of Voroshilovgrad. In 1969 he graduated from the Donetsk Polytechnical Institute with a specialty of "energy engineer." Until he registered for active military duty in the security organs (March 1970) he worked as an engineer in DonNIPlavtomatgormash.

[begin italics]His last position was that of deputy chief of the Administration of the Security Service of Ukraine for Donetsk Oblast. On 22 December 1994 by an edict of the president of Ukraine he was appointed to the position of chief of the Administration of the Security Service of Ukraine.

[begin italics]He is married and is raising two sons.[end italics]

We offer for the readers' attention A. Chumak's responses to the deputy editor in chief of the newspaper AKTSENT, L. Kozin.

[Kozin] What are the basic directions in the work of the Administration of the Security Service of Ukraine for Donetsk Oblast?

[Chumak] Within the limits of its authority as determined by legislation, the Administration of the Security Service of Ukraine is in charge of defending the state sovereignty, the constitutional system, the territorial integrity, and the economic, scientific and technical, and defense potential of Ukraine, as well as the legitimate interests of the state and the rights of its citizens from the subversive intelligence activity of foreign special services and encroachment by individual organizations, groups, and individuals. Our tasks also include prevention, disclosure, and interdiction of crimes against the peace and safety of mankind, and the fight against terrorism, corruption, and organized criminal activity.

Based on the law, the Administration conducts operational investigative activity in all of the aforementioned areas. But it must be noted that the operational situation

makes its own corrections to the emphasis in the work of the subdivisions. As of today one of the priority directions of our activity is the fight against corruption and organized crime in the sphere of management, economics, and the credit-banking structure.

[Kozin] How crucial are questions related to industrial espionage in our oblast today? Can you give some specific examples of the work of members of the administration in this area of activity?

[Chumak] Information received in the Administration of the Security Service shows that intelligence services of foreign countries are devoting constant attention to the advanced achievements in the area of fundamental sciences and science-intensive technologies. Worthy of attention are the conclusions of the Analytical Scientific Research Institute of World Politics (Germany) to the effect that the center of gravity today is shifting from military intelligence to industrial espionage. Here major attention is devoted to information that makes it possible to gain access to the latest technologies.

We have discovered attempts on the part of individual foreigners to obtain information on advanced models of domestic missile technology and arms and other scientific developments of a defense nature. A number of measures are being taken to restrict and interdict illegal activity on the part of foreign compatriots who have left to reside permanently abroad who, taking advantage of communications in the scientific environment and also the incompetence of individual scientific workers regarding competition in the technology market, are buying up priority developments of scientists at ridiculously low prices. And this is being done under the guise of benevolent sponsors who are supporting "research work" at a difficult time for Ukraine.

Unfortunately, there are also representatives of science who for insignificant sums are prepared not only to sell their intellectual labor but also the results and achievements of colleagues and entire collectives of which they are aware.

Within the limits of the law we are doing everything we can to prevent such actions, but I must emphasize that our measures alone will not solve this problem. It is necessary to adopt at the state level a whole package of measures of an economic and sociopolitical nature aimed at sharply raising the standard of living of scientists and creating the necessary base for their scientific creativity.

[Kozin] What can you, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, tell us about the level of coordination of the activity of law enforcement organs in the current unstable socio-economic situation in society, which is characterized by an environment that encourages crime?

[Chumak] Taking into account the specific nature of our activity, we interact closely with organs of the procuracy, the internal affairs administration, the customs service,

and the border guards. We render mutual aid to the tax inspectorate and other control organs. We have a constant exchange of operational information. Above all on such issues as the fight against corruption and organized crime, contraband, extremist demonstrations with signs of terrorism, and sabotage, etc.

Joint operational-investigatory organs are being created for inspecting certain materials. As a result of this we have concluded and are currently working on a number of operational-search cases.

I will mention just a couple of them as examples. In 1993 in conjunction with the oblast procuracy we organized inspection measures involving a number of officials who took bribes in especially large amounts. As a result we caught red-handed and subsequently sentenced to various periods of incarceration the chief of the Krasnoarmeysk city finance department, O.V. Nerushenko, an inspector from this same department, N.Yu. Popov, the deputy chief of the line internal affairs department in the village of Ilovaysk, M.V. Sarasek, and the deputy chief of the Konstantinovka city internal affairs department, S.P. Vorozheyev.

In conjunction with the oblast internal affairs administration and the city procuracy we broke up the organized crime group headed by I.A. Lavrov, who was previously convicted of criminal charges (the Kopcheny Gang), which controlled the gaming business and engaged in cheating and extortion of citizens, acting on behalf of the militia. The group's illegal activity was being covered up by a worker of the Voroshilovskiy Rayon internal affairs department, A.S. Gorban.

The court sentenced Gorban to six years in prison, and Lavrov to five years and three months.

I think that on the whole the level of interaction of law enforcement organs is fairly high although, of course, there are certain gaps, but they can be eliminated during the process of our work.

[Kozin] Ultimate political extremism and illegal armed formations. What is the situation with these in Donetsk Oblast?

[Chumak] The strengthening of radical attitudes in the society against the background of a reduction of the standard of living of the majority of the population leads to a sharp increase in manifestations of extremism, including those such as encroachment on the life, health, and property of people's deputies, law enforcement organs, and power structures. During 1994 alone there were eight actions against people's rights (for comparison: In 1993 there were 28) and there were 46 reports of illegal possession, theft, and loss of weapons or explosive substances.

As a result of the working up of the evidence, 10 people were convicted under various articles of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. The militia and procuracy brought criminal charges against 16 people using our materials,

and warning discussions were held with 11. We removed from criminal circulation 18 bladed weapons and fire arms, 13 automatic weapons of various kinds, 11 grenades, about 1,400 cartridges, more than 4 kg of explosives, and 26 mine detonators.

Unfortunately, it must be stated that in the political arena there have appeared parties and organizations that proclaim the priority of using forceful methods in the battle, one of which is the UNSO [Ukrainian National Self-Defense Forces].

Taking into account the reliable information that is available regarding certain UNSO members who were illegally keeping weapons, on 23 November 1994 in the city of Torez operations were conducted for putting a stop to their illegal activity, during the course of which six people were arrested and fire arms, ammunition, explosives, and homemade explosive devices were confiscated.

The procuracy brought criminal charges under Article 187-6 (the creation of military or other armed formations or groups not envisioned by legislation) and Article 222 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (illegal bearing, possession, acquisition, manufacture, and sales of fire arms or bladed weapons, ammunition, and explosive substances).

[Kozin] From time to time the Moscow newspapers print figures about the number and composition of organized criminal formations. Do these figures exist for Donetsk Oblast?

[Chumak] According to figures we acquired during the process of our operational investigatory work, on the territory of the oblast at the present time there are about 30 groups in which there actually are signs of organized crime. As a rule, they are headed by individuals who enjoy a certain amount of authority in the criminal world and frequently they have been convicted previously. These groupings include from 10 to 20 individuals. They are usually formed along territorial lines, that is, practically each region has its own grouping. Most of them have been legalized under the cover of various commercial structures, international enterprises, etc. Frequently their criminal activity is based on extortion under the guise of offers to render protection services to large-scale entrepreneurs and merchants.

Additionally, we have recently established that they are actively aspiring to the credit-banking system where they can acquire significant sums of money illegally but quickly, which to a certain degree was the reason for dividing up the spheres of influence and brought about a series of contract murders committed in the oblast and Donetsk.

Very unfortunately, it must be stated that, in spite of how flagrantly the criminals work, we do not always succeed in making criminal charges stick. A large part of the reason for this is the imperfection of the legislation.

Incidentally, the victims themselves, who are frequently at odds with the law, do not want to appeal to the law enforcement organs for fear of revenge from the criminals.

Franchuk on Privatization Procedures

954F0932A Simferopol KRYMSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Jan 95 p 1

[Interview with Anatoliy Romanovich Franchuk, prime minister of the Government of Crimea, by Yelena Gornaya; place and date not given: "Privatization: Theory and Practice: If Vouchers Are Being Issued, It Means that Someone Needs Them"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [begin bold]The word "privatization" evokes a lively reaction from politicians, entrepreneurs, business managers, civil servants, and the rank and file owners of vouchers. In Ukraine the process of privatization moved at an accelerated pace, and Crimea can no longer remain the preserve of old regime economic relationships. What does our government think of the conduct and regulation of the processes of destatization? What kind of mechanisms are being developed to monitor the course of privatization in order that it is implemented in the interests of a majority of Crimeans, and not for the purpose of robbing them? Our interview on this subject is with Anatoliy Romanovich Franchuk, prime minister of the Government of Crimea.[end bold]

[Gornaya] At the previous plenary meeting of the Crimean parliament you appealed to the deputies to remove the moratorium on the conduct of privatization immediately.

[Franchuk] We were overly cautious for a long time in conducting reforms that should bring us to a market economy. We approached it in roundabout ways according to the principle of one step forward, two steps back. The terms "small privatization," "large privatization," and "voucher privatization" appeared, but things are not moving, and a moratorium has been published. As a result, the Crimea, and indeed all of Ukraine, has hopelessly lagged behind the other CIS states. We simply ended up on different economic planes that rule out partner interfacing. Business links cannot function normally in the closed system of one republic, of one autonomy. Especially because initially our economy was integrated in the national economic complex of a huge state. This includes sales markets, and employers, and suppliers. Our producers have now run into an insoluble problem. They are unable to conclude mutually beneficial treaties with Russian, Moldovan, and Baltic partners, not because of any kind of political barriers but because of a nonconvergence of the status of the components of economic activity. I am not talking about potential partners and investors from the far abroad and various types of charitable organizations that express a readiness to transfer resources...but not to state banks.

[Gornaya] An edict of President L.D. Kuchma on privatization was published at the end of December 1994 that will accelerate this process in Ukraine as a whole and in the Crimea in particular.

[Franchuk] Undoubtedly, we are taking the Ukrainian privatization scheme as a basis. But at the same time, Crimea's specific character and the peculiarities of our region will be taken into account. The program of economic transformation developed by the Government of Crimea is practically ready, and we are submitting it to the Supreme Council for consideration. Not only is privatization envisioned, but a profound reformation of the tax and bank system, a change in land relationships, and a reorganization in all spheres of the national economy.

[Gornaya] Nonetheless, what can the rank and file laborer count on in regard to privatization? The distribution of privatization property certificates into cash circulation is starting. As the saying goes, if vouchers are distributed, it means that someone needs them. And each citizen wants to use his 52-millionth part of national property correctly. Thus, where is it best to invest a voucher? For example, how will you use this nominal valuable security?

[Franchuk] I have to admit that I have not yet thought about this until now. But I am glad that the mass media has turned to this theme. We must broadly popularize this together, and provide explanations and warnings. Unquestionably, in the placement of privatized resources, preference should be given to branches that are characteristic of Crimea, that have good prospects, reliable sources of raw materials, and a guaranteed market. I advise that special attention be paid to the degree of ecological cleanliness of production. For example, to invest a voucher today in the Kerch iron ore combine is the height of foolishness. This is energy-intensive, ecologically dirty, and unstable production that has no promise. In Crimea, with its resort character, a good return should be given by enterprises in the recreational sphere, the production of food products, and consumer products—"light" industry in the sense of ecological cleanliness, and also shipbuilding enterprises that have a sales market in the far abroad.

To facilitate the selection for voucher owners, the government intends to publish a special bulletin on the economic condition and prospects of all enterprises that are subject to privatization. After familiarizing himself with such a bulletin, a person is himself able to assess whether the enterprise is threatened with bankruptcy tomorrow, whether the sale of its products is guaranteed, and how attractive the enterprise is for investors, etc. In starting privatization with a significant delay, we at least hope to avoid the deplorable experience of our neighbors. Unfortunately, there are examples in CIS republics when mandatory and extremely unsuccessful reprofiling of leading enterprises with outstanding production engineers and modern equipment was the result of privatization. Placing privatized resources in any enterprise

should not be done in a haphazard way, but with clear calculations: First, is this enterprise necessary to Crimea in principle, what does it provide for Crimeans, with what and how does it intend to enter the foreign market, what raw material and type of equipment will be used, what number of jobs will be assured, what personnel qualifications will be required, etc. All this information will be reported in government bulletins. I firmly intend to achieve openness in presenting information on enterprises being privatized, and I ask the mass media to assist me in this. We must not permit vouchers to become a means of profit for individual excessively enterprising persons. Privatization should fulfill its basic purpose—to transfer facilities into the hands of conscientious owners.

[Gornaya] Crimea has practically created its own stock exchange. How is this fact assessed in the government, and does it agree to give it an official "OK"?

[Franchuk] There is no question an exchange is necessary, and the government will examine this question. Only we must monitor it so that it is not transformed into a shady, fraudulent market.

[Gornaya] The inventory of property, which is periodically accompanied by resubordination to the State Property Fund, is taking an agonizingly long time in our republic.

[Franchuk] As for the fund, in my opinion, it should be under the government. We will summarize the results of the inventory, in which all the ministries are engaged, at the end of February and beginning of March. It can be said preliminarily that some miserable facts are being uncovered for which we are proposing to conduct a government offsite meeting.

[Gornaya] Will the list of facilities that are under Crimean ownership and subject to privatization be expanded?

[Franchuk] I think so. I had a discussion on this subject with President L.D. Kuchma. Of course, we will not make any claim to specific objects of the Zarya type, but we also do not intend to neglect Crimea's interests.

Control of Cabinet Major Kuchma Objective

954F0871A Kiev MOST in Russian No 1, 9-15 Jan 95
p 7

[Article by Vyacheslav Pikhovshek: "How Then Do We Subdue the Cabinet of Ministers?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The fact that this is precisely the super-task L. Kuchma has assigned his team, responsible for drawing up the president's draft law "On the Authority," is proved by one of the key sentences of the second "king's speech" delivered by the president: "This law will enable us to set the executive authority straight and make it function effectively... We all understand that there is a certain dichotomy here—concerning relations

between the president and the government. I will state quite frankly that from the point of view of stabilization of the situation in society, the problem of the effectiveness of government activity is question number one. I am not satisfied today with the work of the government on the whole. We have not yet succeeded in overcoming the lack of coordination of actions among ministries and departments and the low level of executive branch discipline. Suffice it to say that the problem of energy supply is 90 percent due to the irresponsibility of specific officials. A fundamentally new model of management of the economy is today being readied. We will also have to effect radical personnel changes, and in a number of instances—purge the government of people to whom mercenary and corporate interests are higher than state interests." In the same speech, the president assessed the activity of the Cabinet of Ministers as being "too independent."

And so, despite the fears of those who see the chief danger of the president's draft law in the fact that the president will have the right to dissolve parliament, the main attacks against the future law seem to be directed towards the Cabinet of Ministers. How is the government of V. Masol threatening L. Kuchma, if it is necessary to adopt an entire law for its "neutralization"?

And it is true that from all indications, no matter how paradoxical it might seem, the activity of the Supreme Council cannot help but suit L. Kuchma. Amorphous, without a distinct majority or opposition, the parliament cannot help the president in effecting economic reforms, but at the same time it does not have the ability to impede him. Attempts from the left to block certain of L. Kuchma's decisions ended in fiasco, and the only thing the left could do was to take the road—potentially more successful for them, but rather long—to the "labor collectives." In all likelihood it is precisely the reliance on "illness" of the legislative organ of the government that explains the fact that neither L. Kuchma nor the members of his administration appealed to the electorate to participate in the voting during the recent parliamentary by-elections.

But the cabinet of V. Masol remains a reality the president cannot fail to reckon with. In addition to the energy supply example cited by L. Kuchma, we must also recall Decree of the National Bank and Cabinet of Ministers No. 599, dated 29 August 1994, "On Primary Credit Emission of the National Bank of Ukraine for II and III Quarters 1994," already termed "illegal" by certain members of parliament insofar as it was introduced contrary to decisions of the Supreme Council—not to mention in secret from the deputies. One member of L. Kuchma's administration, desiring to remain anonymous, labeled the tactics of actions of the Cabinet of Ministers nothing other than "silent sabotage."

Thus, the activity (or inactivity) of the Masol government is a problem that L. Kuchma seems to be in no condition to resolve without assistance from a law. The

present prime minister was appointed by the Supreme Council, substantially dominated by the left at that time, but no longer. Leonid Kuchma is in no position to replace the prime minister, however, insofar as it was not he who appointed him. Despite the weakness in position of the left, the Supreme Council nonetheless will not "help" the president—it lacks the majority needed to declare a vote of no-confidence in the prime minister. Vitaliy Masol therefore finds himself in a situation that politicians at his level can only dream about: Being once confirmed, he need not worry about threat of forced resignation.

Yet clouds seem to be gathering all the same over the head of V. Masol. At a recent briefing in the Kuchma administration, National Security Council Secretary Vladimir Gorbunin stated that he never would have signed an agreement on the zero variant of division of debts and assets of the former USSR, while "V. Masol, in signing this document, failed to show sufficient adherence to principles." It cannot be ruled out that in order to "subdue" the Cabinet of Ministers once and for all, L. Kuchma and his administration will resort to a nontraditional alternative—of the referendum variety. The president's announcement of this possibility came much to the surprise of most deputies.

Nor should the prediction be cast aside that the matter of V. Masol's fate in the post of prime minister of the Ukrainian Government might also be decided in the referendum L. Kuchma spoke about. One employee of the president's administration, whose duties include the provision of information—and disinformation, it seems—to journalists, asserts that the president was strongly relying on adoption of the draft law on the authority if only in the first reading, but that he did not intend to bring the idea of a referendum to the point of realization. Whereas the former probably conforms to reality (the president so stated in his speech), the latter part of this assertion is an obvious untruth. It is accurately known that at least two administration employees have begun working on preparation of the referendum. This effort was quietly begun in several oblast centers of Ukraine. It seems that a referendum is precisely the gift the president will present his fellow countrymen in the New Year.

Citizens Congress Party Opposed to Kuchma

954F0941B Donetsk VECHERNIY DONETSK in Russian 18 Jan 95 p 1

[“Own Information” report under the rubric “Political Palette: From the Position of Opposition”]

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting of the coordinating council of the Citizens Congress of Ukraine [GKU] party was held on 8 January in Kiev. On the eve of it an opinion poll was conducted in regional organizations on two questions: attitude toward the president and the party's place in the political spectrum of Ukraine. On the basis of the poll results, the coordinating council

announced that the GKU is now in opposition to Leonid Kuchma. The explanation for the decision was that the president is not fulfilling his election campaign promises, in particular, on the questions of creating an economic union in the CIS and the equality of the Russian and Ukrainian languages. The coordinating council also noted that in his personnel policy the president relies on the forces that opposed him in the elections; in economic matters follows the lead of the International Monetary Fund; and finally, uses shock therapy methods. The poll also confirmed the GKU's previous position in the political spectrum: a left-of-center, social-democratic orientation.

At the coordinating council meeting, GKU Chairman A. Basilyuk delivered a report on the work of international congress of citizens “Toward Integration Through Accord Between Peoples,” held earlier in Moscow. The gathering unanimously supported the international congress' decision to hold on the territory of four CIS republics a referendum on the question: “Do you want the unification of Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan into one economic, political, and defense union on the basis of the cultural and historic legacy of the peoples?” It was recommended that the GKU's regional organizations begin to create at local level blocs of similarly minded parties and public organizations to collect signatures for the holding of a referendum in Ukraine.

Prospective Liberal Party Chief's Platform

954F0929B Donetsk AKTSENT in Russian 17 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[Article by V. Pozdnyshv: “Liberals on the Eve of the Congress”]

[FBIS Translated Text] Almost nothing has been heard from the Liberal Party of Ukraine [LPU] during the past half year; we have heard no statements from it regarding various events in our sociopolitical life or its assessments of the most important problems arising during this difficult time of crisis. There were, of course, quite objective reasons for this silence. In the first place, the unsuccessful outcome for the liberals in last year's elections to the Supreme Council of Ukraine, in which there was not a single representative of the LPU, undoubtedly had an effect. Following that was another shock: The leader of the party and its founder, I.R. Markulov, unexpectedly resigned from his post. All this, of course, brought about a certain lack of confidence and confusion in the ranks of the liberals, in their primary and regional organizations. This was shown last Thursday at the oblast conference of the Liberal Party, both in the political report from Vice President S.M. Tokarev and in the speeches of the participants.

But the liberals' state of shock did not last long. The party has continued to work and function. And the effect of this work is fairly instructive. The failure in the elections did not discourage the liberals. The influx of members into the party has increased appreciably. There

are now 15,000 registered members in its ranks. One-third of them are in our oblast. The party also has many supporters. And they are the expression of an interesting and unique phenomenon in our sociopolitical life. It is with their forces that the liberals intend to make up for what was lost in the elections and to take over the parliament. And the results are in evidence. The night before the conference, People's Deputies of Ukraine V.F. Ampilogov and Ye.A. Shcherban spoke to the LPU. The work among the deputies is continuing and, it seems, the efforts of the liberals, taking into account their—the deputies'—political instability and indecisiveness, are completely justified. They are relying above all on the political uncertainty of the representatives of the director corps, who do not wish to burn their bridges behind them.

The search for a new LPU leader is curious in this respect. Included in the orbit of this search, it turns out, was V.P. Shcherban, who did not reject the role but, because of his work load, was forced to reject the offer. It turns out that, as LPU Vice President T.A. Kiseleva reported, a month ago they received information to the effect that I.P. Markulov had decided to retract his previous political announcement. But the party Management Council made it clear to him (without underestimating the credit due him for creating the party) that the "train" had already left.

For the post of party president they are recommending a candidate from the Don region who is now a resident of Kiev, O.I. Soskin. He is the deputy director of the Institute of World Economics of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine; a descendant of a miner family, he was a member of the CPSU for 17 years, he taught in the Kiev Higher Trade Union School, and was on the presidential teams of Kravchuk and Kuchma. In O.I. Soskin's opinion, the primary task for the party should be to create a liberal faction in parliament.

Domestic policy, in his view, should be concentrated on creating a powerful—75 percent of the population—middle class which relies on powerful support from its colleagues at high levels. The party's foreign political course too, judging from O.I. Soskin's statement, will undergo changes. Ukraine should adhere to its independent course, avoiding "Moscow's door mat." Instead of the CIS, the Black Sea-Baltic axis will become stronger—that is, the former path from the Varangians to the Greeks. Well, we will wait and see.

Donetsk Oblast Migration Patterns Reported

954F0941A Donetsk AKTSENT in Russian 18 Jan 95
p 2

[Report by the Donetsk Oblast Statistical Administration: "'Fish Seek Deeper Water, and People...' (On Migration Processes in Donetsk Oblast)"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Over a long period of time our oblast's population grew through migration, that is, more people came to live in the oblast than moved out. Beginning last year the trend changed: Now more leave than come. In 1994 this process only intensified. While in 1993 63,000 persons left the oblast and 62,000 arrived, over January-September 1992 almost 50,000 left and only about 37,000 arrived to live here permanently.

Where are our compatriots going? Of the total number of those who left over nine months of the current year, 30,600, or almost 62 percent (59 percent in 1993), went to countries of the former USSR; 15,900, or 32 percent (36 percent in 1993)—to other oblasts of Ukraine; and 3,200—to far abroad countries (which is 1.8 times more than over the corresponding period of last year), or more than 6 percent (it was less than 5 percent in 1993).

Analysis of migration processes also shows that a considerable proportion of Donetsk Oblast residents go to regions of the Russian North, Siberia, and the Far East—that is, where people expect to find a well-paid job and housing. In our oblast there are difficulties with both, and not only because the oblast has a population density that is among the highest (more than 200 population per square kilometer), but also because of the current economic situation. At the same time, the worsening demographic situation will hardly help to overcome these problems. Since 1990 the number of deaths has been exceeding the number of births, and now the situation is exacerbated by the migration outflow of the population at the peak of its productive capacity.

As compared to January-September 1993, the number of persons who arrived in our oblast for permanent residency, including from the countries of the former USSR, declined by 40 percent.

At the same time, analysis of migration in the oblast shows what may be considered a positive trend. There is some migration-caused increase of the population in rural areas; in 1993 the population there increased by 1,900, and over nine months of 1994—by 700. For instance, during last year more than 17,000 persons, of whom three-quarters previously had been urban residents, moved to live in rural areas; the average age of the migrants was 26, and only 7 percent of the total were of retirement age.

National Assembly Not Affiliated With UNSO

954F0941C Simferopol KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jan 95 p 1

[Ministry of Justice of Ukraine-UKRINFORM release: "Ministry of Justice Clarification"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Ministry of Justice of Ukraine has registered another political party—the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA). However, some mass media erroneously reported the registration of the

UNA-UNSO. In reality, these are different organizations; the UNA documents submitted for registration contained no mention of the Ukrainian National Self-Defense party (UNSO). Neither were UNSO documents submitted separately to the Ministry of Justice.

However, the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine is receiving letters and inquiries from citizens questioning whether the UNA-UNSO party has indeed been registered.

The Ministry of Justice states once again: The UNA party has been registered in accordance with the documents submitted.

The UNA party was registered in keeping with the Ukrainian law "On Citizens Associations." Its purpose is participation in the forming of state policy, formation of bodies of authority and local and regional self-rule, and representation in them.

Belarus**Russian Recruitment of Vets for Chechnya Evidenced***MM1901152395 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Jan 95 p 4*

[Report by Aleksandr Starikovich: "Chechen Cannonade Has Reached Belorussia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Minsk—For the duration of the entire Chechen crisis, Belorussia [Belarus] has occupied a stance of nonintervention, deeming the Grozny events to be a domestic matter for Russia. So reports pertaining to the recruitment of republic citizens to participate in the military activities in Chechnya were all the more surprising.

According to information leaked to the press, the Belorussian [Belarusian] secret services have recorded five instances of Russian Defense Ministry and Internal Affairs Ministry representatives' coming to the republic for recruitment purposes. Potential mercenaries were offered pretty good money to help the regular Russian Army. They were rounded up mainly from among reserve servicemen.

Officially Minsk is staying silent on this question for now. Only the KGB Press Service has reacted—its announcement neither confirms nor denies the recruitment reports. It has also been said that Belorussian state security is at present checking the available information on this score. The delicate topic is being discussed extremely reluctantly by representatives of the Belorussian power structures, and even then unofficially. Relations with Moscow are such that Minsk does not want to do anything to complicate them further without a particularly good reason.

Nevertheless, IZVESTIYA's correspondent managed to discover that in this case it is pertinent to answer the question "Did they find a body?" with "More likely than not." Instances of Russian officers' arrival were undoubtedly recorded (for example, at the end of December last year, two militia personnel from Moscow spent some time in one of Lida's hotels), but as yet nobody is willing categorically to qualify their activity on Belorussian territory as recruitment-oriented. Although, according to information received, the visitors did indeed hold a number of meetings with reservists, among whom representatives of the scarcer Army professions—sappers, communications personnel, artillery mount operators, and certain others—enjoyed particular popularity. The recruiters had about their persons official contract forms in which all the terms of "service" were stipulated, including payment in the event of injury or death. On signing the contract, the mercenaries were instantly handed between \$1,000 and \$1,500.

IZVESTIYA sources in the Security Council have the names both of the recruiters and the recruited, but this information is not being divulged for the considerations expounded above.

"For now I would like to refrain from commenting on this subject," Belorussian KGB Chairman Vladimir Yegorov told IZVESTIYA's correspondent. "We have yet to clarify the given situation completely: If it emerges that such things are taking place from whichever side, then we will put a stop to them."

Analyzing the situation that has arisen, it can be suggested that the Belorussian authorities, while not wanting to clash with Moscow, are hinting nevertheless at the impropriety of its emissaries' behavior. Practice shows that, if the recruitment report proved to have insufficient basis, it would be followed by an immediate refutation from the Russian side, with the obligatory emphasis on attempts by evil forces to spoil relations between friendly states. As we know, this has not happened so far. Besides, it is quite likely that, after a while, Minsk will announce that the recruitment story does not correspond to reality anyway. The pause will be useful, in order to bring it to their neighbors' attention that their activity on the republic's territory in certain cases is not only excessive but also unacceptable.

As yet there is no precise answer even to the question of who needed to involve Belorussian citizens in the Grozny events and why. It is clear that, in any case, their numbers will be too insignificant to affect the outcome of the military activities.

Details of Agreements, Joint Declaration With China*LD1901182395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1352
GMT 19 Jan 95*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Grigoriy Arslanov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Beijing January 19 TASS—China gave away a consignment of preparations for radiation sickness to the people of Belarus, who had suffered from the Chernobyl disaster.

The Chinese Government also commissioned Chinese doctors to go to Belarus and teach their colleagues and local patients to use the Chinese preparations made of medicinal herbs most effectively.

The medicaments were handed over to Belarus president's chief of staff Leonid Sinitsyn, who accompanies President Alyaksandr Lukashenka during their visit to China.

Lukashenka's visit is an important event in the history of bilateral relations; it will contribute to strengthening of relations between Beijing and Minsk, said Chinese Premier Li Peng during his talks with President Lukashenka.

Belarus is one of the important countries in Europe and CIS, and China should develop cooperation with it on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, he added.

In his turn, Lukashenka reportedly said that Belarus is interested in studying China's successful accomplishment of economic reform and expressed hope that

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Belarus will participate in construction of the world's largest hydrotechnical facility Sanxia on the Yangtze River.

According to well-informed sources, defence ministers of the two countries agreed to expand cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries.

Chinese newspapers published joint declaration on further development and deepening of cooperation between China and Belarus. According to the document, the bilateral talks were held in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual confidence.

Interaction between the two countries answers to their long-term interests and contributes to strengthening of peace and security in the world, the declaration says.

Belarus acknowledges the Government of the People's Republic of China as the only legitimate government of the whole China, and considers Taiwan an inalienable part of Chinese territory. China, for its part, respects independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Belarus, the declaration says.

Vitebsk, Novgorod Leaders Sign Cooperation Treaty

WS2001105895 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0400 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Leaders of Vitebsk and Novgorod Oblasts have signed an agreement on long-term economic, scientific-technical, and cultural cooperation. The document states: The sides are taking responsibility for creating necessary conditions to establish and develop relations in all areas of life on the basis of equal and mutual benefit for themselves.

Financial Ministry Specifies Level of Foreign Debt

WS2001135695 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0400 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The 1995 foreign debt of Belarus will not exceed \$2 billion, the Belarusian Ministry of Finances said. According to the data from the ministry, the debt stands at \$1.3 billion as of today. Therefore, the Republic can lend no more than \$700 million this year.

Kazakhstan

New Policy Toward Latin America Worked Out

954F0924A Almaty PANORAMA in Russian No 2,
14 Jan 95 p 5

[Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Tokayev by Askar Aukenov; place and date not given: "A New Direction of Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy Was Developed During the Visit to Brazil"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As PANORAMA (No. 1 of 7 January 1995) has already reported, on 1 January Kasymzhomart Tokayev, minister of foreign affairs of Kazakhstan, took part in the inauguration ceremony for Brazilian President Enrique Cardozo. Mr. Tokayev commented on the results of the visit to Latin America specially for PANORAMA.

[Aukenov] Could you dwell in more detail on the main tasks that confronted you in the course of the trip?

[Tokayev] The formal essence of the visit consisted of participation in the president of Brazil's inauguration ceremony. It should be mentioned that importance is attached to this measure in Brazil. This is indicated if only by the fact that the ceremony was attended by delegations from 121 states and 30 international organizations. In addition, we took advantage of the activity for high-level contacts with representatives of Latin American countries. I conveyed personal messages from President Nazarbayev to President Cardozo, had a meeting with the minister of foreign affairs of Brazil, conducted negotiations with the minister of foreign affairs of Chile, and met with the president of Argentina and the head of this country's foreign policy department.

We regard the three above-mentioned states as key states in Latin America. The fact of the matter is that the Latin American direction had not hitherto been developed by Kazakhstan. And I believe that there is reason to say that a new direction in our foreign policy was opened during the visit to Brazil. We intend this year even to establish high-level exchanges. In any event, Mr. Menem, president of Argentina, declared his desire following the May elections (which he will win, by all accounts) to pay an official visit to Kazakhstan. He has a good personal relationship with President Nazarbayev and he would like to develop it for a strengthening of interstate relations between Kazakhstan and Argentina.

I invited the Chilean minister of foreign affairs to visit Kazakhstan. Chile is now developing very dynamically, and this country's inclusion in the NAFTA North American Free Trade Zone is already being conjectured. This is connected with the fact that it is Chile that is adhering to the most open market policy in Latin America.

I also met with the foreign minister of Mexico, which is a member of NAFTA. We agreed on permanent consultations with Mexico and, as far as possible, on the

establishment of cooperation. Kazakhstan will in the future be opening its embassies in the said three or four states, I believe.

[Aukenov] What goals did your meeting with Fidel Castro pursue?

[Tokayev] I did, indeed, visit Cuba, where I met with the head of this country. It has to be said that he displayed a genuine interest in Kazakhstan, and we talked for more than two hours. Mr. Castro inquired after literally all aspects of the domestic situation and the economic position of the republic.

I also held talks with the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of Cuba and the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of foreign economic relations, and the minister for foreign investments. This was, as it happened, the first visit to Cuba by a foreign minister from the CIS.

Cuba is experiencing hard times connected with the continued blockade on the part of the United States. At the same time, on the other hand, the truth is that the international community accepts the blockade of Cuba with great reservations, to put it mildly. It is sufficient to say that only the United States and Israel supported it at the time of the recent vote at the United Nations. Kazakhstan abstained. Thus today only two countries support a continuation of the blockade, which is exerting a very serious negative influence on Cuba's economy. Canada and Mexico—the United States' NAFTA partners—are calling for an end to it. Spain and Brazil do not recognize the blockade and trade with Cuba directly. Investments in the sphere of Cuban tourism, which, Cuban leaders expect, will in the very near future bring the country in approximately \$800 million a year, are currently being attracted from Spain, Mexico, and Canada. Cuba's sugar industry—the main branch of its economy—is being restored quite successfully. In a word, signs of a leveling out of the serious economic situation and a surmounting of the crisis of confidence in the present policy of Fidel Castro have appeared.

It has to be said that a year ago even this lack of confidence was being felt very keenly. The fact is that 5.5 million of the 11 million population of Cuba are people under the age of 30. This is both a plus and a minus for the country, which was admitted to me during the conversation by the minister of foreign affairs, inasmuch as the revolutionary romanticism of the era of Fidel Castro and Ernesto Che Guevara is not understood by this generation: It wishes to live in accordance with the standards that are accepted in the civilized community, and these standards, in this part of the world, in any event, are demonstrated by the United States.

It should be noted that Cuba is far from isolated internationally. The country's foreign minister will shortly make a tour of Asian countries, intending to visit five states of Northeast and Southeast Asia. In May he

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intends to pay a visit to Russia and Ukraine. I invited him to visit Kazakhstan also.

Russian-Cuban relations are being restored. This is evident if only in the example that last year Russia supplied Cuba with approximately 1.5 million tonnes of oil and petroleum products. Russia's ambassador to Cuba spoke to me with optimism about the prospects of Russian-Cuban relations. The fact that there are in Havana currently 80 embassies of foreign states also testifies to the international recognition of Cuba. Negotiations are being conducted between Cuba and the United States on problems of emigration. But there is no understanding as yet between Washington and Havana on cardinal matters, of course. The Cubans believe that the Americans are demanding a change in the social and political system of their state under the slogan of the democratization of social life as a prior condition of the full normalization of relations and the lifting of the blockade. As far as the Americans are concerned, they have their own logic connected with the violations (as they believe) of human rights on Cuba.

To sum up, it may be said that relations between the countries are strained and that Havana is very concerned at the virtual assumption of power in the United States of the Republicans, who adhere to traditionally hard-line positions in relation to Cuba. Nonetheless, the Cubans are embarking on various actions aimed at easing the consequences of the blockade and moving into the international arena. They are succeeding here in principle.

[Aukenov] Was there any reaction on the part of the United States, specifically, of the American Embassy, in connection with your visit to Cuba?

[Tokayev] No, there was no such reaction. Cuba has contacts along diplomatic lines with many states. I have already mentioned that the minister of foreign affairs of Cuba is preparing to go to Russia. He also agreed with Mr. Kozyrev, having met with him recently in New York at the time of the UN General Assembly session, on a return visit of the minister of foreign affairs of Russia to Cuba. That is, the world community makes contact with Cuba, and there is nothing so terrible about this. In addition, within the framework of consultations [word illegible] I intend meeting with the U.S. ambassador in Kazakhstan soon in order to brief him on the main results of my visit to Cuba.

[Aukenov] What, in your view, are the mutual, specifically economic, interests in relations between Cuba and Kazakhstan?

[Tokayev] Kazakhstan has an interest in Cuban sugar, which in terms of quality is perhaps the best in the world. Cuba is interested in obtaining Kazakhstan oil and petroleum products. How feasible these projects are, time will tell, since Kazakhstan is encountering considerable difficulties, primarily in the plane of transportation of oil overseas.

I visited the Cuban Biotechnology Institute, which has world-class inventions, specifically, preparations for the treatment of hepatitis B and radiation sickness. The Cubans are interested in supplying these medicines to Kazakhstan in exchange for other products. In addition, they expressed a wish to accept a small group of children suffering from radiation for treatment in Cuban hospitals, which enjoy quite high authority in the system of world health care. We also signed a cultural agreement and intend to fulfill it to the best of our abilities. Finally, a protocol on consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs was signed, in accordance with which within the framework of the United Nations and also on a bilateral basis we will exchange with Cuba opinions on this international problem or the other.

Nazarbayev Urges CIS 'Pact on Peace'

MM1901115795 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jan 95 p 3

[Interview with President Nursultan Nazarbayev by Yevgeniy Dotsuk; place and date not given: "President Nursultan Nazarbayev: Wisdom for a Politician Consists in Acknowledging and Rectifying a Mistake"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Dotsuk] Nursultan Abishevich, the economic crisis is continuing in Kazakhstan: declining production, impoverishment of the people, unemployment. What has happened?

[Nazarbayev] Despite all the current gravity of the situation in the Kazakhstan economy I did not and do not consider that we have done anything wrong when it comes to the main task. But when it comes to tactics..., that is where we have regrettably made mistakes. And we are not the only ones. None of the postsocialist countries has managed to avoid a painful transition phase of. Although I realize that these arguments are not very comforting for the working man who has been unable to get his wages for doing his job for two or three months....

I do nonetheless think that this year, in 1995, we will start to emerge from the crisis. For five months now the tenge has been holding its ground against the U.S. dollar. We have been able to sustain the exchange rate without spending a cent of the \$190 million that we were given by the IMF to support our currency.

Over the last three months prices have risen by 20 percent, but wages have risen at the same time by 26 percent. Over the last three months industrial production has once again begun to rise, albeit by 2-3 percent.

We come right after Russia today in terms of wages (your average [monthly] wage is now in the region of \$97 while ours as of December stood at around \$80. In Belorussia [Belarus], Ukraine, and Uzbekistan the figures are \$30, \$20, and \$37 respectively).

This enables me to say that we have chosen the correct path, but objectively it involves serious problems.

Do you think that I do not know what life is like for pensioners and war veterans today? Sometimes they go and sell things in underground passageways in order to earn a crust. But was it really love of the good life that originally made the government freeze payments for the Semipalatinsk test range and the Aral? It was hard to take that step at that moment, and not many people know it. Can a person really sleep easy in that situation?

[Dotsuk] Nursultan Abishevich, I would like to touch on the problems faced by Russian-speaking Kazakhstan. The increasing flood of migrants from Kazakhstan is associated increasingly frequently with inequality enshrined in the Constitution. For instance, the problem of state bilingualism has become very acute today....

[Nazarbayev] Literally a few days ago I asked prosecutor's office organs whether there have been instances in the republic of citizens' rights being infringed because they do not speak the state language. There have been no appeals of this kind. Thus our constitution is working; it clearly says that Russian is the language of interethnic communication. Our fundamental law prohibits in concrete, definite terms the infringement of citizens' rights on the grounds of their ignorance of the state language or the language of interethnic communication. Believe you me, we have people to monitor observance of the laws and punish people guilty of violating them.

But since these questions are arising in society, as president I cannot brush them aside. I recently raised these problems in parliament. I proposed ascertaining via a so-called straw poll whether we can now put up the questions of private land ownership, two state languages, and judicial reform for discussion by legislators. In other words, to see what the state of affairs is. Opinions differed—some people were wholeheartedly in favor, some were categorically opposed, and others kept quiet. But by and large the response was negative when it came to the first two questions. That indicates roughly the nature of opinion among the population. But it is absolutely essential to seek a compromise solution to enshrine the current stability in the republic.

[Dotsuk] As a Eurasian ideologue it would appear that you should be the first to introduce a Eurasian system of relations on your territory. This means above all absolute equality for everyone living in Kazakhstan. Have you abandoned this idea of yours following Moscow's cool reception of the Eurasian idea?

[Nazarbayev] If anyone thinks that I am played out and have put aside the idea of a Eurasian Union, they are very much mistaken. I cannot resign myself to the idea that we all disperse and try to make better lives on our own.

There is tremendous spiritual unity among us former fellow citizens. How can that be put out of our hearts? So many generations before us relied on it in campaigning, suffering, and winning victory. Other peoples take hundreds of years to arrive at that kind of commonality, but we have all of these things.

When the CIS was created we said that there should be no customs barriers, no obstacles to the movement of goods, capital, and people. But what do we have?

[Dotsuk] Today, I believe, there are around 70 major customs posts on the Kazakhstani-Russian border. Very fine border edifices....

[Nazarbayev] That's right. I suggested in my Eurasian Union plan that no borders should exist for a person if he lives in one of the Eurasian Union states. If he moves from one state to another within the Union he automatically receives citizenship. Does this not simplify our current problems, both economically and legally? People living in the Eurasian Union should not be foreigners to one another.

At the same time each state should remain independent.

[Dotsuk] You have acquired so many enemies owing to your passion for integration. Will this not be detrimental to you in the impending presidential election?

[Nazarbayev] If you constantly divide up your actions as to whether or not they are detrimental, you will never go anywhere. But I am confident that most people favor integration, and not only in Kazakhstan. I am convinced that the path of integration spells salvation for all of us. Sooner or later we will take that path. But the later it is, the harder it will be to advance, because it will be completely overgrown with weeds.

[Dotsuk] What about your pride? After all, most of the incumbent presidents came to power atop the idea of sovereignization and disintegration.

[Nazarbayev] We presidents are not insured against making mistakes. Wisdom for a politician consists in acknowledging and rectifying them.

I would like to ask my colleagues—the leaders of the Commonwealth states—to specially discuss the question of the steps that we could take to put an end to and avert all conflicts in the CIS area in 1995 and protect our peoples from grief, tears, and suffering. The first step could be the conclusion of a pact on peace and stability in the CIS. We intended to put forward a draft of this for discussion by the Commonwealth heads of state during the meeting in Alma-Ata [Almaty] scheduled for the latter half of December 1994, but regrettably it did not go ahead. We simply must make this attempt!

A new year has begun. Resting on our experience and achievements, we must achieve a breakthrough in politics and the economy and, most importantly, enable people to feel that all their problems can be overcome. I wholeheartedly congratulate KOMSOMOLKA and its readers on the New Year and hope that everyone has faith in the good times.

New Law on Foreign Investments Analyzed

954F0925A Almaty PANORAMA in Russian No 2,
14 Jan 95 p 9

[Article by Musiraly Utebayev, first deputy chairman of the National Agency for Foreign Investments: "New Law

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on Foreign Investments Provides Guarantees for Foreign Investors Against Expropriations and Illegal Actions of State Organs and Officials"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The previous Law on Foreign Investments that was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] on 7 December 1990 played a rather positive role in the formation of an investment climate in the republic. The process of creating joint (foreign) enterprises in Kazakhstan can serve as an example. While at the end of 1990 there were 15, in 1991—225, in 1992—669, then in 1994, according to preliminary data, there were about 1,800, with the participation of almost 70 states.

At the same time, to the extent that economic reforms are intensified, this law could have a negative influence on the processes of attracting foreign investments, especially for small and average businesses. The present situation requires an expansion of the sphere of conducting foreign investments and a consolidation of the principle—everything is authorized that is not prohibited according to objects of investments and types of activity of foreign investors. It is necessary to authorize them to participate in privatization and to acquire the right to use land, natural resources, and real estate. It is also necessary to define the procedure for resolving investment arguments with the application of international rules and norms and to regulate labor relations and social insurance and security.

Another factor is associated with the fact that the guarantees for Western investors set forth in the old edition of the Law on Foreign Investments are inadequate: It is necessary to the extent possible to reinforce the principle of the "sanctity of contracts" in the republic, as is practiced in countries with a market economy.

In the new Law on Foreign Investments, which was adopted at the end of the year by the Supreme Council, both the interests of the state and of foreign investors are taken into account in a proper way. In a significant measure it will make it entirely possible to establish a favorable regime for foreign investments, eliminating the most significant obstacles to the flow of direct foreign investments. The law is of a comprehensive nature, but at the same time it restricts itself to questions that have an immediate bearing on direct (and portfolio) foreign investments.

It is necessary to note here that direct foreign investments, first, serve as direct sources of capital for investment in the production of commodities and services, also ensuring the attraction of new technologies, know-how, and advanced managerial experience and marketing. Second, in contrast to official loans and credits, they do not become an additional burden for the foreign debt of the state. And, finally, they in the best way promote the integration of the national economy into the world economy, owing to a growing foreign interest and to various kinds of production and scientific-technical cooperation.

Thus, the new Law on Foreign Investments introduces the policy of extending the "national regime" to foreign investors. It provides guarantees against expropriations and illegal actions of state organs and officials, it envisions international arbitration for the resolution of arguments and differences when necessary, and it also removes restrictions on the formation of a charter fund and forming it into SKF [freely convertible currency].

At the same time, not all obstacles are subject to regulation by the Law on Foreign Investments. Certain types of legal norms that regulate economic activity should be contained in specific, codified normative acts (the Tax Code, the Customs Code, and the like), and the introduction of norms on privileges in this draft law, which determines the general legal regime of foreign investments, in our opinion, is inexpedient because the precedent should not arise of the crossing over of the legal regulation of one or another sphere of activity. Obviously, the effectiveness of the resolution of problems of attracting foreign investments is not only associated with the adoption of the new Law on Foreign Investments that combines the protection of national interests and guarantees of foreign investors, but to a greater degree with a more accurate and clear differentiation of the sphere of authorities of various government organs. At the same time, it is necessary to realistically put into effect the principle of "one-stop shopping" for foreign investors, which was adopted in Kazakhstan at the beginning of reforms, because experience shows that the uncertainty of the competence of various state institutions in this sphere disorients and scares off foreign partners.

Russians Cut Electricity to Strike-Hit Kazakhstan

LD2001120195 Almaty Kazakh Radio Network in Russian 0947 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The ongoing strike of workers in Kazakhstan's coal industry has rebounded on our country's energy system. In response to incomplete shipments of fuel from Ekibastuz, the Russian Federation took a similar step regarding the supply of electricity to the republic. The Karaganda metallurgical plant is working at half capacity. Since the strike began the plant is receiving less than half of the required quota of coal. The company has neither coke nor coal in reserve. Nobody knows how long this situation will last.

The fact is that the Karaganda miners were not enthusiastic about the statement made at a recent news conference by a number of deputies of the Supreme Council and economic managers led by the first deputy power and coal minister, who said that a draft resolution by the government on additional measures to stabilize the coal industry had been prepared. (Nikiforov), chairman of the Central Committee of the coal industry workers' trade union said, the government has still not met the miners' main demand—for their wage arrears to be paid. It takes years to implement a resolution, but the people need bread today.

Shkolnik on Proliferation, New Technology*95WP0040A Almaty EKSPRESS-K in Russian
12 Jan 94 pp 4-5*

[Interview with Vladimir Shkolnik, minister of science and new technologies of the Republic of Kazakhstan, by Valentina Dudkova; place and date not given: "In the Ministerial Chair and Without..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] Operation Sapphire was not a one-time, random one. Kazakhstan is "destined" to develop nuclear energy. We have our state secrets. Is Kazakhstan threatened with the fate of a "Third World country" in the sphere of science?

On 25 August of this year by an edict of the president, Vladimir Sergeyevich Shkolnik was appointed to the post minister of science and new technologies of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

In 1973 after graduating from the renowned MIFI (Moscow Engineering-Physics Institute) he was assigned to the Mangyshlak energy combine through graduate job assignments. He began as an engineer and ended his career at the combine as deputy director for science, nuclear safety, and reactor production. He is a doctor of physics-mathematical sciences. He is married. He has two children. He is relatively young—45.

An operator happened to fall asleep at the control panel of the nuclear reactor, which cost the United States \$6 billion in losses....

Before being appointed to the position of minister, beginning in 1992, he was in charge of the Academy of Nuclear Energy. Over a short period of time he did an immense amount of work with the nuclear legacy of the former USSR. After all, Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian republic in which five research nuclear reactors and seven uranium production and processing enterprises are concentrated along with a unique plant for producing nuclear fuel and other materials. In the first place, we have become members of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], and in the second place, we have signed the most important international documents and agreements and also created a normal base for regulating nuclear activity. Unfortunately, in the former Union there were no legal acts regarding nuclear energy. In V. Shkolnik's words, one of the reasons for the Chernobyl tragedy was that the Gosatomnadzor had just barely been created at that time.

[Dudkova] Vladimir Sergeyevich, so it has already turned out that since the Chernobyl disaster and the discovery of a large number of accidents at other nuclear facilities the population has developed a negative attitude toward them. Are they really so dangerous?

[Shkolnik] This caution can be understood and explained. After all, at the beginning of the establishment of nuclear energy engineering both in our country and in

the United States and France it involved only the production of nuclear weapons. Therefore everything was strictly classified. The ecological aspects of its functioning were not always taken into account. But I am convinced that nuclear energy engineering has the right to exist under certain conditions which, of course, must be unwaveringly observed. There is no doubt that the functions of control and operation must be divided up, as is accepted practice throughout the world.

I would like to give one example. We cooperate well with the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Several years ago inspectors from this commission went to a nuclear power plant not far from Moscow. It had two blocks with a capacity of 1,100 megawatts. The inspector discovered that one of the operators had fallen asleep at the reactor control panel. Both blocks were shut down. All the personnel were fired. After that they hired new personnel—who had passed all the tests. The nuclear power plant was not started up until a year and a half later. The losses cost \$6 billion!

This is what is called the culture of safety and it is now impossible to function without it. A person employed in nuclear power engineering must give priority to safety above all career, economic, and other considerations.

And I think Kazakhstan is destined to develop nuclear energy engineering! After all, we occupy a leading place in the world in terms of uranium ore reserves and we have a plant for producing nuclear fuel and well-trained personnel. We have the necessary base for its development. Just look, 85 percent of the energy in France is produced by nuclear power plants. And, incidentally, they are surrounded by wheat fields....

We have worked out a concept for the development of nuclear energy engineering in Kazakhstan. It is a 15-volume work. We hope that after the implementation of the anticrisis program we will be able to submit it for judgment not only of the government, but also of all the population of Kazakhstan. Because I think that a person must know the whole truth, and after that make an informed choice.

The Future Lies With Super-Safe Plants

[Dudkova] There is another alarming aspect of nuclear energy engineering. What to do with the wastes. Will Kazakhstan not become a dump for others' nuclear wastes in repayment for certain sums?

[Shkolnik] Article 42 of the law of Kazakhstan on environmental protection says that we do not have the right to accept others' wastes for storage. But we will undoubtedly have to solve this problem with our own wastes. There are two paths. If nuclear energy engineering is large-scale (in the range of several tens of megawatts) it would be expedient to create a production for processing nuclear fuel. For us the most likely is the "Swedish" variation. Treated "collections" are held for

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20-30 years in special storage facilities filled with distilled water. Then they are kept in an open air basin, after which copper is poured over them. Special adits are made on the bottom of the Baltic where these copper containers of spent nuclear fuel are placed. They can be stored there, incidentally, for hundreds of thousands of years.

I want to emphasize once again that problems of nuclear energy engineering and burial of wastes are public problems.

Kazakhstan's Science: The Fate of a "Third World Country"?

[Dudkova] But what about state secrets during the time when all of this is bought and sold? Is there not the fear that when investing their money in the republic, Western investors will help themselves more since they will be in possession of the information?

[Shkolnik] Every state has its secrets, and in many countries the approach to this is very strict. We too have a law on state secrets. As for the nuclear industry, we have drawn up a list of information that constitutes a state secret and we function strictly in compliance with it. As an example I would like to give the recent operation Sapphire for delivery and processing of nuclear material for almost direct use from Kazakhstan to the United States. This operation lasted for more than a year: There were numerous negotiations, business trips, meetings, and exchange of specialists and correspondents. Many were involved in it, but the majority knew only their part of the problem. The situation was extremely confidential. None of the parties violated a single point of the operation. Until the aircraft with the cargo landed at Oak Ridge, the information was kept strictly secret. Then an hour later the news hit THE NEW YORK TIMES.

I want to note that this operation was not a one-time, random one. It was a part of a policy which Kazakhstan has been consistently pursuing at all levels—a policy of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

And regarding aid...well, I am not fostering any illusions that when foreigners offer us aid they are doing it only out of altruistic motivations. Naturally, when they propose their projects to us they receive information. And we, naturally, agree to this. Cooperation must be mutually advantageous. I think that in time, as disarmament proceeds and confidence becomes stronger, there will be fewer secrets. But this does not mean that this information need not be protected!

[Dudkova] Vladimir Sergeyevich, what motivated you to abandon your favorite work and engage in this, which you know to be thankless? Why should there be such a ministry at all—science and new technologies?

[Shkolnik] Briefly, it was the president as a person. And that is not by way of a cheap compliment! He invited me here...I was attracted through my ideas and real projects.

I dare to think that with the support of N. Nazarbayev in the Atomic Energy Agency in a short period of time a fairly large amount of work was done to obtain concrete results.

After the collapse of the Union a vacuum was formed in Kazakhstan in the sphere of management of scientific and technical progress. Therefore, no matter what we called the structure that was created—a state science committee or a ministry—its tasks were the same: state management in the sphere of science and scientific-technical progress. And I do not mean nonadministrative management. Similar structures exist in all industrially developed countries and the CIS countries.

[Dudkova] What is your program?

[Shkolnik] Preservation of the scientific and scientific-technical potential of the republic which is concentrated within the walls of the academies and VUZ's [higher educational institutions] and in the defense enterprises of the republic: design bureaus, laboratories, experimental shops, scientific research institutes. The creation of mechanisms for joining science with production. National scientific centers which, in our view, are the most promising. Some have already been created: the National Nuclear Center, the Center for Biotechnology, comprehensive processing of mineral raw material, radioelectronics, and communications.

The centers are faced with the task of selecting and giving priority to providing resources for new technologies that are prepared for industrial assimilation in a half year or a maximum of one year. Special attention is being devoted to technologies that make it possible to load enterprises that have been converted.

The rapid economic effect from the introduction of developments will make it possible to reduce Kazakhstan's dependency on imports and increase its export potential, and this will be a contribution from republic science to the implementation of the government's anti-crisis program.

As an example one can mention the project financed by the minister for creating mini oil refineries. These refineries are very important for the republic, since 30 percent of Kazakhstan's oil wells are small and have a high water content. Mini-refineries with a capacity of from 2 to 200 tonnes of oil a day will make it possible to increase the production of oil and provide the localities with fuel and lubricants while considerably reducing transportation costs.

An experimental model of such a refinery is successfully undergoing testing in Aktyube Oblast. Series production of mini-refineries could be arranged at enterprises of the republic's defense complex.

Another example is the development and assembly in Western Kazakhstan of mobile installations for processing pit (spilled) oil. Its reserves in Kazakhstan amount to millions of tonnes. Since our oil has high

paraffin and high sulfur content, it is practically impossible to return ground on which it has been spilled to economic use.

Processing pit oil will make it possible not only to increase the production of energy sources but also to considerably improve the region's ecology. A great deal of interest in this technology is being expressed by petroleum processing firms of Kuwait and Russia, and other foreign companies.

The national center for comprehensive processing of mineral raw material is carrying out at the Izumrud production association a project for organizing the production of beryllium bronze. Kazakhstan has large supplies of beryllium, but the needs of the military-industrial complex for materials based on it have decreased sharply. Beryllium bronzes are high-technology products that are in great demand abroad. Foreign firms have made offers to buy them.

Another part of our contribution to the implementation of the government anticrisis program is the creation of a modern computer system which uses existing and developing telecommunications systems. This means that personal electronic accounts have been opened for practically all residents of Kazakhstan for operations for transferring coupons to the accounts of more than 160 investment funds. Data entry into the republic data bank "Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Investments in the Industrial Investment Companies," which contains information about the republic's population of 16 million, is being completed.

Note: During recent years the overall number of scientific and scientific-pedagogical personnel in Kazakhstan has decreased by tens of thousands, including doctors and candidates of sciences. This is a catastrophe for the republic! Promising specialists 35-40 years of age who have 10-15 years of work experience are leaving. What are left are either scientific enthusiasts or inadequately trained and energetic (mainly elderly or beginning) scientific associates who cannot count on a career in commercial and management structures. That is, the numbers are decreasing, the level of qualifications is declining, the volume of work being done is decreasing, and its quality is deteriorating. All this taken together will have serious negative consequences for the future science of Kazakhstan.

[Dudkova] Can Kazakhstan now solve scientific problems independently? How well can the country compete on the world market of ideas?

[Shkolnik] And why not? Our task is to find this work. A considerable number of scientific institutions and VUZ's of Kazakhstan used to work on orders from defense branches of industry, which predetermined an extremely high level of developments of domestic scientists. Thus research in the area of aerodynamics conducted at Kazakhstan State University under the leadership of Professor Sh.I. Yesherin has world priority. The results of fundamental research of our scientists is used in the

supersonic aircraft engine which uses liquid hydrogen, which was developed by the Institute of Aircraft Engine Construction of Russia and is capable of developing a speed of up to 14 MAX. The engine underwent testing successfully at the Sary-Shagan proving ground last October.

Developments in the area of research on high-class mechanisms conducted under the leadership of academician U.A. Dzholdasbekov are known throughout the world. The results of the research were used to create a number of mechanisms that have no analogues in world practice—new manipulation systems for industrial robots, lifting devices, and many other things.

New medicinal preparations developed by the Institute of Chemical Sciences have proved to be highly effective and have low toxicity as compared to foreign analogues. For example, the pain reliever prosidol can replace morphine derivatives with respect to all parameters, and moreover it is nonaddictive.

Considerable success has been achieved in the development of new ceramic materials which have such unique properties as resistance to high temperature gas-dynamic blows, heat resistance, radioparency, etc. These developments are being carried out in the Ust-Kamenogorsk Road Construction Institute, the Scientific Research Institute for Special Material Science (Shymkent), and Kazakhstan State University.

The results of research of the Institute of Problems of Combustion in the area of technologies of spontaneous high-temperature fusion are able to compete on the world market. An entire range of materials has been created—from refractories to highly durable mineral pigments.

Developments of Karaganda State University in the area of molecular electronics, optical recording, and display of information are of considerable interest. We have developed small, super high-speed sensors, gauges of physical volumes, material for holographic recording of information, etc.

The successes of Kazakhstan's scientists in the area of solid state physics, electronic beam technologies, the creation of new catalysts, organic chemistry, metallurgy, etc. are generally known. This list could be continued.

On the whole, Kazakhstan occupied a worthy position in the Union division of scientific labor. Our main task is not to lose the high level of our science. The new conditions require forced development of a number of scientific and technical areas that are vitally important for Kazakhstan: petrochemistry, precision organic synthesis, biotechnology, technology of super pure materials, technology of rare and nonferrous metals, radioelectronics and computer equipment, polymer chemistry, and other areas.

[Dudkova] Carrying these ideas out will take money, and considerable amounts of it. The state budget is bursting

at the seams and we are just managing to patch up the holes. It is clear that a poor state has no room for science. What can and should be done under these conditions?

[Shkolnik] In spite of the difficulties and truly significant budget deficit, money is being allotted for science. But, naturally, under the existing conditions it is necessary to find certain new paths. It is absolutely clear that it is impossible to do without foreign investments. When developing the Tax Code it is necessary to create preferential conditions for organizations working in the sphere of scientific and technical progress.

[Dudkova] In general, in your opinion, what immediate measures must be taken to emerge from the crisis for science of Kazakhstan?

[Shkolnik] The legislative base needs fundamental development. Reorganization of the system for scientific and technical progress and its regionalization. The creation of new economic mechanisms. The attraction of foreign investments. Technological transfer. The development of an intellectual property market. Privatization. Otherwise we are faced with the fate of a "third world country." For science plays one of the key roles in making social development more dynamic. Kazakhstan science has its own specific peculiarities: separation from practice, inadequate acceptance by industry of scientific and technical innovations, and the lack of economic mechanisms and a legislative base that correspond to the transition period. Technological backwardness has been extremely aggravated. There has been a sharp reduction of the acquisition and installation of new equipment and we are faced with a clear tendency toward degradation of the technological structure as a whole, and this danger is of an irreversible nature.

An unnecessary digression: How can one now link science and production if even the giants of the defense industry are dying out?! That same Ulbinskiy combine whose uranium was being sold not so long ago. In order to pay wages to its workers the combine, whose hands are tied because of mutual nonpayments, goes through a complicated chain to receive as payment housing from the Nizhnekamsk plant, which it then sells. Sometimes it pays the workers with the housing. The electricity is being shut off. The state is not even capable of solving these problems! And a certain professor, a doctor of sciences from one of the giants of industry located not far away, outside the gates, is now working with an American firm. But they are not exchanging scientific ideas! The professor is trading in zinc white [tsinkovymi belkyami]....

Even if the state is earmarking strategic directions, it will not have the money for them. We will not be working on space or mathematics for several years to come and we can forget about them. The train left long ago. To be sure, there are left, for example, archaeology, art, political science, and so forth. I have nothing against these sciences but, unfortunately, they do not determine the level of the country's development today.

So far we have no powerful corporations that are prepared to invest funds in new technologies. It is much more advantageous for our "giants of business" to introduce finished technologies from abroad. Perhaps in 15-20 years they will "mature" for science. But what is left for it until then?

The Individual Is a Person Minus a Position

[Dudkova] Vladimir Sergeyevich, are you an optimist? Do you hope to get all this underway?

[Shkolnik] Of course, otherwise I would not be working! I hope that by next year we will manage to achieve a certain stabilization in the country's economy and curb inflation. There is no reason to paint everything in gloomy colors.

[Dudkova] What motivates you in your work, in your creativity?

[Shkolnik] That is difficult to answer briefly. But banal as it may seem, at this moment it is a clear understanding that we will be able to rectify the situation in the country only with our work, correctly organized and effective. That is now the main incentive.

[Dudkova] I heard that you intend to write a book.

[Shkolnik] Yes. But now I have practically no time. (That is for certain, my work schedule is simply packed with constant business trips.) I have forgotten the last time I played tennis. Now it is only on foreign business trips that I once in awhile find myself on a court. To be honest, if I were not a physicist I would be a sportsman or definitely a trainer!

But, as it turned out, the person with whom I was speaking had dreamed about becoming a physicist since his childhood. All the members of his family are physicists: his wife is a physicist, his daughter is studying and the MIFI, his son is a physics mathematician. But you should see V.S. on the court! He has been playing for a long time (and not because this is prestigious!). And even very well for an amateur. For example, this fall he played in a doubles tournament at the Central Stadium.

It is fun to play doubles with him because he does not apply pressure, even if there are no doubts about the difference in skill levels. On the contrary, he will do everything to bolster you and make you play as equals with him. Although in principle he will win the game, he is very tactful in dealing with his partner. He is enthusiastic but still restrained, which makes it possible to realistically assess the situation on the court and make certain effective decisions.

We played for the whole season on the same courts but he never took advantage of his public position either with me or with anyone else. It was difficult in general to imagine that a person who rides around in an old Zhiguli and has been living in a dacha for three years because he has no apartment belongs to the government.

[Dudkova] Who has exerted influence on your development as an individual and a scientist?

[Shkolnik] I was lucky with the people in my life. One of them I call Leypunskiy Aleksandr Ilich. He delivered lectures at the MIFI. The scholar Rezerford. A highly cultured and decent person. He was extraordinarily down-to-earth and accessible! He spoke with equal respect to both his colleagues and us students. His classes helped us professionally and as human beings throughout our lives.

[Dudkova] I understand that you took over the ministerial duties not very long ago and it is probably too soon to speak about any large results. But does anything hamper you in your work?

[Shkolnik] Only objective factors, for instance, the difficult situation in the republic's economy. But there are intelligent people who are trying to get something done. This inspires hope and makes it possible to hope for positive results.

Kyrgyzstan

European Union To Fund Energy, Agriculture Sectors

LD2001115195 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Russian 1200 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Summary] The European Union [EU] is to fund projects in Kyrgyzstan's energy and agriculture sectors in 1995.

The EU's plans, to be implemented through its TACIS program, technical assistance for CIS republics, were unveiled at a news conference held by Kyrgyz and TACIS officials in Bishkek on 19 January.

The director of Kyrgyzstan's State Committee for Investment, Askar Sarygulov says the program for 1995 will involve continued cooperation on agriculture—specifically a project to support private farms in the Issyk Kul Region—as well as support for the coal industry, development of the electricity industry, reform of the state administration, and personnel training.

Sarygulov recalls that the TACIS program is Kyrgyzstan's largest donor, and says his government wants to use its assistance with "maximum efficiency."

The Kyrgyz Government has selected three sectors on which TACIS assistance has focused in 1993-95: agriculture, the power industry, and the development of manpower resources.

Economic Indicators for 1994 Compared to 1993

LD2001112895 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Russian 1400 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Economic Review: As we know, statistics tell all.

The concluding, 12th issue of the Bulletin of the National Statistical Committee on the social and economic position of Kyrgyzstan as of the end of last year confirms this.

The chief indicators of our economy, the gross domestic product and the national income, or net material product, stand at 73.8 percent and 72.6 percent, respectively, of the 1993 level. This means that the our decline in production was about 16 to 17 percent, while the population's monetary income increased 200 percent to reach almost 8 billion soms. Although the volume of individual expenditure represented a 220 percent increase on 1993, we, nevertheless, spent about 600 billion soms less than we earned last year. This means people have some money left in their pockets. In other words, you and I have a little bit left over. That certainly cannot be bad, all in all.

The level of inflation has fallen considerably. Whereas in 1993 it was 466 percent, it was just 87.2 percent last year; while December's rise in prices was just 3.6 percent on November.

What is interesting that 90 percent of the more than 53,000 economic entities in the republic are private enterprises. This indicates that privatization is going on at a fairly high rate.

Meanwhile, the annual unemployment figure was 8.7 percent of the working population, or over 100,000 people.

Kyrgyzstan's population increased a little, by just 14,000 people or 0.3 percent. As of 1 January there were about 4,476,400 of us.

Over the year, 77,500 people emigrated abroad as against 143,600 in 1993. And 20,000 people immigrated; in 1993, 23,000 immigrated into Kyrgyzstan. So, the migration flow has been halved. That is a good sign. It means that not everything is so bad here. As we known, fish try to find the deepest water and people try to find the best place.

Tajikistan

UN Officials Meet with Opposition on Inter-Tajik Talks

LD1901233695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1818 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dushanbe, Jan 19 (INTERFAX)—UN representatives intend to meet with the Tajik opposition leaders today and tell the Tajik leaders of the date and place of the fourth round of inter-Tajik talks, Dushanbe Chief Negotiator for talks with the opposition, Tajik Deputy Defense Minister, General Bakhodur Abdullayev told Interfax.

In accordance with the agreements reached during the third round of inter-Tajik talks in Islamabad (October

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20-November 1), the fourth round of talks was expected to take place in Moscow in December. Later, it was postponed for January 23.

Tajik opposition Chief Negotiator, Deputy Chairman of the Movement for Islamic Restoration of Tajikistan Akbar Turadzhonzoda circulated a statement on January 16 saying that the opposition refused to negotiate in Moscow. Turadzhonzoda said the Russian Federal Border Guards Service failed to observe the agreement on temporary cease-fire on the Tajik-Afghan border. As a result, the Tajik opposition proposed that talks be held "in any other town of the CIS."

Abdullayev stressed that Dushanbe was ready to continue talks with the opposition despite hindrances and new conditions put forward by it.

European Community Supplies Aid to Nagorno-Badakhshan

LD1901133895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1110 GMT 19 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dushanbe January 19 TASS—Countries of the European Community step up supplying humanitarian aid to the people of the Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous region in Tajikistan, who found themselves on the verge of famine, Tajik Vice-Premier Kozidavlat Koimodov told ITAR-TASS on Thursday [19 January].

The European Community sent more than 1,000 tonnes of flour to the Pamir-based region via the Kyrgyz city of Osh. In all, 4.5 tonnes of foodstuffs are to be delivered to the high-mountain region soon.

The Aga Khan Foundation, named after the spiritual leader of the Isma'ilites of the world, also participates in the efforts. Its affiliate was inaugurated in Dushanbe last November. The foundation delivered about 1,000 tonnes of foodstuffs to the highlanders in the past few months.

The Tajik Government also supplies the people of Gorno-Badakhshan with foodstuffs and fuel. Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov ruled that within next two days an automobile caravan is to set out from the Leninabad region along the Osh-Khorog main road. It will bring to the highlanders 300 tonnes of flour and scores of tonnes of vegetable oil, the vice-premier said.

The CIS joint peace-keeping forces stationed in Tajikistan and Russian border-guards provide helicopters to help deliver the humanitarian supplies from Dushanbe to the people of the Darvaz and Vanch high-mountain districts.

Inter-Ministry, Russian Military 'Competition' Vi

LD1901122495 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan in Tajik 0600 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] We will start the commentary section of Payk-i Khuroson [messenger of

Khorasan]. The murder of the Russian officer, Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Borisov, [on 14 January] has again demonstrated the intensifying animosity between senior Russian officers and their satellites in Tajikistan. The majority view is that the latest murders have as their cause the struggle for influence between Interior Minister Yokubjon Salimov and his comrades on one side, and the Russian officers on the other.

In the course of a conversation with the radio Voice of Free Tajikistan correspondent in Dushanbe, Mahmud-i Komil, I first asked him about reaction in the capital to the murder of the border guard officer.

[Begin recording] [Komil] The murder case in Dushanbe has given rise to many rumors among residents and in the upper echelons. Most people think Borisov's murder is the result of the conditions produced by the criminal regime with the assistance of its outside supporters, in particular the Russians themselves. It is currently being observed that the foundations for the unholy alliance between the Russian military and the foster-children of the criminal world of Sangak are slipping away in Tajikistan.

[Announcer] What evidence can you put forward to back this up? What proof do you have of this?

[Komil] This view comes out of private and public comments made by the Russian military and their rivals at the court of this communist administration.

The news conference given by the [deputy] head of the Border Troops headquarters in Tajikistan, Major General Vladimir Novikov, about the 12th murder of a Russian officer during the last 10 months, may be cited as an example. Novikov openly accused the country's Interior Ministry of casual handling of the Russian officers's murders. Novikov noted that in the first two weeks of the new year, two Russian officers were killed and five others were robbed and beaten up.

Except for the murder of Dolmatov, where there is a suspect, the murderers and assailants have not been found. The murderers of 10 other officers killed last year have not been identified. The head of the Border Troops headquarters in Tajikistan said: We cannot speak about perfect work by the law and order agencies or about the establishment of security in the republic under conditions where even the Russian military, who come to protect Tajikistan's borders, live under pressure and danger.

On the Tajik leadership's claims of stability in the country, Novikov said: It would be better if they moved from promises made on paper to action and implemented what they say. In this context, senior Border Troops structures wanted the state propaganda bodies—radio, television, and the press—to give society more details about this murder, and hence, to eliminate the rumors and suspicions circulating about the increase in attempts on the lives of Russian servicemen inside and outside the country.

[Announcer] To what extent are the instructions and wishes of the military being implemented?

[Komil] On the basis of my observations of the situation and of reports from informal sources, these wishes will also remain unanswered. Even Novikov himself, with whom we spoke by telephone, does not believe the situation will change. Novikov openly accused the present structures, and particularly Yokubjon Salimov, of disliking the senior officers's presence, because he feels his absolute power is threatened by their influence and authority.

From the conversation with a high-ranking Russian officer, it is not hard to deduce that competition for total power is under way between President Rakhmanov and Salimov. It is no secret to anyone that the Russian generals in Tajikistan are Rakhmanov's only support.

[Announcer] Might we say that the murder is the work of Yokubjon's supporters?

[Komil] While there is no formal evidence of this, it is possible to establish that the murder is the work of Yokubjon's companions, or at least that he had an interest in it.

First, not one of the murders has been investigated adequately.

Second, Yokubjon is in competition with the Defense Ministry, which is run entirely by Russians, and is completely equipping the personnel under his ministry's command. Compared with the 6,000 men in the national army, he has increased the numbers of personnel subordinate to him to 20,000.

Third, when he installed technical and computer equipment at his ministry, Salimov ignored the communications specialists of the Russian 201st Division and contracted this work out to the French firm Alkon.

There are suspicions that Yokubjon's actions are being encouraged by the relevant authorities in Uzbekistan, which wants to weaken the authority of the Russian generals in order to establish its own rule in this area. [passage omitted] [end recording]

[Announcer] You were listening to our conversation with Mahmud- i Komil, our correspondent in Dushanbe.

While we were preparing this material, we received a report that Emomali Rakhmanov had appointed Ghaffor Mirzoyev, known in the criminal world as Ghaffor Sedoy, as head of his newly-founded guard.

There is no doubt that this appointment [words indistinct] of Yokubjon Salimov, who is the interior minister; Rakhmanov cannot step out of line with him. [passage omitted]

There is also another theory. According to this one, Rakhmanov wants to give power to Ghaffor Sedoy as a way of clearing Yokubjon out of his way. In any event,

time will be the judge of who beats whom at the communist court of Tajikistan.

Convention Banning Chemical Weapons Ratified

LD1901144695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1414 GMT 19 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valentin Volkov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Hague January 19 TASS—Tajikistan has ratified the convention banning chemical weapons and handed over the instruments of ratification to the U.N. secretary general, the Hague-based diplomats said.

The convention was opened for signing in Paris on January 13, 1993, and will come into force 180 days after the 65th country presents instruments of ratification. For the time being, 159 countries have signed the convention. Twenty of them have already ratified it. Tajikistan was the 20th country to ratify the convention.

An organisation for banning chemical weapons with its headquarters in The Hague will be set up to supervise the implementation of the convention after the document comes into force.

Uzbekistan

Uzbek Party, DPRK Envoy Discuss Popular Democracy

LD2001000495 Tashkent OZBEKISTON OVOZI in Uzbek 19 Jan 94 p 1

[FBIS Translated Text] Kim In-pek [name as transliterated], DPRK ambassador to Uzbekistan, was received at the Central Council of the People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan at his own request on 17 January.

Abdulhafiz Jalolov, first secretary of People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, told the guest about ways the People's Democratic Party is implementing its program ideas, about the reforms which are taking place in our country under the leadership of President Islam Karimov, and about our party's role in the reforms.

He also noted that the free elections to the Supreme Assembly and to the local councils of people's deputies of the Republic of Uzbekistan, which took place on 25 December on a multi-party basis for the first time in the history of our country, were a major historical event. The first secretary dwelled on the participation of People's Democratic Party organizations in preparing for these elections, and on the results achieved by candidates nominated by our party.

The elections proved once again that the People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan exerts a quite marked influence on the processes taking place in society.

The ambassador praised the fact that the elections to the representative bodies of state authority were conducted

at a high standard, in the spirit of democracy, and in an organized manner. He spoke about the political situation and the stable nature of that situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

During the talks views were exchanged on developing the relationship between the Workers Party of Korea and the People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan.

Election Outcome Seen Favoring President Karimov

MM1901130195 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 Jan 95 First Edition p 6

[Report by Vladimir Berezovskiy: "Tamburlaine's Formula. Final Results of Oliy Medzhlis (Uzbek Parliament) Elections Summed Up"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tashkent—The rivalry between two parties—the People's Democratic Party (the former Communist Party) and the recently established "Fatherland's Progress" Party—has resulted in a victory for... the oblast soviets. Having gained the right to nominate candidates, the regional elites have grasped their opportunity and have taken two-thirds of the seats in the legislative organ. The People's Democrats won 28 percent of the vote. The "Progressists" made barely 5 percent. Consequently, Islam Karimov's party will continue to dominate parliament. The trick is that many deputies from the "localities" are members of the People's Democratic Party.

The elections passed off without any of the usual political battles. The future people's representatives carefully avoided criticism from the current authorities and made little use of the press or TV. Admittedly, there were some mistakes. "Fatherland's Progress" recalled one of its candidates, well-known banker Rustam Usmanov. He had promised voters that he would enhance the status of the Russian language, stop migration, and expand the rights of ethnic minorities. This, in the party leadership's opinion, on the whole ran counter to the "Progressists'" election platform. It is curious that this was immediately followed by a murder at a "Rustambank" office, and the bank's owner himself was accused of hiring juveniles.

On the whole we can say that a new generation of politicians has arrived in parliament. They are the governors of oblasts and rayons, economic leaders, and party functionaries who have been promoted in the course of reform. "Dinosaurs" such as the 70-year-old Hero of Socialist Labor Bektash Rakhimov, a former vice premier, are a rarity. On the other hand, the 50-year-old Sayera Rashidova, director of the Institute of Chemistry, Physics, and Polymers and daughter of former "top man" Sharaf Rashidov, who ran Uzbekistan for almost a quarter of a century, won her deputy's seat in the first round without any problem.

The Russian community is mainly represented in parliament by the directors of former Union enterprises—

Vitaliy Sigedin, Aleksandr Melkumov, Vladimir Ivanov, Vasily Zhuravlev, Nikolay Kucherskiy, and others. Boris Bugrov, first deputy chairman of the former Supreme Soviet, who had no rivals in his district, also hung on to his parliamentary seat.

Elections to local councils were held at the same time. President Islam Karimov took advantage of this to remove the governors of Tashkent and Navoi Oblasts. His main reason was the failure to meet cotton harvesting plans. These regions have also seen a "dip" in the production of meat, vegetables, potatoes, and grain. And there has been an obvious decline in industry. The president has criticized leaders who, in his opinion, are still hoping that "the USSR will be revived under the mask of 'Eurasia' or other slogans." The president is convinced that "certain forces are striving to destroy Uzbekistan's strategic sectors—the gold-production and ferrous and nonferrous metals spheres—so as to force us once again to kowtow to the center." The head of state has declared war on conservatives impeding reform, bribe-takers, and corrupt officials who are bringing the authorities into disrepute, and he called on people to be guided by Tamburlaine's formula: "Counsel. Discussion. Firm decision. Initiative, vigilance, and caution."

Edict Reduces State Orders for Grain, Cotton

LD1901205795 Tashkent Uzbekistan Television in Russian 1400 GMT 19 Jan 95

[Decree by the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan on measures for the economic stimulation of production and on selling raw cotton and grain cereals of the 1995 harvest to the state—read by announcer]

[FBIS Translated Text] With the aim of increasing the material interest of agricultural enterprises in further increasing raw cotton and grain production and solving social problems in villages:

1. The portion of production left at the disposal of farms which have fulfilled the task set for sales is to be increased to 40 percent of the volume of purchases of cotton fiber and 50 percent of the volume of purchases of grain cereals, by correspondingly decreasing earlier established volumes of the state order from 67 percent to 60 percent for cotton fiber and 50 percent for grain cereals.
2. The Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Uzbekistan has ten days to introduce proposals to the Cabinet of Ministers on purchase prices for raw cotton and grain cereals, as well as on wholesale prices for cotton fiber.
3. Paragraph 2 of presidential decree of the Republic of Uzbekistan of 22nd August 1994, no. 937, on measures for the economic stimulation of the development of agriculture is deemed no longer valid.

[Signed] President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov.

Armenia

President Addresses Parliament

NC1901153995 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First
Program Network in Armenian 1415 GMT 18 Jan 95

[President Levon Ter-Petrosyan's address to the extraordinary session of the Armenian Supreme Council in Yerevan on 18 January—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed chairman and deputies, for me it is easy and pleasant to talk about 1994 because it truly turned out to be the first smooth year of the independence in political, social, and economic terms. This fact needs no proof if we recall the tempestuous events of the previous years. In 1991 the Armenian villages in Gedashen, Shahumyan [Geranboy], and Hadrut were depopulated. Then came the state coup in August [in Moscow]. In 1992, the spring successes were followed by military defeats in Shahumyan, Mardakert, and Artsvashen. Then came the (?closure) of the railway passing through Aghaznia. In 1993 a financial crisis arose as a result of the collapse of the Ruble zone. Then came the temporary misunderstanding that emerged in Armenian-Russian relations.

Although 1994 also started out under exceedingly grave conditions due to the large-scale Azerbaijani offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh and the normal difficulties associated with the introduction of the national currency, these two problems were basically surmounted at the end of spring. After that the Republic entered into a normal course of social and economic stability that is continuing to this day. There is no reason why this positive momentum should not be maintained in the future. That is, we are now dealing not with a chancy, inexplicable, and temporary phenomenon, but rather with a rooted social, political, and socio-economic process that has been brought about by the inconceivably purposeful activity of the Republic's legislative and executive organs. Why this is inconceivable for some may have something to do with the weakness of the state's promotional activity. The relevant organs should seriously mull over this.

Last year the parliament had many opportunities to get acquainted with the addresses of the Republic's president and prime minister on matters of importance for the country. Therefore, I believe it will be superfluous to refer to them in detail today. Let me just recall that I addressed the parliament four times in 1994 during the debate on the yearly plan on privatization, on procedures to adopt the Constitution, on variants of the draft constitution, and on economic programs prepared by the government and international financial organizations.

While avoiding details, I will now try to present and evaluate the most salient features of the past year by dwelling upon three most important issues. What are these?

The first is the long-lasting cease-fire in Nagorno-Karabakh and the normal procedure for the diplomatic solution of the Karabakh conflict.

The second is the uninterrupted tendency towards the stabilization of the socio-economic situation in the Republic.

And the third is the procurement of the long-awaited assistance from the international financial organizations.

The most noteworthy event of 1994 is undoubtedly the eight-month cease-fire; the most lengthy and durable one during the entire history of the Karabakh war.

However, in my view the significance of that cease-fire, which was achieved by the mediatory efforts of Russia and the CSCE and by the political will of the conflicting sides, has not yet been properly evaluated regarding the conditions leading to it and in particular its consequences.

The establishment of the cease-fire would be completely incomprehensible if the almost five-month military situation preceding it is not taken into account; it was the most fierce and bloody one during the entire Karabakh conflict. The large-scale offensive launched by Azerbaijan against Nagorno-Karabakh all along the frontline during the winter months of 1993-1994 tested convincingly, albeit bitterly, the self-defense prowess of Karabakh Armenians. Following long and heavy defensive battles, Nagorno-Karabakh Armed Forces launched a decisive counter-attack in April and fully restored the status quo shaped in Autumn the previous year, plus it achieved the liberation of many settlements in the Mardakert region and the regional center.

The failure of the winter campaign of the Azerbaijani forces, and the restoration of the status quo on the frontline, constituted the main prerequisites for the establishment of the cease-fire in May. It goes without saying that the existence of these prerequisites greatly facilitated the peace mission of the mediating countries.

The establishment of the cease-fire should be seen as the reluctant admission by the conflicting sides that there is no prospect for the military solution of the problem; an admission that is bound to be gradually transformed into a convincing realization that in turn is surely the most important guarantee for the establishment of stable and lasting peace.

Regarding the consequences of the cease-fire, the most important of them is the reinstitution of the diplomatic process for the resolution of the conflict, a process that in the past seemed to have entered an impasse.

However, before touching on the main issue, I would avail myself of your forgiveness to take this wonderful opportunity to allow myself a small lyrical digression on diplomacy. There are different approaches to diplomacy. On the one hand, there is an extreme disregard or distrust in diplomacy, and on the other an absolute

overestimation. The strange thing is that these self-contradictory approaches often manifest themselves in the same persons and political organizations. While rejecting the diplomatic path and the problem's internationalization within the CSCE or UN framework by claiming that the Karabakh problem could be solved only by military means, these same persons and organizations at the same time do not miss any opportunity to sting the Republic's authorities for allegedly not consolidating the military successes with diplomatic achievements. Moreover, it is being claimed that Armenia has been continuously suffering defeats on the diplomatic front by forgetting the simple truth that most often military successes are contingent upon diplomatic achievements.

There could be two explanations for this: Either our opponents have a (?naive) understanding of diplomacy, or there is an intention to distort reality. The main grievance against the Armenian authorities is that they [words indistinct] are trying to keep their diplomatic moves secret. Here too they are forgetting the very simple truth that diplomacy is that sphere in a country's policy that of necessity is kept secret until a result is achieved. This applies not only to Armenia, but also to states that are many times bigger and stronger than us. In all the civilized countries the diplomatic archives are usually opened, if at all, scores of years after the events. It is being demanded from us that in this matter we should act in an original manner and immediately make public our every diplomatic move and discussion. Had we acted in this manner, our state, which has entered its fourth year of existence, would not have stood the trial of the times even for four months. The public makes itself felt in the diplomatic process only during essential breakthroughs or in case of the achievement of certain results. For example, we have now before us the prolonged Arab-Israeli conflict. A Palestinian autonomy was created in accordance with an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. An Israeli-Jordanian agreement was concluded. An Israeli-Syrian reconciliation is not far away. But, all these results were preceded by secret and arduous diplomatic work for scores of years about which no one had any detailed information until it achieved its purpose.

Now, if looked at from the angle of the achievement of substantial breakthroughs or some results in the diplomatic process for the resolution of the Karabakh conflict, we would be able to see the actual picture.

The Karabakh problem became internationalized on 24 March 1992 during the special meeting of the CSCE ministers in Helsinki, which decided to convene the Minsk Conference with the basic aim of the peaceful resolution of the conflict and determining the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh. The day of the internationalization of the Karabakh problem is 24 March 1992. A number of essential diplomatic [words indistinct] have been achieved during the hundreds of stages of the talks that followed: in the CSCE and Minsk Group documents and scores of statements, in the UN Security Council

resolutions, and during the bilateral and multilateral high-level meetings. One was the methodology of resolving the Karabakh conflict step by step. This process started taking shape in 1992 and today it is being strictly applied in all the peace plans without exception. This methodology envisages two stages for the solution of the problem. The first stage calls for the establishment of a cease-fire and stable peace, the safeguarding of the security of the Karabakh population, the liberation of the occupied lands, and the lifting of the blockades. The second stage calls for the solution of the political problems, including the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh's status which, as stated, forms the basic (?task) of the Minsk Conference. The importance of adoption of such a methodology is self-evident because any attempt to solve all the problems simultaneously would have undermined the peace process in view of the natural maximalism displayed by the sides.

In addition, in November 1993 Armenian diplomacy managed to couple the international community's demand for the unconditional withdrawal from the occupied territories to the measures on lifting the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. This found its way into the redrafted peace plan of the CSCE Minsk Group.

Third, as of May 1994, Nagorno-Karabakh has been finally recognized as one of the legitimate sides to the conflict, mostly due to the efforts of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly. Its participation in any level of talks is mandatory now.

Fourth, the issue of safeguarding the security of the Nagorno-Karabakh population was also resolved on a diplomatic level in December 1994. The CSCE summit in Budapest decided to deploy international peacekeeping forces in the conflict zone. This is a completely new stage in the political resolution of the Karabakh problem.

Fifth, the Budapest summit finally harmonized the mediatory efforts of the CSCE and Russia, thus creating the foundation for the international community to formulate a joint plan for the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, without which the peace process would fail for understandable reasons.

These are the basic results of the almost three-year effort for a diplomatic resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. No other results or breakthroughs have been achieved.

The esteemed opponents should be kind enough to pinpoint the bitter defeats that we have supposedly suffered in this domain. Or, is it that our conception of diplomatic victories and defeats are different?

Anyway, I have grounds to assume that the government's opponents equate diplomatic victory to the unconditional capitulation of the enemy. This is, however, extremely unrealistic.

It is appropriate here to recall the greatest diplomatic victory achieved by the Armenian people. I mean the Sevres Treaty [of 1920]. It led to the loss of half of the internationally recognized territories of the first Armenian republic. I do not think that we need any such victories achieved on paper. We have to aspire with all our might to constructively contribute to the international process for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, to strictly observe the cease-fire with the intention of forging a stable peace, to ensure the security of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh through the deployment of the international peacekeeping forces, and to get seriously prepared for the work during the second stage of the political resolution of the problem.

Now let us pass to the second issue. The experience accumulated during the previous years, the surmounting of the difficulties involved with the introduction of the national currency, as well as the long-lasting cease-fire established in the region have helped in the stabilization of the socio-economic situation in the Republic. This was shown by the economic growth, stabilization of the dram, reduction of the budget deficit, curbing of inflation, activation of foreign trade, construction work in the disaster zone, and so on.

According to the January to November 1994 figures—December figures have not yet been processed—material production, or the produced national income, was 103.8 percent compared to the same period of the previous year. Industrial production was 104.8 percent. The mixed agricultural production was 103.2 percent.

The volume of exports and imports substantially increased in 1994, thanks to the liberalization of foreign trade and the improvement of the Republic's customs organs. Thus, compared to January to November 1993, the volume of exports increased by 22.9 percent and imports by 42.6 percent.

The substantial curbing of the inflation rate is one of the basic characteristics of 1994. It resulted in a [word indistinct] well-grounded financial policy. During the 11 months, the overall consumer price index only rose by 11.6 times, compared to 55 times for the same period of the previous year.

It is noteworthy that consumer prices mostly increased—by 7.68 percent—during the first five months of 1994. It sharply fell in the following months and was almost 9 percent in June, almost 2 percent in July, 3.7 in August, almost 6 percent in September, almost 11 percent in October, and 15 percent in November. That is, overall it increased by 50.9 percent over a period of six months. [all figures as received] The difference between the first four or five months and the subsequent months of last year is noteworthy in terms of all indicators [words indistinct]. The process of [words indistinct] continued until April or May, after that started a process of stabilization and growth as evinced by all the indicators, be they [words indistinct], exchange of rate, the volume of foreign trade, or inflation.

Parallel to the curbing of inflation, wages increased ahead of consumer prices. Thus, compared to December 1993, when the average wage was 147 dram, the average wage of the workers in the state sector increased 26 times, to nearly 4,000 drams, in October 1994. The average wage also increased in terms of foreign currency. While it formed \$1.9 in December 1993, it rose to \$4.1 in January [1994], \$4.2 in May, and \$10.9 in October. This is the dollar value of the average wage.

The dynamics of the national currency, the dram, is significant in terms of the manifestation of economic stabilization. The dram declined by 488 percent against the dollar in 1994, that is, nearly five fold. For comparison let us note that in the same period the value of the Turkmen manat fell 110 fold, the Azerbaijani manat 35 fold, the Ukrainian karbovanets 8.7 fold, the Georgian kupon 7.5 fold, and the Kazakh tenge five fold. The devaluation of the national currencies was also noted in the other CIS countries [words indistinct]. On the other hand, almost no devaluation took place in Moldova and Kyrgyzstan because they received IMF assistance on time. This year we will have a situation similar to the one in Moldova and Kyrgyzstan.

Even in this context, the 488 percent drop in the Armenian currency constitutes a huge figure from whichever angle it is viewed. However, here too it should be noted that most of the devaluation of the dram, some 3.17 fold, occurred during the first four months of the year, including April. The dram's drop during the subsequent 8 months was 35 percent overall in dollar terms. This is the most telling proof of its stabilization. To give a more vivid example: One dollar bought 100 drams in January and 300 in April. Whereas between April and December the dram devalued by only 100; that is, one dollar bought 400 drams at the end of December.

Alongside the stabilization tendencies, economic reforms—such as privatization, legislative restructuring of the taxation system, improvement of management mechanisms—also substantially deepened in 1994.

Of the 2,750 small enterprises included in the program on privatization and denationalization of the state enterprises and unfinished buildings, the government has decided to privatize 1,185. Some 591 enterprises have already been evaluated. Privatization agreements have been signed with only 266 enterprises. Around 455 million drams obtained from the privatization of these enterprises has been deposited in the special privatization account. Of this 358 million drams was in the form of privatization certificates, and the remaining 97 million was in cash.

We have to accept our serious shortcomings in this field. The fact is that the program on the privatization of small enterprises has not been fulfilled. And, apparently the next parliament has to reconfirm last year's program as this year's program.

This is the situation in regards to the distribution of privatization certificates: Some 2,900,000 citizens have

been listed. This represents 75 percent of the entire population. Some 1,780,000 citizens have obtained privatization certificates. That is 47 percent of the listed citizens.

The first meetings of the labor collectives have taken place in 1,100 enterprises, which have been included in the partial and uncompensated privatization process. In 1,027 the founding meeting—that is the second—of the stock companies have already taken place. Some 931 enterprises sent their branch committees to the State Commission on Privatization and Denationalization in order to work out a decision on partial and uncompensated privatization. In turn, the State Commission on Privatization and Denationalization asked the government to approve the partial and uncompensated privatization of 611 enterprises. As we see, compared to the privatization of small enterprises, the pace of work is more normal in the distribution of certificates and the partial and uncompensated privatization.

Compared to previous years, 1994 also should be considered successful in regards to our preparation for winter and work in the disaster zone, particularly the housing construction in Gyumri. It is sufficient to note that compared to the 29,600 square meters of housing area in 1992 and 31,100 square meters in 1993, some 52,900 square meters of housing area was commissioned in Gyumri in 1994. Nearly 25,000 square meters of housing was financed from the state budget, nearly 19,000 from the Armenia Fund, and 8,400 from the credits of the World Bank.

Among the important construction projects for 1994 one could mention the Ashtarak bridge, the escalator, the so-called Cascade, in Yerevan, and the repair of roads in Zangezur region.

The decision of the international financial organizations, IMF, and The World Bank on providing essential economic assistance to Armenia should be considered the greatest success of last year. After prolonged arguments and fruitless negotiations, this assistance became possible (?because) of the above mentioned stabilizing trends, the existing cease-fire, and the successful course of reforms.

I think there is no need to go into the details of the socioeconomic program jointly worked out by the Armenian government and IMF, because, first, that issue was already examined in parliament two months ago, second, I already expressed my views in detail during the parliamentary debates, and third, it will soon come before you again as part of a debate on the republic's 1995 socioeconomic development program and draft state budget.

I would be satisfied only by noting that this complex program, which besides substantial foreign investments also envisions serious structural changes in the republic's economy, first of all aims at establishing a macro economic balance. Its first major (?results) are expected in 1996. However there already is every reason to believe that our

people will start feeling the (?results) of that program in the current year, particularly in terms of increases in per capita incomes and (?improvement) of life for the socially disadvantaged strata of the population. [passage indistinct] Besides the purely economic objectives, serious investments are also envisioned in the field of health, education [7-minute-long passage indistinct]

Finally, I want to deeply thank the parliament for its response to my decree on the (?suspension) of (?Armenian Revolutionary Federation), and for its productive examination of the issues on the agenda. I hope that our cooperation will also continue during the final session of the present convocation of the Supreme Council, and I do not doubt that it too will be productive. Thank you for your attention.

Rumors of Mercenaries to Chechnya Refuted

954F0937A Yerevan *RESPUBLIKA ARMENIYA* in Russian 14 Jan 95 p 1

[NOYAN TAPAN report: "Azerbaijan Refutes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The ANI Agency reports that Abbasali Novruzov, commander of Azerbaijan's border troops, has refuted reports from the Russian Government press service that a large quantity of mercenaries and equipment is massed on the border between Azerbaijan and Dagestan for movement to Chechnya.

"We heard such accusations back in December," Novruzov stated, "but the Russian side has not been able to offer any proof."

Azerbaijan

Ambassador Denies Claims of Chechnya Involvement

MM1801134195 Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian 18 Jan 95 p 1

[Statement by Ramiz Rizayev, Azerbaijan Republic ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Russian Federation, carried under the heading "Ambassador's Refutation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I was astonished to read in *PRAVDA* 14 January 1995 the item entitled "Death for \$500," signed by your paper's Yerevan correspondent, V. Mkrtchyan. Citing Armenia's official press and news agencies, it reports that "the bodies of more than 30 Azerbaijani mercenaries participating in the fighting against (Russian) federal forces have been delivered to Azerbaijan from Chechnya", and that a special Turkish Air Force military aircraft is waiting at Baku's "Bina" airfield to take Dzhokhar Dudayev to Turkey via Azerbaijan.

I am authorized to state that not one word in this report corresponds to reality. Since the beginning of the unhappy events in Chechnya similar, totally baseless,

and unsubstantiated reports, supplied by the Armenian propaganda services, have already appeared in the Russian mass media and have been refuted; such reports pursue the goal of complicating relations between Azerbaijan and Russia.

Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh Seek to Settle Karabakh Issue

LD1901125495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1205 GMT 19 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tigran Liloyan]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan January 19 TASS—Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh believe that the decisions of the Budapest summit of the CSCE is an important stage in a Karabakh settlement, Armenian deputy Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanyan said in an exclusive interview with ITAR-TASS here on Thursday [19 January].

This conclusion was drawn by participants in talks in Stepanakert, the capital of the breakaway republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, which were held there by Oskanyan and Nagorno-Karabakh Foreign Minister Arkady Gukasyan.

The Armenian diplomat said the sides noted at the same time that the present stage includes both serious prospects for a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem as well as a danger of new combat operations in the conflict region if the talks break down.

In the opinion of Yerevan and Stepanakert, Oskanyan said, the main responsibility at the present stage rests with the Azeri side which should display will and understanding.

Local analysts believe that Azeri goodwill should give an impetus to push forward peace talks on a settlement of the conflict. "We drew this conclusion, taking into account the five-year experience of the Karabakh confrontation," the Armenian diplomat continued.

"We noted that the CSCE document taken in Budapest removes some problems which were in the way of the peace process as well as disagreements between mediators."

It was stressed that the brunt of a settlement will be shifted onto the conflicting sides after the full implementation of the Budapest understandings so that they should display a more serious approach to drafting a major political agreement on ending the conflict, Oskanyan noted.

He described as "sufficiently effective" his talks with Gukasyan. The talks with the Karabakh side were aimed at a search for points of contact and at coordination of forthcoming foreign policy actions, Oskanyan stressed.

In the deputy minister's opinion, it is necessary to have regular contacts between Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh

and Azerbaijan as well as between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan to make the present negotiating process more effective.

The Armenian diplomat said that there is no specific understanding at present on a meeting between the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh.

According to Oskanyan, such a meeting is always possible: Appropriate proposals were repeatedly put forth by Russia, other countries as well as by the CSCE and the U.N.

However, Azerbaijan's objection to participation of the Karabakh leaders in such a meeting was always a serious obstacle.

Moscow-Based Opposition Group Seeks To Remove Aliyev

MK1901134095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 19 Jan 95 p 5

[Report by Arif Useynov from Baku in the "Opposition" column: "Civic Union Intends To Oust Geydar Aliyev. The New Political Movement Is Led by Azerbaijan's Ex-Defense Minister Ragim Kaziyeu"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ex-Defense Minister Ragim Kaziyeu, who last year escaped from a National Security Ministry prison with three highly placed officers, speaking on Radio Liberty a few days ago announced the creation of a Civic Union. The new political movement aims to overthrow republic President Geydar Aliyev. Observers are baffled by the fact that the ex-minister was given the possibility to announce his claims on power by Radio Liberty's Azerbaijani Service. The Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not reacted to the action by the foreign radio station but diplomats point to the inappropriateness of the "services" it renders to criminals who are taking refuge in Moscow. Judging by the reaction of the authorities, the ex-minister's invention has been met with indifference.

Publications in the ENI MUSAVAT newspaper present the creation of Civic Union as "yet another surprise by the Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service" with which "the enemies of the Azerbaijani people" are allegedly connected. The Azerbaijan General Prosecutor's Office has issued warrants for their arrest but they are hiding in Moscow and are out of the reach of Azerbaijan justice. The AZALDYG newspaper notes that the Russian Federation special services are preparing an "Avtorkhanov option" for Azerbaijan, a la Chechnya, that is to say, an opposition which could, if necessary, become a buttress for an anti-Aliyev coalition. Authors of the publications insist that the republic government demand from the Russian Prosecutor's Office that the criminal group be extradited. Such attempts have been made but they have not so far produced any tangible results. It is pointed out that with the most stringent passport regime in Moscow, the fugitive Azerbaijani leaders have launched vigorous

political activity. They speak in the mass media, persistently stressing that after Geydar Aliyev is replaced, Civic Union leaders will guarantee scrapping the "contract of the century" with Western oil companies and also protection of the republic's borders jointly with Russia.

Alliance Formed To Remove Aliyev

954F0937B Yerevan VREMYA in Russian 14 Jan 95
p 1

[NOYAN TAPAN report: "They Want To Remove Aliyev..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] The opposition in Azerbaijan has formed an alliance to remove President Geydar Aliyev.

The NEGA agency has relayed reports from Azerbaijan sources that participants in this alliance include former president Ayaz Mutaibov (who has been living in Moscow since his overthrow in May 1992 by the People's Front), ex-prime minister Suret Guseynov, expelled for participating in the October 1994 putsch, former defense minister Rakhim Gaziyeu, and leader of the Talysh dissident movement Alikram Gumbatov.

The latter two individuals have arranged prison escapes of especially dangerous criminals in Baku, where they served a sentence for state crimes at the end of September 1994.

Georgia

Shevardnadze on One-Day Visit to Bulgaria

LD1901092795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0804
GMT 19 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tengis Pachkoriya]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tbilisi January 19 TASS—Head of the Georgian State Eduard Shevardnadze left for Bulgaria by plane for a one-day official visit today. During the visit a number of treaties and agreements on cooperation between the two countries in the field of economy, policy and culture is planned to be signed.

Federation Council's Gustov on Peacekeeping

LD1901175395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1412
GMT 19 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 19 TASS—The dramatic changing of the situation in the northern Caucasus has set entirely new tasks between the Russian peacekeeping troops in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, Vadim Gustov, chairman of the Federation Council committee for the affairs of the CIS, told ITAR-TASS today. "Now they will keep back the extremist forces, which are trying to organize the smuggling of weapons and fighters to the Chechen territory," he said. According to Gustov, "those factors were also taken into account" in a resolution of the Federation Council, adopted on Wednesday, on prolonging until May 15 the mandate of the Russian peacekeeping troops in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.

Aside from geopolitical interest, he continued, Russia has peacekeeping commitments within the framework of the new commonwealth. They coincide with the desire of the Georgian and Abkhazian nations to live in peace with Russia. According to Gustov, it became clear during visits of a Russian parliamentary delegation to Georgia and Abkhazia that "the local population regards the Russian peacekeeping troops as their defenders and a guarantor of peace."

Estonia**Luik Hopes for Border Accord With Russia***LD1901210395 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1700 GMT 19 Jan 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Estonian Foreign Minister Juri Luik hopes that Estonia and Russia will conclude a new border agreement in the course of this year. This is what he said in Paris today, when he answered questions from French journalists. According to Foreign Minister Juri Luik, Estonia does not want to have problems with Russia and is prepared for substantial compromises on the border issue, provided that Russia recognizes the Tartu peace treaty and agrees that Estonia was annexed unlawfully in 1940.

According to Luik, Estonia has been supporting from the start the French initiative on concluding the European pact of stability. As he stated, Estonia was hoping that the preparation of this document would help, via intermediaries, to resolve the Estonian-Russian border issue.

According to what Luik said, Estonian-Russian relations have cooled since the Chechen war began. He voiced a fear that events in Chechnya will have a negative effect on Russian domestic policy. In Luik's opinion, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe might be able to help settle the conflict.

Foreign Minister on Talks With France's Juppe*LD2001114095 Tallinn Estonian Television Network in Estonian 1900 GMT 19 Jan 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The main topic at the meeting between Foreign Minister Juri Luik and French Premier [title as heard] Alain Juppe on 18 January was the resolution of the Chechen conflict. Both foreign ministers found that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe must take the lead in resolving the Chechen crisis. [passage omitted]

Here is Luik, on the telephone from Paris.

[Begin Luik recording] It was our fairly common understanding that the Chechen crisis can be resolved only through international mediation. The parties have shed so much blood that it is hard to see any other solution.

We discussed also the CSCE's role on a broader basis. That is, if we say that there is a CSCE mission in Estonia, for example, then it would evidently be more expedient to have one in Russia engaged in the preventive diplomacy for which it has been established.

We also discussed issues to do with Estonia becoming a full member of the European Union. Here, indeed, we have strong support from France. I had already discussed this with Alain Lamassoure. France took over the presidency at a very favorable time for us, and the French are the ones to see Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as, well, as countries firmly inside Europe or as countries that are

members of all the main European organizations—that is, the European Union, the Western European Union, and perhaps later also NATO. So this was pleasant to hear, and this was stated by both ministers. [end recording]

Chechnya Discussed With French Foreign Minister*LD1901201495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1547 GMT 19 Jan 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Jan 19 (Interfax)—The French and Estonian Foreign Ministers met Wednesday [18 January] evening in Tallinn to focus on the situation in Russia and the Chechen conflict, the press service of the Estonian Foreign Ministry told Interfax Thursday.

The two Foreign Ministers favored the possible use of an international mechanism for the solution of the Chechen problem and pinned hope on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. An OSCE mission will be expected to visit Moscow next week but other levers for a non-violent accommodation in Chechnya should not be overlooked either, the Ministers said.

The French Minister for European Affairs told Estonian Foreign Minister Juri Luik Wednesday that France would do its utmost for enable the Baltic republics to join, as associated members, the European Union. France is currently chairing the European Union.

Latvia**'No Information' on Latvian Mercenaries in Chechnya***LD1901192695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1745 GMT 19 Jan 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga January 19 TASS—The press service of the Latvian Government said on Thursday [19 January] that the authorities have no information about Latvian mercenaries taking part in combat actions in Chechnya. The statement of the Latvian Government noted that information "has been more than once circulated by Russian officials and the press service of the Russian Government."

Such statements "in no way contribute to the process of developing normal goodneighbourly relations," the document said.

The statement also said that "the Latvian Government expresses the hope that Russia will cooperate with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and will not put any obstacles in the way of involving this organisation in finding a solution to the conflict".

Bill Approved on Status of Former Soviet Citizens*WS1901154495 Tallinn BNS in English 1248 GMT 19 Jan 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Jan 19, BNS—The Latvian Saeima (parliament) approved Thursday [19

January] in the second reading the bill on the status of former Soviet citizens, who are not citizens of Latvia or any other state.

The Latvia's Way (LC), the Political Union of Economists (TPA), the Democratic Party (DP) and the Popular Concord Party (TSP) factions and the Latvian Farmers Union (LZS) faction deputies Aivars Berkis, Gunars Resnais, Pauls Putnins, the Latvian Christian Democrat Union's deputy Olafs Bruvers and the Equality of Rights faction deputy Larisa Lavina supported approval of the bill.

The Homeland and Freedom faction deputies did not take part in the vote on the bill.

Before the vote on the bill, the Saeima rejected 20 National Bloc deputies' proposal to suspend consideration of the bill and pass over to the next issue of the agenda.

Support for approval of the bill in its second reading was ensured when four Saeima factions (LC, DP, TPA, and TSP) signed Wednesday an agreement protocol on formation of a working group for drafting proposals to the bill in its third reading.

The agreement protocol determines that deputies of other factions will be able to join the working group.

The previous Saeima plenary meeting on Jan. 12 was suspended, because the National Bloc factions, the Equality of Rights and the TSP factions boycotted the vote on the bill.

The bill provides for issuing non-citizen passports to those former Soviet citizens, who lived before July 1, 1992, in Latvia and were termlessly registered in the territory of Latvia.

Non-citizen passports would be issued when presenting personal code of a Latvia resident in the passport of the Soviet citizen.

According to the bill, non-citizen passports will not be issued to persons, who were retired from service in the Russian Army after May 4, 1990, if these persons in the time of the call-up did not permanently reside in the territory of Latvia, as well as their family members who arrived to Latvia in connection with Soviet militaries' service in the Russian Armed Forces.

Parliament Rejects Cabinet Regulations on Aliens

WS2001123395 Tallinn BNS in English 1609 GMT
19 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Jan 19, BNS—Latvian lawmakers rejected Thursday [19 January] Cabinet regulations on travel and stay of aliens and stateless persons in Latvia.

The proposal to revoke the regulations came from Prime Minister Maris Gailis himself who said the document was prepared in haste without due coordination with related legislative acts.

Instead, the government will prepare the bill and submit it to the parliament in the common order. The rejected version was passed as urgent in between parliament sessions.

The regulations were tailored to tackle the problem of Russian military pensioners who were discharged after Jan. 28, 1992.

The mistakeful interpretation referred the document also to those who were discharged after May 4, 1990, and are already included in the Register of Residents.

The regulations, however, were supported by the National Bloc factions, which described them as an efficient means to resolve the issue of military settlers.

In addition, the parliament voted down the urgent regulations on grain market and grain reserve, and amendments to the law on sugar.

Lithuania

Deportation of Russian Citizens Corresponds to Law

LD1901232295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1918
GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, Jan 19 (INTERFAX)— Actions of Lithuania's authorities with respect to the Russian citizens to be deported from the country will correspond to the republic's laws. Chairman of Lithuania's Seimas (parliament) Ceslovas Jurisas declared to Interfax Thursday [19 January].

In its address to Lithuania's Seimas on January 18 Russia's State Duma condemned "the upcoming deportation of a group of citizens of The Russian Federation from the Lithuanian republic."

Lithuania plans to deport Valeriy Ivanov, Vladimir Shorokhov, Aleksandr Kondrashov, and Viktor Orlov who permanently live in the republic. Konstantin Zatulyn, Chairman of the State Duma committee on CIS and Ties with Compatriots, pointed out that the only guilt of these people is that "they do not recognize the collapse of the Soviet Union and keep their Soviet passports."

Jurisas reported that the address of the Russian deputies was handed over to Seimas' Committee on Foreign Affairs and the parliament's reaction will depend upon the proposal of this committee.

Jurisas noted that "the State Duma's reaction towards Lithuania's intention to expel several people, who are undesirable to the republic, is disproportionately exaggerated because there are mass violations of human rights on a terrible scale in Russia itself and the attention of the world's public is attracted to this fact."

Russian Reproach Called 'Most Impudent Demagogy'

WS2001123595 Tallinn BNS in English 1609 GMT
19 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, Jan 19, BNS—If the Russian State Duma wanted to insult every former

Lithuanian exile and every single person who perceives the extent of crimes committed by communists, the aim has been achieved, says Lithuanian Opposition Leader Vytautas Landsbergis.

"Having sensed the weakness of Lithuania's Government, the Russian parliamentary authority took unprecedented measures of pressuring so that Valeri Ivanov, who acted against the Lithuanian state and must go back to his country together with three others who committed crimes and served punishment, be left in Lithuania," Landsbergis said in a statement circulated Thursday [19 January].

The statement came in response to an appeal issued Wednesday by the lower house of the Russian parliament, which asked Lithuania not to deport Ivanov, former leader of the pro-Soviet organization Yedinstvo, and three other former Soviet activists.

In its appeal, the Russian Duma pointed out that deportation, as a means of fighting against ideological opponents, is rejected worldwide.

"This must be especially well known in Lithuania, whose people have suffered from deportations. It would be a

pity if such actions, reviving memories of repressions of the fourth decade, would be associated with the present Lithuania, which declares its commitment to freedom and democracy," the appeal said.

Landsbergis termed the reproach "most impudent demagoguery" in which the mass deportation and extermination of Lithuanians is compared to the planned deportation of Ivanov to a place "where his government will take care of him."

Ivanov and three other former Soviet activists have been asked to leave Lithuania by Jan. 22 on the grounds that their presence may threaten the country's security and public order.

Ivanov has served a three-year prison sentence in Lithuania for participation in the January 1991 failed Soviet coup attempt. After his release last October, Ivanov openly spoke about his intentions to continue political activities and refused to admit having made any mistakes.

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